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ABSTRACT
How police officers exercise their unique power to use deadly force continues to
be a topic of interest among academics and, due to recent events, has moved to the
forefront of public policy concerns. A number of scholars have proposed theories as to
how police officers make the decision to use deadly force, but arguably the most
comprehensive deadly force decision-making framework was put forth by Arnold Binder
and Peter Scharf three and a half decades ago (1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). They
posit that officers’ decision-making processes during an encounter that either includes
police use of deadly force, or could have reasonably included police use of deadly force
but did not, can be broken down into a four-phase model: anticipation, entry and initial
contact, information exchange, and the final frame. Binder and Scharf believe that
decisions made by a police officer during prior phases of the encounter have bearing on
the officer’s final decision regarding whether to use deadly force. Previous work has
referenced this framework when analyzing the differences in decision-making between
officers involved in incidents in which they discharged their weapons and officers who
held fire in incidents wherein no officers shot (Scharf and Binder, 1983; Fridell and
Binder, 1992). Scholars have yet, however, to study decision-making processes during
incidents in which multiple officers are involved, but only some chose to discharge their
weapon. Such an analysis would not only contribute to our understanding of how police
officers make decisions during this type of encounter, but it may also shed light on why,
given the same situation, some officers make different decisions regarding the use of
deadly force.
Using qualitative data collected during interviews with police officers across the
United States who were involved in incidents in which at least one officer discharged his
or her firearm and at least one officer did not, this study assessed the extent to which the
Binder and Scharf deadly force decision-making framework applied to officers’ decisionmaking processes in events where only some officers present chose to shoot. The sample
used in the analysis consisted of 83 police officers: 46 who chose to use deadly force
during their incident and 37 who chose not to use deadly force, but were present when
another officer fired at a suspect.
Initial coding of the interviews summarized each instance of decision-making
using the model proposed by Binder and Scharf (1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). The
initial codes were used to identify when and how decisions were made in each of the four
phases, as well as the situational context in which decisions were made by the
participating officers. A constant comparison method was used to assess the decisionmaking processes of the police officers in the sample. Comparisons were made between
shooters and witness officers as two separate groups and among police officers involved
in the same incident with goal of identifying themes directly related to officers’ decision
to use or not to use deadly force.
By focusing on the decision-making processes of police officers participating in
the same incident, the findings from this study shed light on reasons why, given the same
situation, some officers decided to use deadly force against citizens, while other officers
choose to hold fire. In addition, the way in which the data were collected provided an
opportunity to assess whether and how individual officers’ decision-making processes
were impacted by the presence and decisions made by other officers involved in the same
iii

incident. This is a critical addition to the deadly force literature, as past research on the
topic has viewed the decision by a police officer to use deadly force as an individual
choice and not as one potentially influenced by the presence of, or decisions made by,
other officers on scene.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
As John Goldkamp (1976:169) reminds his readers, “the power to take life exists
not only at the final stage of the criminal justice process where the state may execute
prisoners under the sentence of death,” but it also exists “at the earliest stage where
deadly force may be used by police.” The irreversible nature of the death penalty has led
to stringent and unwavering requirements that all decisions relating to this sentence be
carefully made and scrupulously reviewed after the defendant has received due process,
yet police officers are given the power to make quick decisions to take the life of citizens
(under certain circumstances with no form of prior review whatsoever) (Fyfe, 1981).
Adams (1999:14) states that the capacity of the police to use deadly force is “so central to
understanding police functions” that one could argue it “characterizes the key element of
the police role.”
Officer-involved shootings have long garnered “considerable controversy” by the
media and the public (McElvain and Kposowa, 2008:505). Although the use of deadly
force by the police has been a contentious topic in the United States for some time, a
number of recent high profile cases (including incidents in Ferguson, Missouri,
Cleveland, Ohio, and North Charleston, South Carolina) have moved police use of deadly
force to the forefront of public policy concerns. Criminal justice researchers and policy
makers are now seeking to gain a better understanding of how and why police officers
make the decision to use deadly force against citizens.
We still know relatively little about how often police in the United States use
deadly force (Fyfe, 2002; Klinger, 2012; Sherman and Langworthy, 1979). For we lack a
sound national database for counts of police use of deadly force. While the FBI’s
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Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system does include some information on policecaused deaths, it is a mess. Current data from the UCR states that 461 individuals were
justifiably killed by law enforcement in 2013 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014).
Data provided by UCR aggregate counts and additional details about each homicide event
provided by Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHRs) still fail to capture all homicides
caused by law enforcement, however. The Bureau of Justice Statistics designed the
Arrest-Related Deaths (ARD) program in an attempt to capture all deaths that occurred
during the process of arrest in the United States and a recent evaluation of this program
sought to compare arrest-related death counts from the ARD program and SHR data.
Findings from this evaluation revealed that between 2003 and 2009, the ARD program
only captured, at best, 49 percent of all law enforcement homicides and the SHR only
captured 46 percent (Banks, Couzens, Blanton, and Cribb, 2015). In addition to issues
associated with the aforementioned data sources, assessments of justifiable homicide
counts from another data source, the National Vital Statistics System, also uncovered
underreporting, undercounting, and inconsistencies in citizen deaths at the hands of law
enforcement (Loftin, Wiersema, McDowall, and Dobrin, 2003; Sherman and
Langworthy, 1979).
Not only do we lack accurate counts of the number of citizens killed by the police,
but even if we had a sound count of law enforcement-caused homicides, we would still be
missing a large part of the deadly force picture. The data collected by the aforementioned
methods count only deaths and fail to capture cases in which police used deadly force
that did not result in the death of an individual. This is a big problem because there are
many instances in which police use of deadly force does not result in the death of a
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citizen, but rather a wounding of the suspect or a miss altogether (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and
Scott, 1992; Klinger, 2012). In fact, McManus, Griffin, Wetteroth, Boland, and Hines
(1970:128) state that “relatively few bullets of all those fired [by police] hit the target at
which [they are] aimed.” Instances such as these are not captured in data that are limited
to homicide counts caused by law enforcement. We may not have an accurate count of
how often police use deadly force in the United States, but best estimates, which include
instances in which no one is hit by police bullets but police shots were fired, place this
count at a few thousand per year (Fyfe, 2002; Klinger, 2004).
While national data are poor, researchers have collected and analyzed the
available national data and data in a small number of police agencies seeking to provide
insight into why officers choose to pull the trigger. Scholars have identified individual,
situational, environmental, and organizational factors that may come into play during an
encounter in which an officer decides to fire his or her weapon. Some individual officer
characteristics that have been found to be related to officers’ use of deadly force include
their gender (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), their
race (Binder, Scharf, and Galvin, 1982; Fyfe, 1978; 1981; Geller and Karales, 1981;
Gellar and Scott, 1982; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), their age and rank (Binder et al.,
1982; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), their level of education (McElvain and Kposowa,
2008), and their assignments (Blumberg, 1983; Fyfe, 1978; Gellar and Karales, 1981).
Prior studies have also identified a number of situational factors that influence
officers’ use of deadly force. Characteristics of the suspect involved can have bearing on
an officer’s decision to fire, including the gender of the suspect (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and
Karales, 1981; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008; Milton, Halleck, Lardner, and Albrecht,
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1977), the race of the suspect (Fyfe, 1982a; Geller, 1982; Geller and Karales, 1981;
Goldkamp, 1976; Meyer, 1980; Milton et al., 1982; Robin, 1963, 1964; Sherman, 1982),
the age of the suspect (Fyfe, 1978; Milton et al., 1977), and the suspect’s demeanor
(Binder et al., 1982; Dwyer et al., 1990; Fridell and Binder, 1992; Geller and Karales,
1981). Additional studies have also found connections between the type of crime
committed by a suspect and the use of deadly force by the police (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and
Karales, 1981), whether the suspect was armed (Dwyer et al., 1990; Geller and Karales,
1981; Hayden, 1981; White, 2002), and the type of weapon with which the suspect was
armed (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981; Milton et al., 1977).
A number of environmental factors have been linked to police officers’ use of
deadly force. For example, a number of studies have found that instances of police use of
deadly force coincide with levels of violence (Fyfe, 1982b; Geller and Karales, 1981;
Alpert, 1989), as well as with levels of economic inequality and high minority
concentration within the community (Fyfe, 1978; Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998; Sorensen,
Marquart, and Brock, 1993).
Lastly, findings from a few studies have revealed connections between
organizational policies and police use of deadly force among the officers in the
department. An assessment of officers’ use of deadly force in New York City (Fyfe,
1978) and Los Angeles (Meyer, 1980) revealed that after each department placed
restrictions on “defense of life” and “fleeing felon” policies that had been in practice for
years, the number of officer-involved shootings markedly decreased. Examples of such
restrictions enacted in New York included only using deadly force in defense of life or
when attempting to apprehend an individual suspected of committing a violent felony,
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discontinuing the use of warning shots, and refraining from firing at moving vehicles
(Fyfe, 1978). In 1977, police officers working for the Los Angeles Police Department
were prohibited from firing at suspects who were disobeying orders or appeared to be
reaching for weapons in situations where there had been “no assault and no use, display
or threat of a weapon” (Meyer, 1980:105).
Another strain of research has focused specifically on the decision-making
processes through which officers make choices during a deadly force incident. A number
of scholars have posited theories that seek to explain why police officers choose to use
deadly force. Some have branded the decision to use deadly force as one made in a splitsecond after the officer has exhausted all other options (Geller and Karales, 1981). Others
have argued that an officer’s decision to use or not to use deadly force is influenced by
decisions made by the officer previously in the encounter (Binder and Scharf, 1980;
Reiss, 1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). These theories, however, remain largely untested
to date.
The current study was designed to add to the existing literature on police use of
deadly force by empirically assessing a deadly force decision-making framework
originally proposed by Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf in 1980. This decision-making
framework was used to guide the qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with 83
police officers across the United States who were present at an officer-involved shooting.
The officers in the sample were selected because they were present at an incident in
which one at least officer fired and at least one officer held fire. Of the 83 officers in the
sample, 46 officers fired shots during their incident while 37 did not fire but were present
when a fellow officer took a suspect under fire. The interviews conducted with the 83
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officers were analyzed to determine whether the Binder and Scharf decision-making
model (detailed below) holds true among each of the police officers in the sample. The
data used in this dissertation allowed for an analysis of this deadly force decision-making
framework that has yet to be completed: an assessment of the decision-making processes
of multiple officers involved in the same event, some of whom chose to use deadly force
and some who did not.

DEADLY FORCE DECISION-MAKING MODELS
Academic consideration of how officers come to make the decision to shoot
emerged in the early 1980s. An early conception of deadly force decision-making was
that an officer’s decision to shoot was one that was made in a split-second when the
officer was left with no other option in order to preserve his or her safety or the safety of
citizens. While this “split-second” decision theory may explain how some officers decide
to use deadly force, others have argued that we should be cautious of accepting this
simplistic understanding of deadly force decision-making (Fyfe, 1986; Reiss, 1980). One
of the scholars who opposed this simplistic explanation of the decision to shoot was
Albert Reiss. Reiss (1980:127) argued that although officer-involved shootings are often
conceived as the result of quick decisions, this view does not coincide with the idea that
decisions are “formulated in terms of a series of choices or related decisions” and each
decision “is contingent upon prior choices” made by the individual. Drawing from his
line of thinking, Reiss proposed that an officer’s decision to shoot may be best
understood as the result of a series of sequential choices made by the officer during the
encounter. That is, the series of choices an officer makes during an event can expand or
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restrict the number of choices available to the officer later in the encounter, which may
have direct bearing on his or her decision to use deadly force (Reiss, 1980). Reiss does
acknowledge, however, the difficulty in breaking down an officer’s decision-making
process and pinpointing specific “choice points” during a process that often unfolds in a
very short amount of time (Reiss, 1980:128). According to this line of thinking then, the
task should be to focus on identifying possible factors of the police-citizen encounter that
influence officers’ decision-making and the outcome of the incident.
Taking Reiss’ considerations into account, two scholars sought to advance the
notion of a deadly force decision-making process and aimed to identify key factors that
affect how officers make decisions during potentially violent interactions with citizens.
Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf argued that police officers’ decisions regarding the use of
deadly force are best explained as the result of a series of decisions made by officers
during specific temporal frames throughout encounters with citizens (Binder and Scharf,
1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). More specifically, Binder and Scharf state that the
deadly force decision-making process can be best described as involving four phases
wherein decisions made by officers in previous phases can impact the decisions they
make in subsequent ones.
The first phase of their model, the anticipation phase, begins when an officer is
made aware of an incident, either through a call into dispatch, personal observation while
out on patrol, or some other avenue. Once the officer arrives on scene and begins to make
direct observations of the situation at hand, he or she has initiated the entry and initial
contact phase. If the officer decides to make verbal or physical contact with the suspect,
he or she enters the information exchange phase of the incident. During this phase, the
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officer communicates with the suspect, often in an attempt to gain compliance. The point
at which the officer decides to fire his or her weapon or decides that the use of deadly
force is not necessary is the final frame phase of the event.
Empirical assessments of Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making
framework have provided some support for their model. Scharf and Binder (1983)
assessed their own framework by analyzing qualitative data gathered in interviews with
officers involved in police-citizen encounters. Some of these officers used deadly force
and others were involved in other situations in which deadly force could have reasonably
been used, but officers opted to hold their fire. Binder and Scharf then compared the
decision-making processes of officers who shot with those who arguably could have used
deadly force but refrained from doing so. Binder and Scharf reported that regardless of
the outcome, the decision-making processes of all police officers involved in potentially
violent police-citizen encounters follow the four-phase framework they had originally
proposed.
The findings from Scharf and Binder’s assessment advanced scholarly
understanding of deadly force decision-making, but were limited. To make comparisons
between officers in different situations who chose to shoot and officers who chose not to
shoot, Scharf and Binder (1983) attempted to control for situational differences by
matching incidents based on similar characteristics. For example, in one instance, the
authors compared a case involving a middle-aged woman armed with a knife who was
shot by police with another case involving a middle-aged woman armed with a knife who
was not shot by police.
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Drawing from the cases from the original Scharf and Binder study, Fridell and
Binder (1992:389) assessed the Binder and Scharf framework. Again, these data were
collected from officer-involved shootings, as well as from police-citizen confrontations
“in which a police shooting reasonably could have been expected but did not occur,” and
found support for Binder and Scharf’s four-phase decision-making model. Their findings
suggest, among other things, that the decisions made by officers in the information
exchange phase of the encounter are critical as they relate to the officer’s final decision to
use or not use deadly force.
Although not directly assessing the Binder and Scharf framework, White (2002)
briefly references the model in his study of officer-involved shootings among officers in
Philadelphia during two time periods (1970-1978 and 1987-1993).1 White found that
police officers were more likely to use deadly force earlier in the encounter (e.g., when
they first entered the scene or made contact with the suspect) when confronted with a
gun-wielding suspect. Although he does not dwell on this finding, he does acknowledge
that it is applicable to Binder and Scharf’s multi-phase decision-making framework and
that early decisions made by officers attending to a “man with a gun” call (e.g.,
maintaining distance between himself/herself and the gun-wielding suspect, finding
cover2) can escalate or reduce the likelihood of a police shooting.
While the aforementioned studies have contributed to the understanding of how
police officers make decisions during high-risk police-citizen encounters, there are
notable limitations to these works. While Binder and Scharf sought to assess police
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White’s 2002 analysis was only limited to incidents in which police gunfire occurred and did not account
for instances in which officers arguably could have fired, but did not.
2 “Cover” can be defined as a large object or fortification that provides a officer protection from potential
dangers.
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officers’ deadly force decision-making processes by comparing cases wherein at least one
officer shot to cases with similar situational circumstances in which at least one officer
held fire, the fact remains that these officers did not participate in the same incident.3
Therefore, one can make a strong argument that important unaccounted for situational
differences in Binder and Scharf’s comparison analysis could have impacted officers’
decision-making.
An additional factor that many past studies on deadly force decision-making have
failed to address, including Binder and Scharf’s work, is how the presence of other
officers may impact an individual officer’s decision-making. Specifically, if a policecitizen encounter involves multiple officers, do the decisions of one officer impact the
decision-making processes of the other officers present? A number of scholars, such as
Klinger (1997) and Walsh (1986), have emphasized the fact that a lot of police work is
done in groups. That is, many aspects of police work require officers to work with one
another to draft solutions and solve problems. It seems reasonable to assume that this
same notion of “group work” can be applied to situations involving a high potential for
deadly force. While some such incidents are limited to one officer and one suspect, many
involve multiple officers (Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom, and Deckard, 2016; White 2002).
Therefore, in congruence with its recognition in other aspects of police work, it seems a
reasonable task to assess how different officers involved in the same incident make
choices during events that result in police use of deadly force.

3

A notable exception to this were the few instances in which the authors describe incidents involving one
specialized unit from Newark comprised of multiple officers. The individual decision-making processes of
each of the officers involved, however, were not discussed.
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OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
The sequential deadly force decision-making model put forth by Binder and
Scharf seeks to account for the various factors that may impact an officer’s decision to
use deadly force. The current study, therefore, was an empirical assessment of the
applicability of the four-phase decision-making framework proposed by Binder and
Scharf (1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). Data from interviews with 83 police officers
across the United States who were involved in an incident that resulted in police use of
deadly force were analyzed. This subset of 83 interviews, drawn from a larger sample of
218 interviews, included responses from multiple officers involved in 24 incidents that
concluded in police use of deadly force.
This sample was selected to assess the Binder and Scharf deadly force decisionmaking model for a number of reasons. First, the sample of 83 officers included multiple
officers involved in the same distinct incidents, some of whom chose to fire and some of
whom chose to hold fire. Second, although Scharf and Binder (1983) were able to assess
their framework by comparing the decision-making processes of officers involved in
similar incidents, they were not able to assess differences in the decision-making process
among police officers involved in the same incident. The qualitative data used in this
dissertation allowed for the analysis of the decision-making processes of multiple officers
who were involved in the same event, yet differed in regard to their use of deadly force.
By accounting for situational differences, the analysis was designed to shed light on
whether differences in the decision to use deadly force among the officers involved in the
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same event is primarily due to significant differences in the decisions they made
throughout the incident.
Third, by studying officer-involved shootings in groups, I was able to examine the
effect that the presence of other officers on scene played in how and why police officers
made decisions regarding the use deadly force during a potentially violent police-citizen
encounter. This is a factor that was not accounted for in Binder and Scharf’s original
model, but which might impact how police officers made decisions and moved through
the decision-making framework proposed by the authors.
In sum, this analysis was conducted to provide additional insight as to whether
police officers involved in deadly force incidents complete the decision-making process
as outlined by Binder and Scharf and if the factors identified by the authors do, in fact,
directly impact officers’ decision-making. Therefore, the first question my dissertation
was designed to answer is:
Do the decision-making processes completed by the different police officers involved in
the same incident follow the deadly force decision-making framework as proposed by
Binder and Scharf?
Because both “shooters” and “witness officers” (i.e., officers in the sample who
did not use deadly force but were present at an event in which a fellow police officer used
deadly force) were interviewed, these data allow for the analysis of decision-making
processes among officers involved in the same incident who made different decisions
regarding whether to use deadly force. The second question this dissertation was
designed to answer is: Given the same situation, do stark differences in how police
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officers move through the Binder and Scharf decision-making process account for why
some officers chose to use deadly force and some chose not to use deadly force?
The data also allowed for an analysis of decision-making at the incident-level.
One factor that could influence officers’ decision-making during a high risk policecitizen encounter, but is not identified in the Binder and Scharf framework as a factor, is
the presence of other officers. One could argue that the presence of other officers and the
decisions they make could have the potential to influence the decisions made by an
officer in early stages of the incident, which in turn may influence that officer’s decision
to use deadly force in the final frame. Therefore, the third and final question this
dissertation was designed to answer is: How does the presence of other police officers
affect the choices made by an individual officer during a deadly force incident?
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CHAPTER TWO: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE
Police are entrusted with the power and authority to use coercive force when
necessary (Bittner, 1970). Although police rarely decide to use deadly force, the social
impact of this decision is great and our society has a vested interest in understanding how
police officers decide when to exercise such power. Research on police use of deadly
force has examined various factors that may influence officers’ use of deadly force,
including individual, situational, and organizational elements. Many of the early studies
cited in the subsequent sections of the literature review assessed officers’ use of deadly
force within a single department (Fyfe, 1978, 1982b; Geller and Karales, 1981; Hayden,
1981; Robin, 1963; Rubenstein, 1977). As deadly force research progressed, scholars
were able to access data from multiple departments, make comparisons within and across
departments, and gather information pertaining to the suspect, the situation, and officerprovided explanations regarding why deadly force was used.

INDIVIDUAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS
Scholars have analyzed the individual characteristics of the officer in relation to
the use of deadly force, including police officers’ gender (McElvain and Kposowa,
2008), race (Binder, Scharf, and Galvin, 1982; Fyfe, 1978; 1981; Geller and Karales,
1981; Geller and Scott, 1982; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), officers’ level of education
(Aamodt, 2004; Binder et al., 1982), officers’ age and rank (Binder et al., 1982; Geller
and Karales, 1981; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), and their assignments (Blumberg,
1983; Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981).
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Findings from a number of studies have revealed that male officers are more
likely to use deadly force than female officers (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981;
McElvain and Kposowa, 2008). This finding is consistent with what is known about
officer behavior and use of other types of force. For example, Alpert and Dunham’s
(2004) assessment of force used by officers in Prince George’s County Police
Department revealed that female officers were more likely to use lower levels of force,
such as verbal commands or defensive force against suspects if necessary, compared to
their male counterparts. The small number of cases that resulted in police use of deadly
force in their sample all involved male officers.
Regarding officers’ race, scholars who have assessed the use of deadly force
among police departments in New York (Fyfe, 1978), Chicago (Geller and Karales,
1981), and Riverside, California (McElvain and Kposowa, 2008) found that most police
officers involved in shooting incidents, regardless of the race of the perpetrator, were
white. Conversely, these studies also revealed that most suspects involved in police
shootings, regardless of the race of the officer, were black (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and
Karales, 1981; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008). As Fyfe (1978) notes, however, these
findings could be consistent with the fact that policing has been a white male-dominated
occupation, and therefore, white males are more likely to be involved in deadly force
incidents.
Interestingly, given the prominence of white officers among shooters, a number of
studies have also found that black and Hispanic officers are disproportionately involved
in shootings when compared to their representation in the department (Fyfe, 1978; Geller
and Karales, 1981). Geller and Karales (1981) reported that minority-race officers in
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Chicago (e.g., black and Hispanic) were more likely than white officers to shoot civilians.
These findings could be connected to the fact that minority officers were more likely to
live in and be assigned to high-crime areas of the city, therefore increasing the likelihood
of being involved in an incident that may conclude in the use of deadly force (Fyfe, 1978;
Geller and Karales, 1981).
Results from prior research have also identified relationships between experience,
officers’ rank, and use of deadly force. McElwain and Kposowa (2008) report that the
risk of being involved in a shooting decreases for police officers as they age and their
years of experience in law enforcement increase. Fyfe (1978) found that officers in
supervisory positions were less likely to use deadly force than patrol officers and
detectives. In their assessment of officers who had used deadly force in Chicago, Geller
and Karales (1981) found that line officers were more likely to use deadly force when
compared to officers in supervisory positions. This finding, however, may be best
explained by the fact that officers in supervisory positions are less likely to be out on the
street and interacting with citizens when compared to line officers (Geller and Karales,
1981). Finally, an officer’s assignment may have direct bearing on their likelihood of
being involved in a deadly force incident. For example, Geller and Karales (1981)
reported that officers assigned to special operations groups, tactical units, and robbery
units were far more likely than officers assigned to any other unit to shoot civilians while
on duty in Chicago.
Some researchers have also analyzed the characteristics of the suspects involved
in police shootings. In regards to gender, officer-involved shooting suspects
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overwhelmingly tend to be male (Fyfe, 19784; Geller and Karales, 1981; McElvain and
Kpowosa, 2007; Milton et al., 1977). The picture is not so clear where the race of the
suspect goes. Findings from early studies on police use of deadly force suggest that
minorities are disproportionately targeted by the police (Fyfe, 1982a; Geller, 1982; Geller
and Karales, 1981; Goldkamp, 1976; Meyer, 1980; Milton et al., 1982; Robin, 1963,
1964; Sherman, 1982). Some scholars, however, have argued that this disproportionality
can be explained by situational and environmental factors. In New York City, for
example, Fyfe (1978) found that although blacks made up a disproportionate share of the
suspects in officer-involved shootings, they were also more likely to have been armed
with a firearm and engaged in a robbery at the time of the shooting. This finding, Fyfe
(1978:141) argued, suggests that police officers do not have “one trigger finger for whites
and another for blacks,” noting that the disproportionate number of minority suspects in
police shootings could be due to factors other than racial discrimination or police
misconduct.
The findings of racial disproportionality may also be explained by the higher
levels of violent crime and the lower levels of cooperation with law enforcement that are
typically found in communities with primarily minority residents, which in turn may lead
to an increase in officers’ use of lethal force (Geller and Karales, 1981; Robin, 1964).
Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) argue that the environment in which officer-involved
shootings take place needs to be accounted for, as they found that police shootings are
more likely to occur in large, more populated cities with higher levels of race inequality.

4

Fyfe’s (1978) analysis of shooting suspects in New York City found that although females were present
at officer-involved shootings, a male accompanied most all of them at the time of the shooting.
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The racial effects captured in past studies could also be due to a greater number of
officers being assigned to areas with higher rates of violent crime and increased number
of calls for service, which also tend to be areas characterized by low socioeconomic
status and high percentages of minority residents (Geller and Karales, 1981; McElvain
and Kposowa, 2008). This can create an environment in which the police begin to
associate violent crime with the underclass and minority residents, causing members of
the underclass and minority residents to feel “over-policed” by law enforcement,
therefore creating feelings of resistance toward the police. This then may lead to an
increase in situations in which citizens attack officers, thus concluding in police use of
deadly force (McElvain and Kposowa, 2008).
Finally, the age of the suspect has been another factor linked to officer-involved
shootings. In their analysis of officer-involved shootings in seven U.S. cities, Milton and
colleagues (1977) found that almost three-quarters of the shooting victims were under the
age of 30, and 50 percent were under the age of 24. An analysis of deadly force incidents
in New York City revealed similar findings, as more than half of the suspects on which
age data were available were less than 24 years old at the time they were involved in a
police shooting (Fyfe, 1978).
Research on police-shooting suspects also suggests that most are armed at the
time of the police shooting. Fyfe’s (1978) analysis of deadly force incidents in New York
City revealed that the majority of suspects shot at were armed with handguns at the time
of the shooting. Milton and colleagues (1977) found that 57 percent of the suspects
involved in the shootings they examined were armed at the time the officer fired. Geller
and Karales (1981) found that the majority of the police officers in Chicago who
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intentionally used deadly force reported being threatened by a perpetrator with a gun at
the time they decided to fire.
Furthermore, scholars have also found relationships between police use of deadly
force and the type of incident to which officers are responding. Assessments of officerinvolved shootings in New York City (Fyfe, 1978) Chicago (Geller and Karales, 1981),
and Philadelphia (Robin, 1963) revealed that the type of incident in which police most
often used deadly force was armed robbery. In contrast, Milton and colleagues (1977)
found that the most common type of incident in which deadly force was used in seven
U.S. cities involved disturbance calls (i.e., family quarrels, fights, assaults, disturbed
persons, reports of an individual with a gun).
Most recently, White (2002) conducted a multivariate analysis of situational
factors related to officer-involved shootings using data from the Philadelphia Police
Department. He argues that such an analysis was necessary because many previous
studies on situational factors and police use of deadly force have only assessed simple
bivariate relationships, ignoring “more complex and likely important multivariate
relationships” (White, 2002:726). His results indicate that the type of incident in which
an officer is involved is a critically important predictor of deadly force. For example,
“man with gun,” robbery, and disturbance calls were more likely to conclude with an
officer-involved shooting.
As previously stated, deadly force data are often difficult to come by. To identify
situational characteristics that play into officers’ decision to use force then, some scholars
have used vignettes and asked participating officers to identify which situational factors
they would consider if they found themselves in a similar situation in real life. In one

19

such study, Hayden (1981) provided officers in a police department with brief synopses
of three situations and asked officers to identify, in the order of importance, which
situational factors would most impact their decision to use deadly force. Participating
officers who reported that they would have used deadly force in each scenario
consistently selected five situational factors that affected their decision: the type of
weapon the suspect had, the location of the interaction, the physical distance between the
officer and the suspect, the availability of back-up, and whether cover was available to
the officer (Hayden, 1981). These results suggest that regardless of the differences in the
situations posed to the officers, most officers considered the same type of information
and attached similar weight to the aforementioned factors.
Similarly, Dwyer and colleagues (1990) provided a sample of police officers with
written scenarios, asking officers to read each scenario and then decide whether they
would a) refrain from drawing their weapon, b) draw their weapon, c) draw their weapon
and aim it at the suspect, or d) shoot the suspect. Officers were then asked to explain why
they chose the action they did. Based on these responses, the authors found four
situational factors that significantly predicted the likelihood that officers would shoot: (1)
the suspect had a weapon, (2) the suspect intended to harm the officer, (3) the suspect
was committing a felony, and (4) the suspect was leaving a building.

COMMUNITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL FACTORS
Past studies have looked at community context and how it relates to deadly force
and found positive relationships between levels of violence in the community and the
shooting behavior of police officers (Fyfe, 1986; Geller and Karales, 1981; Jacobs and
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O’Brien, 1998). That is, a number of scholars have reported strong relationships between
officer-involved shootings and violent crime rates and homicide rates in the area (Fyfe,
1978, 1986; Sherman and Langworthy, 1979; Matulia, 1985). As previously mentioned,
police shootings tend to occur in high-crime areas characterized by high concentrations of
minorities and high levels of economic inequality (Fyfe, 1978; Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998;
Kania and Mackey, 1977; Sorensen, Marquart, and Brock, 1993; Waegel, 1984). Jacobs
and O’Brien (1978) argue that as economic inequality within the community increases, so
too will police use of lethal force. It is the “disparities in economic rewards” that tend to
“produce potentially unstable social order,” which needs to be quelled by force on the
part of the police (Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998:843). Regarding high minority
concentrations within a community, some have posited that dominant populations are
threatened in areas characterized by a large racial underclass (Blalock, 1967), causing
fear of crime to increase. Police departments then may be more likely to use coercive
force against members of a minority population in response to the growing fear of crime
within the community (Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998).
Lastly, past studies have found relationships between organizational
characteristics and police use of deadly force. Lee and Vaughn (2010) detailed how
administrative failures, such as a breakdown of division of labor, authority, and control,
may contribute to officers’ use of deadly force. In addition, deadly force policy within
police departments can affect officers’ use of lethal force. Fyfe (1980) in New York City
and Meyer (1980) in Los Angeles found a decrease in officers’ use of deadly force after
more restrictive policies were implemented in their respective police departments.
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In 1977, the New York City Police Department provided detailed guidelines for
when their officers could use deadly force in “defense of life” or “fleeing felon” cases.
These guidelines stated that NYPD officers could use deadly force provided that every
other means of coercion was utilized before they fire their weapon, officers could no
longer fire if said gunfire would place innocent citizens in harm’s way, officers could not
fire warning shots, they could not fire their weapon from a moving vehicle, or discharge
their firearm to summon the assistance of other officers (Fyfe, 1978). The NYPD also
established a review board consisting of the Chief of Operations of the police department
and two deputy police commissioners who had the ability to review each officer-involved
shooting (Fyfe, 1978). The board was permitted to conduct hearings if need be,
interviewing civilian witnesses to the shooting, the officer(s) involved, and supervisors of
the officer(s) involved. An analysis of the officer-involved shootings in New York City
revealed “a considerable reduction” in the frequency of police shootings after these
guidelines were established (Fyfe, 1978).
Meyer (1980) found similar results in his assessment of officer-involved
shootings in Los Angeles. In 1977, the Los Angeles Police Department adopted a policy
restricting the shooting of fleeing felons unless the police officer knew that the suspect
had committed a felony involving the death or serious bodily injury of another individual.
Although the department saw a decrease in officer-involved shootings prior to the new
restrictions taking into effect in 1977, the kinds of incidents that were specifically
restricted by the new policy (e.g., using deadly force against non-violent fleeing felons,
firing at suspects who disobeyed orders or made furtive gestures as if reaching for
weapons) substantially declined (Meyer, 1980). Such findings have led a number of
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scholars to encourage police departments to establish clear guidelines and procedures
outlining officers’ discretion to use deadly force (Fyfe, 1980) and to place more
restrictions on when officers are authorized to use deadly force (Fyfe, 1982b; Gellar and
Karales, 1981; Reiss, 1980).

DEADLY FORCE DECISION-MAKING THEORIES
A number of theories have been proposed to explain how police officers make the
decision to use deadly force. The two most commonly referenced vary in terms of when
in the incident the decision to fire one’s weapon occurs, how long it takes for an officer to
make such a decision, and the various factors that influence an officer’s decision to pull
the trigger. The following section will be devoted to reviewing two deadly force decisionmaking theories.
SPLIT-SECOND DECISION-MAKING
Geller and Karales (1981) note that early conceptualizations of deadly force
decision-making revolved around the “split-second” model. This was the belief that there
is a decision point during a deadly force incident at which an officer decides to fire his or
her weapon and that this decision is often made “only at the last moment when the citizen
had failed to heed all warnings” (Reiss, 1980: 127). This assumption may have been
grounded in the fact that all too often, police officers do not attempt to diagnose problems
until they find themselves in the middle of one (Fyfe, 1986). Assessing police use of
deadly force through this split-second lens, however, fails to account for other factors that
may contribute to officers’ decision-making during this type of encounter, such as
decisions made early in the encounter (Fyfe, 1986; Reiss, 1980). The split-second
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decision-making theory ignores the possibility that the decision to use deadly force is
influenced by other decisions made by the officer previously in the encounter that may
have decreased the number of other available options for the officer (Fyfe, 1986; Reiss,
1980). That is, if the analysis of officers’ decision to use deadly force is reduced to one
point in time during which a decision to pull the trigger is made, this suggests that the
decisions made by officers earlier in the encounter had no bearing on his or her decision
to fire. By focusing only on the point at which an officer makes this decision, this
narrows attention to only one frame of the incident and fails to account for anything that
occurred previously (Fyfe, 1986).
All police-citizen encounters that result in an officer-involved shooting are
different and while some may be prolonged events, such as a hostage situation, others
may begin and conclude in a matter of minutes or seconds. Fyfe (1986:477) argues,
however, that in most police-citizen contacts, police officers often have time “to attempt
to prevent the potential for danger from being realized.” Because most police officers are
dispatched to scenes of potential violence (as opposed to already being present when
violence erupts), officers can use the time between when they are assigned to a location
and when they arrive on scene “to avoid split-second decisions” by using the information
they have been given by dispatch to diagnose the problem and consider possible solutions
(Fyfe, 1986:477). Such considerations may impact the officer’s decision to request back
up, where he or she will park their vehicle upon arrival, how close the officer is to
available cover and concealment, and how the officer will approach the perpetrator. All
of these decisions, in turn, may impact whether or not an officer may find himself or
herself in a position later in the encounter where deadly force is necessary.
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Because the “split-second syndrome” viewpoint fails to consider a number of
potential influences on officers’ deadly force decision-making, Reiss (1980) encouraged
scholars to view police use of deadly force as the result of multiple decisions made by an
officer during an incident. He refers readers to sequential decision theory, stating that this
model “focuses both upon the options or alternatives attached to each decision and how
each decision affects subsequent ones” (Reiss, 1980:127). That is, each decision made by
the individual is contingent upon prior decisions he or she has made. Decisions made by
an officer during police-citizen encounters can either increase or decrease the number of
potential options available to the officer, as well as the number of potential solutions to
the issue at hand. According to Reiss (1980), when the number of available alternatives to
deadly force are narrowed by decisions made by an officer earlier in the encounter, the
officer may find himself or herself at “a point of no return” in regards to the use of deadly
force, therefore substantially increasing the likelihood that deadly force will be used
(127). Fyfe (1986) echoes this notion, arguing that police officers should be trained as
diagnosticians and be provided with the decision-making skills necessary to assess and
diagnose problems, consider all possible solutions, and be cognizant of the fact that each
decision they make has the potential to expand or constrict the options they will have
available to them later in the encounter.

THE BINDER AND SCHARF DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
In 1980, Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf sought to advance the notion that a
police officer’s decision to use deadly force is best described as “a contingent sequence
of decisions and resulting behaviors” that “[increase] or [decrease] the probability of an
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eventual use of deadly force” (116). Potentially violent police-citizen encounters often
require officers to make important decisions in a short amount of time and complex social
forces may explain why one officer may choose to use deadly force while another may
not (Scharf and Binder, 1983). To best understand how officers make decisions during
such an event and how decisions made previously in the encounter can impact subsequent
decisions made by the officer, Binder and Scharf believe that the police-citizen encounter
must be analyzed using a framework consisting of four phases: anticipation, entry and
initial contact, information exchange, and the final decision.5 A visual of this framework
is provided in Figure 1. Binder and Scharf also identify a number of factors, which they
refer to as “social influences”, that they believe impact officers’ decision-making in each
of the four phases. Figure 2 provides an overview of these influences. The subsequent
paragraphs will provide a detailed explanation of each of the figures below:

Figure 1: The Binder and Scharf Deadly Force Decision-Making Framework

Conscious decision to shoot

Information
Exchange
Anticipation

Entry & Initial
Contact

Final Frame
No
Information
Exchange

5

Conscious decision to hold
fire
Not a conscious decision to
shoot

This phase model was modified in their 1983 book, wherein the authors referred to the final decision
phase as the “final frame” and added a fifth phase, the aftermath (Scharf and Binder, 1983). This fifth phase
will not be included in the analysis, as it occurs after the officers’ decision to use or not use deadly force
and thus is not relevant to the focus of this project.
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Figure 2: The Binder and Scharf Deadly Force Decision-Making Framework with
accompanying social influences (as originally proposed by the authors in 1980 and
subsequently updated in 1983)
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•
Safety and timing
•
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Phase 4

Anticipation, the first phase of the incident, occurs as the encounter is being
initiated and includes the time from notification, or dispatch, to the arrival of the officer
on scene. During this phase, officers may receive information about the incident, the
caller, or the suspect from a dispatcher, a fellow officer, or a citizen. Furthermore, “the
words used by others to describe the opponent” to the officer “may greatly affect the
[approach] that the officer takes toward the incident” (Scharf and Binder, 1983:112).
According to Binder and Scharf, officers often use the information they receive
during the anticipation phase to develop a working definition of the situation they are
about to enter (Scharf and Binder, 1983). During this phase then, the authors hypothesize
that the mode, quality, and credibility of the information officers receive about the
incident or the suspect involved eventually influences the outcome of the incident (as
demonstrated in Figure 2 above). That is, police officers’ decision-making in this first
phase may be influenced by matters such as: from whom they receive the information
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(e.g., dispatch, another officer, or a citizen), the quality of the information they receive
(e.g., amount of detail about the situation and/or suspect involved), and how credible or
accurate they believe that information to be.
For example, Scharf and Binder (1983) note that citizens may distort the
information they give police officers during the initial call in order to ensure that their
call is a high priority and police attend to their issue as soon as possible. A citizen
observing a prowler on their property may call the police and report a “man with a gun,”
knowing that this will be labeled a high priority call (Scharf and Binder, 1983). Because
this information has come from a citizen, an officer may not give credence to the “man
with a gun” report from the citizen, instead opting to “downplay” the call because past
experience tells the officer “that all calls are exaggerated” (Scharf and Binder, 1983:119).
On the other hand, the officer may trust in the information reported by the citizen caller
and over-anticipate the seriousness of the incident, leading him or her to prepare for a
confrontation with an armed individual upon arrival on scene. In sum, Scharf and Binder
(1983) believe these early understandings of the situation and how and what information
officers choose to process can impact officers’ decision-making during this initial phase.
Upon arriving on scene, officers enter the entry and initial contact6 phase of the
encounter. During this phase, officers may make a number of decisions, such as how or
when to approach the citizen, as well as gather information about the suspect and the
situation at hand through direct observation. Binder and Scharf believe a number of
factors may play a role in officers’ decision-making during the entry phase, including the
amount of distance between the officer and the perpetrator, the availability of cover, and
6

Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, the entry and initial contact phase will be referred to as the
entry phase for the sake of brevity.
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the physical appearance of the perpetrator (Scharf and Binder, 1983). Once the officer
has arrived on scene during this phase, Scharf and Binder believe the officer immediately
seeks to expand the options available to him or her. An example of this would be finding
a good position on scene (e.g., not too close to the suspect) and seeking out cover. The
authors provide a number of examples in which police officers fired at suspects because
they were not protected by cover and in close proximity to the armed individual, thus
leaving the officer exposed to serious harm at the hands of the suspect. In these cases, the
officers’ early decisions to not seek cover and distance upon arrival on scene directly
influenced their later decision to fire.
It is also during the entry and initial contact phase that officers are able to confirm
or disregard previous information that they received in the anticipation phase, an action
Scharf and Binder (1983) identify as being pivotal to determining the outcome of the
situation. In some cases, this may mean that the situation to which officers were
originally alerted is not as serious as they considered it might be. The authors provide
readers with an example of an officer receiving a call about a man with a gun attempting
to murder another individual. Once the officer arrived on scene however, he observed
that the man wielding the pistol was so intoxicated that the officer “didn’t think he could
hit me with that gun” and that this situation was “not what I expected from dispatch”
(Scharf and Binder, 1983:123).
Alternatively, police officers can arrive on scene and directly observe situational
characteristics that suggest a far greater degree of danger than they had initially
considered (Scharf and Binder, 1983). Another example provided by the authors involved
officers who received a call about a domestic dispute between a man and a woman. They
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received information that the female wanted the male out of her house and was insisting
that one of the items he was trying to leave with was hers, inciting an argument between
the two. The officers reported that they “were expecting a nothing thing,” but upon
arrival observed the male throwing things and threatening the officers with a broken
bottle and a kitchen knife (Scharf and Binder, 1983:124). In both cases, officers used
their direct observations of the scene and the situation to adjust their original definition of
the situation and ultimately used the new definition to guide their decision-making.
Scharf and Binder (1983) note that many, but not all, police-citizen encounters
have a third phase, the information exchange, during which the officer and the suspect
communicate. This communication may be verbal, such as the officer issuing commands
to the suspect, or it may be non-verbal, such as the officer and the suspect exchanging
looks or adjusting their postures based on the presence of the other party. This exchange
can last seconds or hours depending on the situation. For example, an officer may issue a
command to the suspect and the suspect complies with the officer’s command. In such a
case, the information exchange phase might last mere seconds. In a more complex
encounter, such as a hostage situation, the information exchange phase may last for hours
while officers attempt to resolve the situation at hand. Information provided to the officer
by the suspect, the body language of the officer and the suspect, the type of
communication made by the officer, and changes in the level of control the officer has
over the situation are all factors that may influence an officer’s decision-making during
this phase (as noted in Figure 2).
For example, Scharf and Binder (1983:126) argue that the body language of the
suspect “may be critically important in determining the outcome of some situations.” If
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the suspect takes an aggressive stance toward the officer or abruptly advances at the
officer, the officer may interpret this as a threat, which will guide his or her decisionmaking at this point. Conversely, the authors also note that police officers’ body language
can be equally as important during this phase (Scharf and Binder, 1983). A citizen may
interpret an officer’s body language as being “unreasonably violent,” leading the citizen
“to fight to defend himself” (Scharf and Binder, 1983:126). Thus, the decisions officers
make regarding their approach to communication with the suspect, both verbal and nonverbal, during this phase of the encounter can expand or constrict the decisions and
options available to the officer. Scharf and Binder (1983) note that the information
exchange phase provides officers with the opportunity to prevent the suspect from hurting
himself or herself, as well as other officers, through non-lethal means.
If the situation cannot be solved through communication or other less-lethal
means, police officers may consider the use of deadly force. Scharf and Binder (1983)
believe that at some point during the encounter the officer will make the decision to
either use deadly force or decide that the use of deadly force is not necessary, thus
entering the final frame phase. This decision might be deliberate and planned, as
exemplified in a sniper operation, or this decision “might simply be the reflexive
squeezing of the trigger” (Scharf and Binder, 1983: 115). Regardless of whether an
officer decides to shoot or not to shoot, Scharf and Binder (1983) believe that this
decision can be influenced by the perpetrator’s movements, implied dangers to others on
scene as perceived by the officer, and the officer’s assessment regarding the degree to
which the suspect is an immediate threat.
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In sum, as one can see when referencing Figure 1, Binder and Scharf posit that
decisions made by officers involved in high-risk police-citizen encounter can be
classified as occurring in one of the four phases. The authors believe that officers’
decisions and actions follow this linear four-phase model, thus making it an optimal
framework through which to analyze deadly force decision-making.
After initially proposing this model in a 1980 article, Scharf and Binder expanded
on their model in their 1983 publication. Using narratives collected from police officers
involved in shootings and officers who had been involved in high-risk situations during
which they opted to hold fire, the authors found evidence of officers’ decision-making
being predicated on decisions made earlier in the encounter. While the stories from
shooters and non-shooters were drawn from different incidents, Scharf and Binder
attempted to compare the decision-making of officers who shot to the decision-making of
officers who held fire by selecting officers involved in incidents that shared situational
similarities, including the behavior of the suspect(s) toward the officer and the type of
weapon possessed by the suspect.
In their 1992 article, Fridell and Binder also assessed the Binder and Scharf
deadly force decision-making model using the same data utilized in Scharf and Binder’s
1983 analysis of their own model. They found that incidents characterized by surprise or
ambiguities, such as not having information about the suspect(s) involved, the inability to
determine the mental state of the suspect, and failure to consider early on that the
situation could end in police gunfire, were more likely to result in a shooting.
Furthermore, their findings suggested that the information exchange phase of an incident
is a “critical point in the process” (Fridell and Binder, 1992:393). That is, officers’
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communication with the suspect played a large role in their decision to fire or hold fire.
For example, roughly 44 percent of shooters in their sample reported that communication
during this phase of the incident did not help to diffuse the situation, but rather made their
opponent “much angrier” (Fridell and Binder, 1992:395). This anger and non-compliance
on the part of the suspect may have increased the likelihood that these situations
concluded in police gunfire. On the other hand, the authors found that roughly 20 percent
of the non-shooting officers said that communication made their opponent “much
calmer” (Fridell and Binder, 1992:395). This calmness could have encouraged these
suspects to comply with officers’ commands, which may have eliminated the need for
officers in these situations to use deadly force.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
While the Binder and Scharf model has been assessed using data from officers
who chose to use deadly force and those who could have but chose not to (Fridell and
Binder, 1992; Scharf and Binder, 1983), the data used in prior studies to assess this
decision-making model did not include shooters and non-shooters who participated in the
same incident. Using this model to assess the decision-making of officers involved in the
same incident may provide insight into why, given the same situation, some officers
choose to fire, while others do not. What accounts for this within-situation difference in
use of deadly force? Is the difference in outcome due to differences in decision-making
that occurred in earlier phases of the encounter? Do officers who ultimately choose to use
deadly force consider factors not considered by officers who choose not to shoot?
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Although a number of scholars have emphasized the importance of understanding
how officers make decisions during police-citizen encounters (Alpert and Rojek, 2011;
Binder and Scharf, 1980; Fridell and Binder, 1992; Reiss, 1980; Scharf and Binder,
1983), few have had access to the type of data necessary to complete such an analysis.
That is, one would need data that identifies the cues that officers see during a potentially
violent police-citizen encounter, how these cues are considered and used in officers’
decision-making processes, and an explanation of why officers selected the particular
responses they chose (Alpert and Rojek, 2011). Furthermore, in police shootings that
involve more than one officer, it is still unknown how the presence of other police
officers and the decisions they make influence the decision made by other officers
involved in the event. This is a topic of inquiry regarding deadly force decision-making
that should be addressed, but such questions can only be answered by analyzing data
collected from multiple officers who were present at the same officer-involved shooting.
One way to capture information about the aforementioned factors is through indepth interviews with police officers who have been involved in an incident that
concluded in police use of deadly force. In doing so, officers who have been present at
and involved in such an incident are provided with a private forum in which to detail their
decision-making process, as well as identify key factors and cues that impacted their
decision-making process during the officer-involved shooting. Therefore, using data
drawn from interviews with 83 police officers who were involved in an incident that
concluded with police use of deadly force, this dissertation was designed to fill the
aforementioned gaps in the deadly force literature and to answer the three questions that
were first stated in the initial chapter of this dissertation.
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1. Do the decision-making processes completed by different police officers
involved in the same incident follow the deadly force decision-making framework
as proposed by Binder and Scharf?
2. Given the same situation, does a significant difference in how police officers
move through the Binder and Scharf decision-making process account for why
some officers chose to use deadly force and some chose not to use deadly force?
3. Does the presence of other police officers impact the decision-making process
completed by an individual officer during a deadly force incident?
The next chapter details the data and analytical methods that were put to use to
examine these three questions.
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS
Qualitative methodologies have commonly been used in past studies focused on
police use of deadly force. Qualitative work allows researchers to “get close to the
subject matter” by gaining understanding “through lived experiences and perspectives of
critical actors” (Shover, 2012:11). Therefore, this dissertation has been designed to gain a
greater understanding of police officers’ decision-making processes during deadly force
incidents using data derived from in-depth interviews with officers who have been
involved in this specific type of police-citizen encounter.
The first section of this chapter will describe the data collection methods used by
the interviewer. The second section will provide readers with a description of the sample
that will be used in the analysis. Characteristics of the officers in the sample, as well as
characteristics of the incidents in which they were involved, will then be discussed.
Finally, the third section of this chapter will outline the analytic strategy that was used to
analyze the data garnered from each of the interviews included in the analysis.

DATA
The data used in the analysis were collected as part of a Bureau of Justice
Assistance study geared toward understanding police officers’ decision-making during
officer-involved shootings. During 2011 and 2012, Professor David Klinger from the
University of Missouri – St. Louis conducted interviews with police officers in the United
States who had been directly involved in incidents in which police bullets were fired.
Officers were eligible to participate in the study if they had been present at an officerinvolved shooting and either themselves fired during the event or could have shot, but
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held fire during the event. This interview framework created two groups within the
sample Klinger developed: police officers who were “shooters” and police officers who
were “witness officers” during the event.
A chain referral sampling method with multiple strategic informants located in
various geographic regions was used to recruit participants. The interviewer used initial
contacts within multiple departments who then communicated with other officers who fit
the inclusion criteria. This technique was utilized to develop a sample that included
multiple officers involved in single incidents. In the end, the interviewer conducted a
total of 218 interviews of shooters and witness officers that covered distinct officerinvolved shootings.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the original sample of 218 police officers
was narrowed down to a subsample of 83 police officers who were involved in 24 distinct
shootings. These 83 officers were selected from the larger original sample because they
were present at a deadly force incident in which at least one officer involved fired a shot
and at least one officer involved held fire: 46 of these officers fired shots and 37 did not.
A brief description of each incident included in the analysis can be found in Appendix A.

INTERVIEW STRUCTURE AND DESIGN
After police officers who agreed to participate in the study signed an informed
consent form, interviews with each individual officer began. Each interview was
conducted in private, with only the interviewer and interviewee present. All interviews
took place in one of three sorts of locations: police headquarter buildings, police station
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houses, and hotel rooms. Each interview was audio recorded and later transcribed.7 The
transcriptions from the 83 officers selected for this study were for the present study.
To collect information regarding officers’ decision-making, the interviewer used a
modified critical incident method to conduct each interview. The critical incident method
is a knowledge elicitation strategy that uses cognitive probes in order to determine one’s
decision-making process and situational assessment during non-routine events. Klein,
Calderwood, and MacGregor (1989) established this retrospective interview strategy to
gain a better understanding of how individuals who work in occupations that require
expert judgment make decisions. Examples of such occupations include urban and
wildland firefighters, paramedics, and tank platoon commanders.8
The critical incident method is a step-by-step process that starts with asking the
interviewee to provide a brief description of the incident in question. The interviewer
then uses probing questions to collect more information about different aspects of the
event and the interviewee’s decision-making process during the incident. As Klein and
his colleagues (1989:465) note, such probes are used to “obtain information at its most
specific and meaningful level” and most of the interview should be focused on
“uncovering these cues.” The authors also stress the importance of using this method to
strike a balance between a completely structured approach and a completely unstructured
approach to an interview. Although the interviewer should ask interviewees the same
questions at each decision point, the order and wording of the questions asked should
follow the natural flow of dialogue (Klein et al., 1989). The semi-structured format of

7

A number of interviews were randomly selected and their audio files were checked against the typed
transcription in order to ensure that the interviews had been transcribed accurately.
8 The study from which the interviews used for this dissertation came appears to be the first to employ the
critical incident method framework to examine officer-involved shootings.
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this method allows the interviewer to collect specific information from the interviewee
while also providing the interviewee with the opportunity to reflect on the strategies
he/she selected and the decisions he/she made during the incident.
At the beginning of each interview, participating police officers were asked to
complete a brief questionnaire in order to provide the interviewer with basic information
about themselves and the incident.9 Next, each officer was asked to recount the incident
as they experienced it to activate his or her memory regarding the incident. Using
participants’ responses on the initial questionnaire and their initial recounting of the event
as guides, the interviewer then led officers through a timeline reconstruction of the
incident. It was during this portion of the interview that officers provided details relating
to what decisions they made and how they made them. A series of different probes were
then used by the interviewer to collect information regarding the officers’ situational
concerns, goals, and whether or not they considered multiple options at each decision
point. Each interview concluded with participating officers sharing lessons learned from
the encounter and possible training and policy implications of it. Due to the wide range of
topics discussed, interviews lasted more than an hour on average.

SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVES
The aforementioned questionnaire sought demographic information about the
officers and information about each incident in which each officer was involved.10 This

9 Additional data about officers’ participation in their shooting event(s) were collected in the questionnaire
and during the interviews, but the discussion here is limited to the data pertaining to officers’ decisionmaking processes, as that is the focus of this study.
10 Some of the participating officers were involved in multiple incidents captured in the sample and made
different decisions regarding their use of deadly force in each incident.
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demographic information will be reviewed in the following section, but can also be
referenced in Table 1 and Table 2 in Appendix B.
Most of the 83 subjects are male (90 percent). The majority of the subjects are
white (80 percent), with the additional officers identifying as Hispanic (17 percent), black
(1 percent), Asian (1 percent), and other (1 percent). At the time of the event in question,
the youngest officer in the sample was 24 years old and the oldest officer was 57, with an
average age of 37. Most of the 83 officers in the sample had completed some college (43
percent) or had earned a four-year college degree (41 percent) at the time of the event.
The majority of the police officers in the study worked for a municipal police agency at
the time the officer-involved shooting in question took place (88 percent), with the
additional officers being employed by county (10.8 percent) or state agencies (1.2
percent).
At the time of the event, most subjects held the position of patrol officer (86
percent), but seven (7) held the rank of sergeant and five (5) held the rank of lieutenant.
The number of years an officer had served in law enforcement prior to being involved in
the incident in question ranged from less than one year to 35 years. The average number
of years between when an officer became a law enforcement officer and when the event
about which they were being interviewed occurred was 12. Lastly, many of the subjects
were performing general patrol duties at the time of the event (48.2 percent), but some
officers reported being involved in a special patrol assignment when the shooting
occurred (18.1 percent), taking part in a SWAT operation (12 percent), apprehending a
suspect or engaging in detective work (9.6 percent), executing a search warrant (4.8
percent), working a traffic-related (2.4 percent), K-9 (1.2 percent), off-duty (1.2 percent),
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or administrative (1.2 percent) assignment, or identified their assignment at the time of
the event as “other” (1.2 percent).
Participating police officers also shared information about the other officers on
scene, citizens present at the time of their shooting, and the suspects who were involved.
The average number of officers present at an incident was 3.5.11 The majority of the
police officers in the sample reported that the other officers with them during the time of
the event were from their own law enforcement agency (86.7 percent). In a small number
of cases, some of the other officers involved in the shooting were from the officer’s own
agency and some of the officers were from another law enforcement agency (10.8
percent). Lastly, in two incidents, officers reported that the only other officers present
during their incident were from another law enforcement agency (2.4 percent).
Participating officers were asked to report whether non-suspect citizens were
present at the time of the officer-involved shooting. The number of citizens present
ranged from zero to 60, with the average number of citizens present being 2.5. Nearly
half of the officers, however, reported that there were no non-suspect citizens present at
the scene when the officer-involved shooting took place (48.2 percent).
Regarding the suspects involved, most of the 24 incidents captured in the sample
included only one suspect (95.2 percent), but a small number of incidents included
multiple suspects (4.8 percent). Of the suspects who were armed at the time of the
officer-involved shooting, 56 percent of them were armed with a handgun. Aside from
firearms, additional weapons used by suspects present at the incidents included in the
sample were motor vehicles (9.6 percent) and edged weapons, such as knives (6
11

When one incident involving 16 officers in the sample is removed (Incident #20), the average number of
police officers present at the time of the shooting drops to 2.9.
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percent).12 Nearly 23 percent of the officers in the sample reported that the suspect fired
at them during the incident. Some officers reported that the suspect fired at other officers
on scene (33.7 percent) and only a small percentage of officers reported that the suspect
fired shots at citizens on scene during the incident (4.8 percent).

ANALYSIS STRATEGY
To analyze the deadly force decision-making model proposed by Binder and
Scharf, I completed a qualitative analysis of the aforementioned 83 in-depth interviews in
which some officers fired and some did not. Qualitative analysis can be used to
investigate specific concepts of interest, but can also provide insight into concepts that
may have gone unobserved in previous studies using different analytic methods
(Charmaz, 2006).
Because I was assessing the Binder and Scharf framework, I needed to apply this
four-phase framework to the data drawn from the interview transcripts. To begin, I read
through each narrative and demarcated when each of the four phases described by Binder
and Scharf appeared to begin and end. The decisions officers made and how they made
them were then categorized based on when they occurred in the incident using the four
phases proposed by Binder and Scharf: anticipation, entry and initial contact, information
exchange, and the final frame. By organizing officers’ thoughts, actions, and decisions
based on when they occurred during the incident, this framework provided the ability to
assess how officers made decisions in each of the phases and which, if any, social
influences impacted their decision-making during each phase.
12 A more comprehensive list of the weapons possessed by the perpetrators in these incidents can be
viewed in Table 3 in Appendix B.
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To properly apply this framework to the data, it was necessary to have a
comprehensive understanding of when one phase ended and another began according to
the original authors. The anticipation phase began when the officer was dispatched to a
call or made an independent decision to make his or her way to the location of the
incident. The anticipation phase continued until the officer arrived on the scene of the
incident. Once the officer arrived on scene, decisions made from this point until the
officer made verbal contact with the suspect were categorized as occurring in the entry
and initial contact phase. If the officer made verbal contact with the suspect, this initiated
the information exchange phase.13 The information exchange phase continued until the
officer entered the final frame stage, which occurred when the officer made the decision
to use deadly force or made the decision not to fire.
It is necessary to note that not every officer’s account will include all four phases.
For example, if, after being dispatched to a location and upon arrival on scene, an officer
made a quick decision to fire his or her weapon, Scharf and Binder would argue that this
encounter lacks an information exchange phase. In this example, the officer arguably did
not have time to verbally communicate with the suspect before making the decision to
fire. According to this train of thought laid out by the authors, decisions made by this
officer prior to his or her decision to use deadly force would be classified as occurring in
either the anticipation phase or the entry phase, but not in the information exchange
phase, as that phase never transpired during the encounter.
After applying this framework to each narrative, I separated the narratives into
two groups: shooters and witness officers. By reviewing each group separately, my goal
13

If the officer did not engage in verbal contact with the suspect, they did not enter the information
exchange phase and their decisions were coded as occurring in either the entry or final frame phase. More
information about why this decision was made will be addressed in a subsequent section of the dissertation.
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was to identify themes that were specific to either officers who chose to use deadly force
or to officers who chose not to use deadly force during their respective incidents. Once
the narratives were separated into two groups and the four-phase framework had been
applied to each transcript, I completed an open coding of each interview. The process of
open coding can be best described as reading the interview data and applying open-ended
codes or themes to particular descriptions or actions (Charmaz, 2006). An initial open
coding of the data allowed me to identify key factors that influenced or impacted officers’
decision-making when they made decisions during each phase. Open coding also
provided me with preliminary themes and initial codes that were later condensed into
categories (Charmaz, 2006; Neuman, 2006). Next, I completed close, repeated readings
of each narrative, which enabled me to refine the codes and themes that emerged during
the initial open coding process.
Throughout the coding and categorization process I used a constant comparative
method. This method involves the systematic comparison of statements across the various
levels of data (Chamberlain, 1999). According to Strauss (1989: 25), this process forces
the analyst to “[confront] similarities, differences, and degrees of consistency of
meaning” among categories. To accomplish this, I compared officers’ statements and
descriptions of their actions, thoughts, and decisions to other statements and descriptions
they gave regarding their actions, thoughts, and decisions during the interview. This
comparative method allowed me to label the considerations officers made when making
decisions and then group each based on their conceptual similarities and differences, thus
creating specific categories related to decision-making (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). In
addition, as Charmaz (2006) notes, this process also provides researchers with an
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opportunity to identify instances when the data do not fit into previously identified
patterns. This constant comparative process allows researchers to identify similarities and
differences in the data, but also serves as a way to minimize subjectivity and bias during
the coding process (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Once the data were
coded, I used basic tabulation to count and total each instance of the observed patterns to
assess their strength.
Once I completed within-interview comparisons, I then began conducting acrossinterview comparisons. That is, officers’ decision-making processes were compared to
the decision-making processes of other officers in their respective category (i.e., shooters
and non-shooters). Finally, I grouped officers’ narratives by incident in order to assess
officers’ decision-making processes in relation to the processes of other officers on scene
at given shootings. The goal of this incident-level analysis was to understand whether
differences in the decision-making process of the officers involved could explain why
some officers chose to use deadly force during the incident and other officers did not.
Again, I continued to use a constant comparative method when coding each narrative. I
reviewed each officer’s interview, comparing statements, descriptions, and rationales
linked to decision-making provided by one officer to statements, descriptions, and
rationales linked to decision-making provided by the other officers involved in the
incident. The continued use of the constant comparative strategy throughout the analysis
allowed me to adjust and refine my conceptual definitions of the categories and
subcategories I had created.
Using a constant comparative method during the coding process also allowed me
to identify deviant cases, which were those that are not consistent with previously
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identified patterns and themes. The existence of such cases is important to address when
considering the strength of a theoretical perspective. As Sullivan (2011: 906) states, the
“deductive testing of evidence in support of or against specific theories is an important
aspect of explanatory development.”

LIMITATIONS
There are some limitations associated with the data that were used in this study.
First, because the sample is a non-probabilistic sample, the findings from this study may
not be representative of the larger police officer population in the United States regarding
deadly force decision-making. But, as Marshall (1996:524) notes, non-probabilistic
sampling methods are common in qualitative work, “where improved understanding of
complex human issues [are] more important than the generalizability of results.”
Second, the interviews were conducted by a single interviewer. This may be
considered a limitation, as a single-interviewer has the potential to bias the data collection
by dictating which questions are asked and the way questions are asked, thus leading to
inconsistencies in data collection. It can also be argued, however, that relying on a singleinterviewer is better than utilizing multiple interviewers, as the use of multiple
interviewers can also introduce issues of inconsistency and bias across interviews. Should
there be some concern regarding consistency and potential bias introduced by the
interviewer, the author of this study transcribed the majority of the interviews and can
confirm that the interviewer asked respondents the same series of questions and in the
same manner during each interview she was responsible for transcribing.
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Third, police officers’ accounts of their incident were reported to the interviewer
retrospectively and, as such, this may introduce issues associated with validity and
reliability, specifically associated with memory, recall, and distortion.14 A number of
concerns have been voiced regarding retroactive accounts of traumatic events. First,
individuals may have an incomplete recollection of the event in question (Hardt and
Rutter, 2004; Krinsley, Gallagher, Weathers, Kutter, and Kaloupek, 2003) or report false
memories (Hardt and Rutter, 2004), or suffer from incomplete recall (Della Famina,
Yaeger, and Lewis, 1990; Mollica and Caspi-Yavin, 1991). Second, individuals may only
be able to recall what they were aware of at the time of the event, which may lead to an
incomplete account of the incident (Hardt and Rutter, 2004). Lastly, repeat storytelling of
the incident in question, whether in the form of formal reviews or therapeutic sessions,
may lead to inconsistent reporting by the individual (King, King, Erikson, Hwang,
Sharkansky, and Wolfe, 2000). The focus on traumatic events and the growing need to
gain a better understanding of such phenomena, however, often requires researchers to
collect trauma histories using retroactive interviewing (King et al., 2000).
Although these are all considerable limitations regarding the analysis of
retrospective data, the data collection efforts used by the interviewer may help to mitigate
some of these potential problems. For example, scholars have recommended that when
using retrospective data, researchers should attempt to corroborate retrospective
recollections by gathering data from additional sources that can support or discredit the
information collected during the initial interview (Hardt and Rutter, 2004). Because the
data that will be used in this analysis were collected from multiple officers who
14

The average time between the date of the shooting incident and the date of the interview was five years.
The range of years in which shootings took place among the officers in the subsample was 1996 to 2011.
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participated in the same shooting, individual officer’s accounts of what transpired were
cross-checked with responses provided by the other officers on scene. Furthermore, the
critical incident method used by the interviewer was designed to minimize potential
sources of bias by first asking the interviewee to provide an uninterrupted account of the
incident (Klein et al., 1989). It was not until this initial account was completed that the
interviewer began to ask probing questions. This interview process also lends itself to a
comprehensive assessment of the incident in question, as each interviewee reviewed the
incident with the interviewer multiple times during the interview, allowing any possible
discrepancies to be identified and discussed.
In sum, while there may be limitations regarding the sample used in this
dissertation, these data provided information about decision-making during deadly force
incidents that other data sources are lacking, and as such, were optimal for answering my
research questions. The subsequent chapters will detail the findings from this study, with
each chapter addressing the findings of one of the three research questions proposed by
the author. Lastly, the dissertation concludes with a discussion of the results and training
and policy implications associated with my findings.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ASSESSMENT OF THE BINDER-SCHARF DEADLY FORCE
DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
As noted previously, the first question this dissertation was designed to examine
is: Do the decision-making processes completed by the police officers in the sample
follow the decision-making processes outlined by Binder and Scharf? That is, do each of
the officers in the sample enter into and make decisions in each of the four phases
described by Binder and Scharf? In addition to their outline of these four phases, Scharf
and Binder (1983) identified a number of social influences that they believe impact
officers’ decision-making in each phase. While assessing the presence of these social
factors and whether they influenced officers’ decisions would have been ideal, it became
clear that the nature of the data would not allow for the measurement of every social
influence proposed by the authors.15 When these social influences could be identified in
the data, however, they were coded as such and will be discussed when applicable.
The following section will detail the results yielded from this portion of the
analysis. As is common in qualitative studies, excerpts from some of the narratives were
selected to serve as examples when discussing themes and patterns that emerged from the
data. The work begins at the start of the Binder and Scharf model: the anticipation phase.

ANTICIPATION
Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) argue that the deadly force decision-making
process begins with the anticipation phase. This phase is initiated when an officer is
dispatched to a call or makes the individual decision to become involved in an incident
15

The Binder and Scharf framework was applied to the interview transcripts for the present analysis after
interviews had already been conducted. Therefore, the original interviewer did not have this model in mind
when crafting interview questions for participating officers.
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and continues until the officer arrives on the scene of the incident. The authors assert that
at this stage, officers will be collecting as much information as they can about the
situation they are about to enter and the suspect (or suspects) involved. Information about
the situation or the potential suspect(s) can come from dispatchers, other police officers,
or citizens who have made the call to the police requesting assistance.
The majority of the police officers in the sample (n=78) began their decisionmaking process in the anticipation phase and did collect information about the situation
and potential suspect(s) they were about to encounter. Fifty-nine (59) officers (33
shooters, 26 witness officers) in the sample used this time to collect information about the
type of situation they would be arriving to and/or the suspect with whom they would be
dealing. Such information often included what was known about the situation (e.g., the
type of call, whether suspect(s) could be, or were, present), the suspect’s physical
description, whether the suspect was armed, the perceived emotional state of the suspect,
and what was known about the suspect’s past criminal history.
In addition, 11 other officers (six shooters, five witness officers) had previously
collected information on the suspect prior to getting involved in the incident. For
example, most of these 11 officers had been involved in investigations of the suspect and,
when they received a call that they believed involved this suspect, they made the decision
to become involved in the incident. These officers did not necessarily collect additional
information about the suspect during this phase, as they were relying on the information
they had previously collected prior to the call.
Contrary to what Binder and Scharf suggested, some officers in the sample did
not use their time in the anticipation phase to collect information about the incident they
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were en route to address. Interestingly, eight (8) officers reported that their decision to
initiate involvement in their incident was in response to a request by other officers to
serve as back-up. These officers did not use the anticipation phase to collect additional
information other than the type of incident to which they would be responding. Instead,
these officers engaged in information collection once they arrived on scene (i.e., when
they entered the entry and initial contact phase; see below).
Furthermore, some of the 78 officers in the sample who operated within the
anticipation phase framework also used this time to communicate with their fellow
officers (via the radio) about the information that was known to them about the situation
and the suspect(s). At times this was with the goal of drafting a plan with other officers
who were en route to the same incident (12 officers) or communicating known
information about the situation or suspect(s) with other officers or dispatchers (8
officers).
In sum, most of the officers in the sample began their incident in a fashion
consistent with Binder and Scharf’s notion of the anticipation phase. That is, all but five
officers gathered information about the situation they were on their way to attend, the
potential suspect(s) involved, or both, prior to arriving on the scene of the incident. The
five officers who did not act in conformance with the anticipation phase were already on
the scene of an incident when they observed a suspicious-looking individual or situation
and independently made the decision to initiate action. This means, by Binder and
Scharf’s definition, that they were unable to collect information about the situation or the
suspect(s) prior to arriving on scene, which eliminates the anticipation phase.
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An example of this type of deviant case comes from Incident 20, which involved
16 officers (the incident with the largest N of officers involved). Officer #35 was a
supervisor of an anticrime unit who was conducting a nightly patrol in his vehicle when
he spotted a male who looked suspicious. Officer #35 described this man as “heavily
tattooed [with a] big mustache, bald head,” leading this officer to assume that the man
“was a parolee. . .no doubt in my mind that this guy’s been to the joint.” When the officer
approached the man, he described how this individual kept “looking over his right
shoulder to see what my move was going to be.” Officer #35 made the decision to
approach this individual and initiate a conversation with him. As Officer #35 approached
him, the male drew a pistol and shot at Officer #35. Officer #35 did not fire shots back,
but instead requested back up to apprehend the fleeing assailant. Fifteen (15) additional
officers responded to the request for assistance and 11 eventually fired shots.
Another example wherein the anticipation phase was eliminated involved four
officers in Incident 47. These officers were members of an anticrime team in a large city
who were tasked with making routine contact with individuals hanging around an area of
the city known to be a location for criminal behavior. As two of these officers were
preoccupied talking to other citizens on scene, the other two officers sought to talk to an
elderly man who rebuffed their attempt to speak with him. While the second pair of
officers persisted, the elderly man drew a weapon and fired at one of the officers. Three
of the four officers returned fire. Because the officers in this incident were already on
scene when the situation unfolded, they began their decision-making process in the entry
phase and never entered the anticipation phase described by Binder and Scharf.
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It should be recognized that although the five deviant cases are not representative
of the majority of the sample, they still signify an inconsistency with the deadly force
decision-making model as proposed by Binder and Scharf. The authors acknowledge that
officers may skip – or not enter – the information exchange phase, but they do not state
that officers may fail to enter and complete the anticipation phase. Therefore, in contrast
to Binder and Scharf’s original model, police officers involved in a deadly force incident
may initiate a potentially violent police-citizen contact in the entry phase.

ANTICIPATION PHASE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES
Two possible social influences that Binder and Scharf believe affect officer
decision-making during the anticipation phase include the mode of information (i.e., who
the information is coming from) and the believed accuracy of the information. Results
from the analysis suggest that these factors can, in fact, impact officers’ decision-making
early in the incident. Furthermore, the mode of information and the believed accuracy of
the information can impact officers’ decision-making in subsequent phases as well.
Although not a strong pattern, a few of the officers in the sample detailed how the
mode of the information they received influenced their decision to become involved in
the incident in question. For example, three officers, all involved Incident 20 that began
when another officer was shot at when he tried to stop a suspicious pedestrian noted that
they chose to get involved because they knew the initial officer would not request backup unless it was a very serious matter. When Officer #35 broadcast on the radio that shots
had been fired at him, that the suspect has run off on foot, and requested that additional
officers make their way to the scene, Officer #37 reported how he knew this was a
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legitimate request, saying, “Bob16 is Bob and he doesn’t cry wolf. And if he’s chased the
[suspect] that was shooting at him, then it’s. . .it’s serious.” Officer #42 echoed this
thought, stating that he thought the call was “serious because it’s Bob Johnson”
requesting back-up and “he doesn’t normally just call these things out.” Lastly, when
detailing why he originally thought this call was high in danger, Officer #42 mentioned
why the mode of information in this case mattered, saying:
“It was an officer putting it out. We get a lot of calls of ‘shots fired’ and it turns
out it’s nothing, but we had an officer – a sergeant – a squared away, wellrespected guy saying that there are shots being fired, so you know it’s legit.
Something is happening.”
These officers’ descriptions demonstrate that because they knew the officer who
requested assistance was a sound source of information, they placed more stock into the
information being broadcast. Had another officer put out the call for assistance, it leads
one to wonder whether officers would have put the same amount of stock into the call
and responded in the same fashion.

ENTRY AND INITIAL CONTACT
After police officers arrive on the scene of the incident, Binder and Scharf (1980;
1983) assert that officers begin observing the situation and the suspect, thus reconciling
the information they received in the anticipation phase with what they are directly
observing now that they are present at the scene. These direct observations will either
confirm or dispute the information received by officers in the previous phase. Using this

16

To preserve the confidentiality of the research subjects, pseudonyms will be used throughout this study.
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new information then, Binder and Scharf suggest that the officer will update his or her
assessment, or working mental model, of the situation and respond accordingly.
Similar to what was observed in the anticipation phase, many officers continued
to collect information during the entry and initial contact phase, both through direct
observation and from the reported observations of other officers. The majority of officers
(52 officers; 27 shooters and 25 witness officers) used the beginning stages of this phase
to provide one another with situational updates, coordinate plans (whether it be a building
entry or a suspect apprehension plan), or direct incoming officers where to go on scene.
These officers thus used communication as a tool to ensure they all had the same
information, which allowed them to have similar conceptions of the situation at hand.
Consistent with Binder and Scharf’s description of the entry phase of the
encounter, the results suggested that upon arrival on scene, officers (both shooters and
witness officers) often began assessing the situation. Ten (10) of the 83 officers explained
that after they arrived on location, they tried to get more information about the suspect,
such as known background information or observations of the suspect made by other
officers on scene. In addition, nine (9) officers in the sample described focusing on the
suspect’s demeanor or overall appearance, observing that the suspect in their incident
appeared to be “agitated,” “calm,” “passive,” or “not acting like a typical suspect does.”
This new information was then commonly used among these officers when deciding on
their next steps in the encounter.
At times, this newly acquired information during the entry phase altered officers’
perceptions and definitions of the situation, causing them to view the situation as more
serious than they had originally considered it to be in the anticipation phase. For example,
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in Incident 12, Officer #15, a SWAT officer, was called to respond to a barricaded
persons incident. A female had called the police to alert them that her husband had
barricaded himself and one of their children in their home and she was afraid he was
going to harm the child. When asked how he rated the level of danger of this situation on
a one-to-ten scale (with one representing “low danger” and 10 representing “very high
danger”) based on what he knew about the incident prior to arriving on scene, Officer #15
rated it as a one because he had responded to many SWAT call-ups that turned out to be
false alarms in terms of violence. Once he arrived on scene, however, Officer #15 learned
that the suspect had been violent toward his family in the recent past and this led him to
believe that the situation was more serious than he originally thought. As he put it:
I’m starting to put on my gear and a supervisor came up to me and he goes, “Hey,
[the suspect], he came home from work, got in a fight with his wife”. . .and the
most telling thing to me that ramped me up the most was, [my supervisor] goes,
“They started fighting and he pulled a gun and started throwing his two year old
daughter around and threw her into the wall and broke the dry wall.” That was the
one thing that made go, “This guy is a mean mother-fucker”. . . you know, I’m
like this guy’s crazy. . .Cause he threw his daughter into a wall. . .And I thought
anybody that does that is not right. . .anybody that does that is fucked up. . .mean.
And it turns out he did have a long history of violence. . .I said, “If this guy comes
to the door and he does not [come] completely out, I’m shooting.” Even if he’s
unarmed [when he exits the home]. . .he’s already shot at his wife. . .I’m not
letting him back in [the house].
Receiving the information that the suspect had been violent toward his daughter
led this officer to believe that this situation was likely far more dangerous than he had
originally considered. After learning this, Officer #15 made the personal decision that if
the perpetrator exited the house, he was going to shoot. He then decided to communicate
his intent to the other officers around him, telling them, “I’ll give him commands like
‘Come here,’ but if he starts to shut that door, we’re launching.” Not only did information
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acquired after arrival alter Officer #15’s definition of the situation, but it also played a
considerable role later in the incident when officers drafted and executed a hostage rescue
plan, during which Officer #15 fired at the suspect.
Another example of how information acquired during the entry phase altered
officers’ ideas comes from Officer #69, who was involved in Incident 46. He described
how what he viewed upon arrival at the scene of his incident drastically changed his
initial mindset about the nature of a situation to which he responded. Incident 46 involved
two officers who were dispatched to a community center after someone had reported that
shots were being fired. At first, these officers were surprised and in disbelief, as they
were working a traffic detail a few blocks from the community center and had not heard
any gunshots. Surely if shots had been fired, they would have heard something, or so they
thought. After arriving on scene and making their way to the community center front
door, Officer #69 described how they came upon the body of a young woman who had a
gaping shotgun wound to her chest. He soon noticed that there was a duffle bag in close
proximity to the woman’s body containing shotgun ammunition. Officer #69 realized at
this point that this could be an active shooter situation, saying:
She had multiple shotgun wounds to the chest. Like close contact. There was
smoke or steam coming out of her chest. As I looked around, there [were] two
gym bags. One of the gym bags was open. Spilled out of it were several 12 gauge
shotgun cartridges and a box of ammo. He. . .he came. . .you know, it’s not like
he took a club out of his pocket and just beat her. In my brain it was like he came
ready. Ready for war. Ready for battle. Ready to do a killing. I don’t know. But
he came ready. With the extra ammo he could walk through that building and just
keep killing until he’s stopped. . .So yeah, I took that much more serious. . .And
of course, he’s gone into the shelter. About that time, [the suspect] appeared
behind the glass doors and [my partner] engaged him verbally.
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Officer #69’s partner during this incident, Officer #104, echoed this change in
perceived seriousness of the situation upon viewing the victim and, soon after, the
suspect armed with a shotgun, describing:
When I saw the victim. . .and oh, by the way there was a box of shotgun shells
next to her and there was a whole bunch of shells lying around her. . .at that point
there was that, that fear factor and that adrenaline rush. You’ve got your gun out.
You’ve got it trained, but now you know, you’re at home plate and it’s a full
count. Bases are loaded, you know? It’s up to you to do your job or strike out.
When I saw [the victim] and then [the suspect] with the gun. . .that’s when
everything came to. . .came to a head.
Both of these officers originally questioned whether this “shots fired” call was
legitimate, as they failed to hear shots being fired when they were in close proximity to
the reported location. Upon arrival, however, their direct observations of the deceased
victim with a shotgun wound to her chest, a bag filled with shotgun ammunition, and
seconds later seeing a man holding a shotgun, led these officers to change their original
perception of the incident from disbelief to a legitimate call involving a suspect who had
the potential to harm other citizens and themselves. Eventually, Officer #104 fired shots
at the armed suspect while Officer #69 held fire.
The aforementioned examples show how some of the officers in the sample used
new information they received during the entry phase (whether it was through direct
observation or from other officers) and adjusted their definition of the situation. This is
consistent with the decision-making process as described by Binder and Scharf. That is,
officers’ decision-making during such an encounter is fluid and can be influenced by
newly acquired information and shifting situational conditions.
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ENTRY AND INITIAL CONTACT PHASE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES
One of the social influences identified by Binder and Scharf that could impact
officers’ decision-making during the entry phase was safety. That is, Scharf and Binder
(1983) found that officers often make decisions and behave in ways to protect their
personal safety when first arriving on the scene of an incident. In congruence with Scharf
and Binder’s findings, “safety” was a common theme that influenced decision-making
among shooters and witness officers during the entry phase among the officers in the
sample used in this study. Of the officers who later used deadly force during their
incident, eight (8) officers described taking actions intended to enhance their personal
safety once arriving on scene and 11 officers reported drawing their weapons during this
phase of the encounter. Among the witness officers, 12 officers described taking actions
designed to enhance their personal safety, such as finding cover, and nine (9) officers
drew their weapons during this phase of the incident. These behaviors on the part of
shooters and witness officers may have been the result of training and on-the-job
experience. As Skolnick (1966) noted, danger is ever-present in police work and because
of this fact, police officers are encouraged to be cautious at all times to preserve their
safety.
One interesting finding from the analysis of officers’ entry phase actions
regarding safety is that for many officers, safety concerns extended to their fellow
officers and this can, at times, impact their decision-making. Eighteen (18) officers (10
shooters, 8 witness officers) described how their concern for another officer impacted
their decision-making upon arrival on the scene of the incident and before verbal contact
was made with the suspect.
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A good example of this can be found in Incident 59, which involved four officers
who responded to reports of shots being fired at a local high school. Officer #133 and his
partner were the first officers on the scene. Officer #133 made the decision to wait for at
least two additional officers to arrive before entering the school. This was a tactical
decision; he had SWAT experience and wanted to enter the school with three additional
officers so they could utilize what is known in police culture as a diamond formation
wherein one officer takes a leading, (or “point”) position, officers flank the front officer
(one on the left and one on the right), and the last officer positions him or herself behind
them, thus forming a diamond. Officer #133 described his reasoning thusly:
My thought process at that point was that [it was] an active shooter, although we
were not hearing shots immediately when we arrived on scene. We were informed
that there had been a classroom taken over and shots had been fired. So, my
thought process was to go in immediately, neutralize that threat by containing,
stopping, controlling that scene as fast as possible, but as intelligently as possible.
In other words, instead of having two people covering where I know that I can’t
physically cover every 360 degrees, if I have the opportunity to go in – in that
diamond formation - then I’m going to have a lot higher odds of successfully
resolving that situation.
While Officer #133 does not directly say it, it appears that he believed utilizing
the diamond formation would provide these officers with more protection from an armed
student, and, by maintaining their safety, the entering officers would be able to do their
job and protect the students and teachers inside the school from further harm. When it
came time to decide which positions in the diamond the officers would take, Officer #133
decided that he would be in the front (the point position) not only because of his SWAT
experience, but also because he valued the safety of his fellow officer, explaining:
I’m on point because I chose it. And I’m on point because I think I had the most
tactical background at that particular time given my time on SWAT, as well as
just my experience in general. And I felt that personally, if I’m going to make a
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decision as to do something that I was going to put myself in what I considered
the most vulnerable position. I’m asking somebody to do something that is going
to put them directly in the line of fire as well, and so I felt that the odds of
somebody being in that line of fire were higher given that point position than they
would be say in a rearguard position. [I was] protective I guess. . .if you will.
As is evident in this description, Officer #133 was well aware that he was asking
these patrol officers to do something – and enter a situation – that may place them in
harm’s way if they made their way into the school and the suspect fired at them. While he
recognized his SWAT experience may justify why he chose to be the point officer, the
remaining part of his explanation shows that he was cognizant of the safety of his fellow
officers and this contributed to his decision to take the lead upon entering the high school.
This incident continued when the officers found the armed student barricaded in a
classroom, at which point a standoff ensued until the student emerged from the classroom
with a firearm in a raised position in his hand and aimed in the direction of police
officers, at which point three of the four officers interviewed fired shots (including
Officer #133).
Another example of how concern for other officers’ safety impacted officers’
decision-making during the entry phase can be observed in Incident 47. As previously
mentioned, this incident involved four officers who were members of an anticrime team
and tasked with patrolling a high-crime area that was known for being a narcotics hub
and was the location of many calls for service. When Officer #103 spotted the elderly
man who looked suspicious, he felt the need to alert the other officers to his uneasy
feeling about this individual, stating that although the other officers may not have noticed
this man or felt the same uneasiness about it, he was “still making sure that other people
are paying attention to what I’m paying attention to. If I felt uncomfortable, they needed
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to feel uncomfortable.” Alerting the other officers to his suspicions arguably changed the
trajectory of this incident. Had Officer #103 not said anything, perhaps his fellow officers
would have continued their contacts with other individuals and left the suspiciouslooking man alone. Instead, the officers who were alerted to the elderly man’s odd
demeanor attempted to make contact with him, at which time he pulled out a firearm
from his waistband and fired at the officers, causing three of the four officers to return
fire.
In sum, the analysis of officers’ social influences during the entry phase revealed
that safety concerns did drive the decision-making of some of the officers in the sample.
Again, it is necessary to note that these findings are not limited to only shooters or only
witness officers, but rather were decision-making patterns observed by officers who made
varying decisions in the final frame phase. Such findings suggest that shooters and
witness officers may have more commonalities in their decision-making and the ways in
which social influences impact their decisions than they do differences.

INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Scharf and Binder (1983) designate the information exchange phase of the
encounter as the point at which the police officer and suspect make verbal or non-verbal
contact. A shortcoming of the authors’ description of this phase, however, is that they do
not clearly explain what constitutes as a non-verbal interaction between police and the
suspect. Scharf and Binder (1983) briefly allude to the use of gestures on the part of the
officer or citizen as the basis for non-verbal communication, but this is the only point of
clarification provided. Because Scharf and Binder did not provide a clear definition of
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what constitutes “non-verbal contact” and for the sake of conceptual clarity, information
exchange was limited to verbal communication between the police and the suspect(s) in
this study. More specifically, officers in the sample were coded as engaging in
information exchange only if they made verbal contact17 with the suspect.
Working off of this definition, 36 officers (21 shooters, 15 witness officers)
entered the information exchange phase. That is, they relied on verbal communication to
either convey their intentions to the suspect, or to gain a better understanding of the
suspect’s intentions. When analyzing the circumstances under which the 36 officers in
the sample issued verbal commands to the suspect in their respective incidents, 22
officers who made verbal contact with the suspect did so to ask the suspect to drop
his/her weapon (14 shooters, eight witness officers). The remaining 14 officers who
issued verbal commands during this phase did so for the following reasons: five (5)
officers informed the suspect that he/she was under arrest (one shooter, three witness
officers), four (4) officers communicated to the suspect that they needed to stop and talk
to him/her (four shooters, two witness officers), four (4) officers requested that the
suspect exit his/her vehicle (four shooters, two witness officers), and one (1) officer used
verbal communication to instruct a suspect to stop running to evade police contact. In
addition to communicating with the suspect, officers also communicated with one another
about the suspect, the situation at hand, and, given what information they had at this
point, how the situation may play out.

17

For the purposes of this study, “verbal communication” occurred when an officer spoke directly to the
suspect. Initiation of the verbal communication was a non-factor. Police-suspect verbal exchanges took
many forms among the incidents in the sample, from informing the suspect that officers were on the scene
to issuing commands to the suspect in attempt to gain compliance.
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Of the 83 officers in the sample, 47 officers did not enter the information
exchange phase. Consistent with Binder and Scharf’s conception of this, 17 of these 47
officers did not issue commands to the suspect because there was not time to do so. To
illustrate why these 17 officers did not issue verbal commands to the suspect(s) in their
respective incidents, descriptions of three of the seven incidents follow. For more detailed
information about the other four incidents in which at least one officer did not enter the
information exchange phase, please see Appendix A.18
Incident 20 involved 16 of the officers in the sample and began when Officer #35
was fired upon by an assailant. After the suspect shot at Officer #35, he fled on foot.
Responding officers received word from a resident of the area that there was rustling in
nearby bushes about a block from the assault on Officer #35. This led a small group of
officers to believe the suspect may be in said brush. Six officers (Officers #28, #29, #31,
#32, #34 and #41) congregated in this street near the brush and began discussing the
situation at hand. As the officers were talking, the suspect emerged from bushes and fired
shots in the direction of the officers, then fled from them on foot down a nearby sidewalk.
As the suspect was running away, four of these officers (Officers #29, #31, #32, and #41)
shot at the suspect without saying anything to him, thus entering the final frame stage and
skipping the information exchange phase of Binder and Scharf’s decision-making model.
Similarly, Incident 124 involved four officers who were members of a team
assigned to execute a search warrant of a residence. Officers believed that individuals
dwelling in the home were involved in drug trafficking and two of the officers involved,
Officer #183 and Officer #213, had been working for months to build a case to support
18

Incidents 11, 90, 105, and 127 included at least one officer who did not enter the information exchange
phase because he or she did not have time to communicate with the suspect.
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the request for a search warrant. Once the officers had collected the necessary
information and obtained the warrant, they worked to gather a team of officers to
participate in serving said warrant.
Officer #213 explained how he worked with the officers involved in the incident
to draft an entry plan into the home. Participating officers were assigned a place in the
entry line up: the first officer was charged with breaching19 the door to the home and,
simultaneous to the breaching of the door, another officer would break a nearby window
of the home to detonate a stun grenade20 to disorient anyone who may be in the home at
the time. Additional officers in the line-up would then file into the home, with the goal of
locating and apprehending any individuals in the home and proceeding with their search
of the location.
Upon entering the home, however, officers were immediately fired at by two
suspects. To prevent the suspects from continuing to fire, one of the four officers
instantly began returning gunfire (Officer #213 was the only shooter). The other three
officers who were interviewed and held fire did so for one of three reasons: one officer
chose to attend to a fellow officer who had been shot by suspects’ gunfire (Officer #184),
another officer did not have a clear shot of the suspects because other officers in front of
him in the entry line-up were in his line of fire (Officers #183), and because other officers
had already engaged the suspects in gunfire, a third officer chose to hold fire (Officer
#185). Although these officers varied in their use of force, one commonality they shared
was, due to how quickly this incident unfolded upon their entry into the home, each of

19

The process of “breaching” an entryway requires an officer to breakdown a fortification (such as a
doorway) for the purpose of entry.
20 A stun grenade, or a flashbang, is a non-lethal device used by law enforcement to temporarily disorient a
suspect’s senses (such as sight and/or hearing).
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these officers failed to issue verbal commands to the suspects, thus not participating in
the information exchange phase.
A third example of an incident that unfolded so quickly that officers did not enter
Binder and Scharf’s information exchange phase was Incident 103, which involved two
of the officers interviewed. Officer #147 was on his way to work and driving on a busy
highway when he spotted a highway patrol officer, Officer #152, who had initiated a
traffic stop and appeared to be administering a field sobriety test to the driver. Officer
#147 soon saw that an additional police vehicle was heading in the direction of the
stopped highway patrol officer, which signaled to Officer #147 that this highway patrol
officer had requested back-up and something about the traffic stop was not right. This
officer decided to pull over to assist, noting that he was approximately 15 yards away
from the highway patrol officer, when very quickly he noticed that Officer #152 was in a
physical altercation with the driver he had pulled over. Officer #147 soon lost sight of
Officer #152, leading him to believe that he had fallen next to or in front of the driver’s
vehicle. When Officer #147 heard the gears of the driver’s vehicle grinding, he thought
Officer #152 was about to be run over and felt he had very little time to prevent the driver
from seriously injuring or killing Officer #152. Because he believed giving verbal
commands to the driver would not stop him from harming Officer #152, Officer #147
decided to fire at the driver to protect Officer #152. Because this incident unfolded so
quickly, Officer #147 did not have time to issue verbal commands to the driver before he
made the decision to use deadly force.
In addition to the 17 officers who did not enter the information exchange phase
because their incidents unfolded rather quickly, 30 officers (17 shooters, 13 witness
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officers) did not make verbal contact with the suspect in their respective incidents, but
not for the reason originally proposed by Binder and Scharf. These 30 officers, who
participated in 14 different incidents, did not make verbal contact with the suspect(s)
because another officer had already initiated verbal communication with the suspect(s).
This finding is worth noting, as it is unique to incidents that involved more than one
officer. That is, many of these 30 officers may have very well verbally communicated
with the suspect(s) in their incidents had other officers not been present. Because this
finding is unique to incidents that involved more than one officer, this may explain why
Binder and Scharf did not consider this vis-a-vis the information exchange phase in their
writings; most of the cases they considered were single-officer events. The presence of
other police officers and how their choices about contacting suspects impacted officers’
decisions in the information exchange phase will be expanded upon in Chapter Six of this
dissertation.
On another note, one factor that was present in a few of the incidents studied here
but was not mentioned by Binder and Scharf in their description of the information
exchange phase is the use of a formal negotiator. Four (4) of the 24 incidents captured in
the sample involved the use of an officer who had formal training and was designated by
a police agency as an expert in crisis negotiation. In these cases, the negotiators were
tasked with engaging in verbal contact with the suspect. Some of the officers involved in
these incidents described how this type of communication with the suspect was used in an
attempt to coax the suspect out of the location or as a de-escalation tool. The use of a
negotiator, however, limits the number of officers who are supposed to verbally
communicate with the suspect, which explains why some of the officers who were
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involved in these incidents did not enter into what Binder and Scharf designated as the
information exchange phase. The implications of this finding for the Binder and Scharf
model are discussed below.
In sum, the analysis of the information exchange phase among shooters and
witness officers provided some support for Binder and Scharf’s conception of this phase.
The results suggest that officers may, at times, enter the information exchange phase and
communicate with the suspect for a number of reasons. The results from the analyses also
support Binder and Scharf’s hypothesis that not all officers enter the information
exchange phase, as some potentially violent police-citizen encounters can proceed
quickly, thus not providing the involved officers the time needed to open lines of
communication before having to make the decision to use or not use deadly force. Both
shooters and witness officers can be observed in both groups (i.e., those who entered the
information exchange phase and those who did not), suggesting similarities between
decisions made by those who chose to shoot and those who chose to hold fire.
One key finding from the current analysis that was not addressed by Binder and
Scharf concerns the use of crisis negotiators. As previously noted, much policing is group
work and the division of labor when negotiators are present means that Binder and
Scharf’s focus on individual officers would appear to miss the mark when it comes to
their notion of information exchange. The use of a designated crisis negotiator to open
the lines of verbal communication with a suspect eliminates the need for other officers
present to engage in verbal contact with the suspect. Consequently, the use of negotiators
indicates that Binder and Scharf’s decision-making framework should be expanded to
include the notion that police work groups can frame encounters with police in particular
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ways that will exclude some officers from engaging in some aspects of the initial Binder
and Scharf model.

INFORMATION EXCHANGE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES
One of the social influences that Scharf and Binder (1983) identify as applicable
to officers’ decision-making in the information exchange phase is the level of control
over the situation that an officer may feel he or she has. While the police officers who
were interviewed were not directly asked about how much control they felt they had
throughout the incident, a number of officers did report that, during this phase, they could
tell by the suspect’s behavior that he or she was not going to comply or reported having
“a bad feeling” about how the situation would conclude. Seventeen (17) officers (11
shooters, six witness officers) explained that during this point in the incident, they did not
expect the suspect to comply with their commands and considered that the incident may
not conclude without the use of deadly force.
An example of this was found in the decision-making of Officer #149 who
participated in Incident 105. This incident involved four officers in the sample who were
part of specialized team tasked with identifying and apprehending a suspect who had
been breaking into vehicles in a particular neighborhood. An officer spotted a male exit a
vehicle he had been driving and break into a vehicle parked in an alley, and alerted the
other team members. By the time officers converged on the suspect, he had returned to
his vehicle and was attempting to flee, so they used their vehicles to try to block the
suspect’s vehicle from leaving. Multiple officers, including Officer #149, were issuing
commands to the suspect to exit his vehicle. The suspect, however, refused to comply,
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and instead began moving his vehicle back and forth, attempting to break free from the
vehicle enclosure officers had set up. In the midst of this takedown, one of Officer #149’s
fellow officers, Officer #166, had exited her vehicle and found herself trapped behind the
suspect’s vehicle.
Officer #149 described his summation of the situation at this point, saying:
We’ve moved up to within maybe 10 feet or so of [the suspect’s] car and we’ve
been telling him the whole time, “Stop and put your hands up!”. . .that kind of
thing. And I look inside of the [suspect’s car] and he’s trying to go from reverse
to drive, from drive to reverse. And I see him doing it and I recognize that
[Officer #166] is behind the car. Everything else he’d hit so far he’d totally
destroyed. I felt like if he hit her with that car that she would be either crippled or
killed. This all happens in my head immediately. . .it just sort of dawns on me and
that if we don’t do something right now, she’s probably going to get run over by
this car.
While Officer #149 does not directly reference his level of control over the
situation, one can see from his description that, based on the suspect’s behavior and noncompliance with police commands, he saw this as a situation in which the suspect was
dictating action. He highlights his concern about the suspect’s control over the safety of a
fellow officer, leading him to the conclusion that if the officers did not act quickly to
somehow alter the suspect’s behavior that Officer #166 could be seriously wounded or
killed. In fact, soon after reaching this conclusion, Officer #149 (along with another
officer interviewed) decided to shoot the suspect in order to prevent him from running
over Officer #166.
Another example that highlights an officer’s perception of his level of control
during the information exchange phase can be drawn from Incident 26. This incident
involved four officers who were going to apprehend a suspect who was wanted on a
felony family violence warrant in a bail bondsman’s office. Each of the officers stated
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that prior to making contact with the suspect, they thought this apprehension was going to
go smoothly. Once they entered the bondsman’s office and issued commands to the
seated suspect to stand up so he could be placed under arrest, the suspect quickly became
defensive and began posturing like “he [was] going to fight” (Officer #53; witness
officer). Officer #172, the second witness officer in this incident, reported that the
suspect’s demeanor and behavior also signaled to him that this situation was not going to
conclude as easily as they all thought, saying:
[The suspect] moved away from us. Believe it or not, it’s something I hadn’t seen
before, it’s something they hadn’t trained us for either. He didn’t run and he
didn’t stand and fight, which is the two things that you expect. [Suspects] either
wanna a piece of you or they try to get away. I’m a little more aggressive by
nature, even though I’m kinda small, I don’t know, so when [the suspect] moved
away from us I jumped on him. . . first thing I did, I grabbed him and I tried
bringing him down. . .and that’s when Joe jumped on him, too. The other officer’s
on his right side and that’s when I hear Greg yell that [the suspect] has a gun. .
.and when I heard him call, “Gun!”, I was like holy shit. I knew what was gonna
happen. I knew that this was gonna end badly.
Interestingly enough, Officer #172 was confident that these officers would
overtake the non-compliant suspect once he stood up and backed away from the officers.
Even though the suspect did not listen to their commands and multiple officers attempted
to physically restrain him, Officer #172 felt they had him “under control physically”
because “I had four cops there.” Once he heard another officer had spotted a gun on the
suspect, however, Officer #172 changed his view of the situation, noting that this
signaled to him that the situation could go in a direction he had not previously anticipated
and that he and his fellow officers may not, in fact, be able to physically control the
suspect. After a physical altercation between the suspect and officers ensued, two of the
four officers fired shots at the suspect.
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Another example of how a suspect’s demeanor and/or actions can suggest to
officers that they are losing control of an encounter can be found in Incident 11, which
included four officers who had been involved in a vehicle pursuit. Officer #25 made the
decision to participate in the pursuit when he heard it on the radio. As he was en route to
the location of the chase, he heard on the radio that the suspect had been purposefully
ramming into other officers’ vehicles with his car in an attempt to flee. The suspect
eventually crashed his vehicle, which ended the pursuit and gave officers the opportunity
to exit their vehicles and issue verbal commands to the suspect to exit his vehicle. Officer
#25 described how he issued commands to the driver to exit the vehicle, but rather than
complying with the officer’s request, the suspect began lurching his car forward toward a
fellow officer’s vehicle with the officer still inside. Officer #25 explained that the
suspect’s behavior at this point signaled that he was not going to listen to officers’
commands and he was not going to stop his flight. He stated:
You know I was thinking right there this is okay. [The suspect] has nowhere else
to go. I was getting out of my car to hear him going back and ramming us again. It
was kind of one of those things like, ‘Are you kidding me?’ And that’s what
raised my concern, my worry for us, because he’s not showing any indication that
this is going to stop. It’s going to be us or him. And that was the scenario I felt
that he was putting us in by just continually ramming us. You know, whatever it
took for him to get away, that’s what he was going to do at the time.
As one can see, Officer #25 believed the suspect’s behavior indicated that he
would do whatever was necessary to escape apprehension. This officer then made the
decision to exit his vehicle and draw his weapon, continuing “to treat it as a felony [stop],
pointing the gun, [trying to] get [the suspect] out of the car.” In the final phase of the
incident, Officer #25 made the decision to fire at the suspect.
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Another officer involved in this incident, Officer #14, made a similar
interpretation of the suspect’s mindset, but did not use deadly force in the final frame
phase of the incident. When witnessing the suspect’s erratic driving during the high
speed chase, Officer #14 reported that this behavior on the part of the suspect made it
clear that he had no intention of being apprehended. He stated:
You can tell this guy is just driving like a madman now, you know? You can tell
he’s not going to stop. I mean just years of experiencing, you know, high speed
pursuits, you could tell this guy wasn’t going to be getting out and surrendering
anytime soon.
Once the suspect crashed his vehicle and officers surrounded his vehicle with
their own, the suspect continued to try to break his vehicle free by backing into the
surrounding police vehicles. Again, this behavior suggested to Officer #14 that the
suspect did not intend to surrender. At this point, Officer #14 drew his weapon,
explaining:
I was already exiting my vehicle and I saw [the officers’] weapons drawn, so I
remembered starting to draw mine. But I was thinking the whole time this guy
might get back on the road, but, it was almost a point of no return then, you
know?
This officer did not fire at the suspect because by the time he felt he had a clear
shot, Officer #25 had already shot the suspect. What this incident demonstrates, however,
is that regardless of whether an officer decides to shoot or hold fire, officers can observe
a suspect’s behavior, make similar inferences about the suspect’s intentions and their
perceived level of control over the situation, and then use these perceptions to guide their
subsequent decision-making.
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Suspect Demeanor
Another social influence identified by Binder and Scharf as impacting officers’
decision-making during the information exchange phase is the suspect’s demeanor, or
response to officers’ commands. The authors note that officers often use verbal
commands at this point to inform the suspect what he or she needs to do to reduce the
threat posed to the officers. For example, if a suspect is armed with a firearm, an officer
may issue commands to the suspect to “Drop the weapon.” Therefore, in addition to
analyzing officers’ behaviors and decisions during this phase, it is also necessary to
assess suspects’ responses to what officers say in each incident.
As previously noted, 36 officers issued verbal commands to the suspect in their
respective incident. If Binder and Scharf’s hypothesis holds true, one would expect to
find that more shooters than witness officers were confronted with non-compliant
suspects. By not listening to officers’ commands, such non-compliant suspects limit the
options available to police to resolve the incident.
None of the suspects who received commands from the 36 officers who issued
them complied with the orders given. Twenty-two (22) of the 36 officers who issued
verbal commands told the suspects to drop the weapons they possessed. Fourteen (14)
additional officers issued commands to the suspect to do a variety of other tasks (e.g.,
stop and exit his/her vehicle, stop to talk with the officers, or request that the suspect
cease from fleeing from custody). Of the 36 officers who issued verbal commands, 21
officers ultimately used deadly force in the final frame phase and 15 officers refrained
from using deadly force.
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It is important to note that these 36 officers participated in 20 different incidents.
Of those 20 incidents, there were 10 that included at least two officers who issued verbal
commands to the suspect, one who eventually used deadly force and another who did not.
To demonstrate the similarities observed among officers who engaged in the same
behavior (i.e., issuing verbal commands to the suspect) and how they interpreted the
suspect’s non-compliance in their incident, a few examples will be reviewed below.
Incident 43 involved two officers: Officer #65 was a field training officer at the
time and his trainee, Officer #113, was with him when they received a call reporting
multiple homicides at a local apartment complex. Officer #65 explained that his trainee
wanted to work on one of her weak points (e.g., verbal communication), so they opted to
respond to the location of the call, even though both officers made it clear in their
interviews that they initially believed this to be a prank call. Upon arrival on scene,
however, the officers were confronted with a visibly angry male. Since Officer #113 was
in training and wanted to practice her stern communication skills, Officer #65 told her to
initiate verbal contact with the suspect. As Officer #113 was beginning to approach the
suspect, Officer #65 saw that the suspect was armed with two knives. Fearing for his
trainee’s safety, Officer #65 began issuing commands to the suspect, explaining:
I’m thinking ok, now this is great training opportunity because we’re going to
have a little standoff here until this guy surrenders. And you know, [I am] just
giving him commands, “Alright, drop the knives.” At this point, I still didn’t think
anything of this. I hadn’t even drawn my weapon at this point. I’m just, “Drop the
knives. Come on. What’s going on?” It was just kind of a thing of ordering
commands by rote, you know? “Drop the knives. What’s your problem?”. . .He
didn’t actually ever [listen]. . .I had that sick feeling in my stomach that I’m going
to have to shoot this guy. And I actually said to him, I said, “Come on buddy,
don’t make me do this.”
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His officer-in-training, Officer #113, was also issuing commands to the suspect.
She also reported similar concerns about the suspect’s behavior, saying:
I figured, you know. . .remember, I was out to prove that “Hey, I’m gonna control
this guy.” I’m gonna walk up and say, “Hey, come back here” and I’m actually
gonna make him do it when he doesn’t want to. . .I remember my FTO saying,
“Stop!” I think we were both definitely saying, “Stop! Don’t come any closer!”
And [the] guy kept walking. . .there’s a guy with a knife approaching, he’s well
within twenty-one feet. So I took the slack out of my trigger.
Both Officer #65 and Officer #113 issued verbal commands to the suspect to drop
his knives, but the suspect remained non-compliant by continuing to hold on to his
weapons and move toward the officers. At this point, both officers considered that this
situation could conclude in the use of deadly force. Officer #65 verbalized this
consideration to the suspect, while Officer #113 described her recognition that based on
the totality of the circumstances in front of her, she could, and may have to, use deadly
force. This situation ultimately concluded with Officer #65 firing shots at the suspect
while Officer #113 held fire.
Another incident that involved multiple officers who issued commands to a
suspect was Incident 118. This case involved two homicide detectives who were
searching for a man they suspected of committing a recent homicide. They had a photo of
the suspect and identified a number of locations he could be based on where he was using
the victim’s stolen credit cards. These officers were driving around one of these locations
hoping to find their suspect and bring him into custody. They happened upon a man who
matched the suspect’s description and, while still in their undercover vehicle, discussed
whether they agreed that the man they saw could be their suspect and, if so, what would
be the best way to apprehend him. They called for back-up, but were afraid that once the
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suspect heard the sirens from arriving patrol cars, he would run. Therefore, they agreed
that they should make contact with him immediately, as they did not believe back-up was
far behind.
Upon exiting the vehicle, they agreed that Officer #217 would be the one to issue
commands and his partner, Officer #168, would be the one to take the suspect into
custody. As they approached the suspect and began to execute their plan, however,
Officer #217 described how the encounter quickly went awry, explaining:
I had opened the door and step[ped] out of the car and I’m literally on the
sidewalk. [The suspect] is walking towards me. I immediately start issuing
commands and now I’m face to face with him. He’s looking at me. “Police, don’t
move! Police, get down on the ground! Police, don’t move!” Those kinds of
commands. And he. . .[my partner] is in my peripheral vision out in the middle of
the street and he may have been yelling some commands as well, but he. . .[the
suspect] for whatever reason, he has this. . .it was almost Hollywood-like
transformation of his face where he turned. . .he turned to this animalistic facial
expression where he was gritting his teeth. . .a very angry look. And he
immediately dropped the bottle he was carrying and his hands went out in front of
him like this in a claw sort of. . .zombie sort of hand thing. . .and he let out this
scream that was a growl. And he starts running towards me.
His partner, Officer #168, described similar behavior on the part of the suspect in
his account of the information exchange phase, saying:
I can see my partner in the peripheral and I start hearing the commands. And I’m
looking at the suspect the whole time. As soon as I hear that, I put the gun up on
him and put a sight picture on him. He had been walking totally unaware [we]
appeared, and then as soon as he starts hearing the commands, he freezes, just
stops in his tracks. He’s looking directly at [my partner], but not doing anything,
so I start yelling out, “Police, freeze. Don’t move. Police.” He – this has all
happened – from this point, just extremely fast. He looks at my partner, looks at
something between my partner and I, is what it appeared to me, and then looks
directly at me. He drops into a slight crouch, just gets a look of absolute rage on
his face, baring his teeth. I kind of describe it as a war cry, [and] just starts
screaming. He throws his hands out directly in front of him and starts running.
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Again, both of these officers issued verbal commands to the suspect in their
incident and ended up dealing with a non-compliant individual who had no interest in
listening to the officers and instead decided to physically attack them. As one can see,
both of these officers made the same decision (i.e., to issue verbal commands to the
suspect) and observed the same aggressive, non-compliant behavior from the suspect, yet
in the final frame phase, Officer #168 decided to fire shots and Officer #217 held fire.
In sum, these findings suggest that suspects’ responses to officers’ commands
may not have as much of a direct influence on an officers’ decision to shoot or hold fire
as the original Binder and Scharf model had opined. True, the results do suggest that
more officers who dealt with non-compliant suspects ended up using deadly force
compared to those who did not shoot, but the fact that the number of officers who chose
not to shoot - despite being faced with an individual who posed a dangerous threat - was
relatively close to the number of officers who did choose to shoot is worth noting. If
anything, this finding demonstrates that both shooters and witness officers confronted
suspects who were not willing to comply, yet they still made different choices regarding
the use of deadly force. In addition, as exemplified by incidents presented above, shooters
and witness officers in the same incident can have similar reads of the suspect during this
phase, yet ultimately make different decisions regarding whether to use deadly force.
While the reason for this difference has yet to be determined, the response of the suspect
– or lack of response – does not definitively explain why some officers chose to shoot
and others did not.
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Line in the Sand
Furthermore, when describing how a suspect’s demeanor and physical appearance
can impact officers’ decision-making in the information exchange phase, Scharf and
Binder (1983) describe how officers can use this to form a metaphorical line in the sand.
That is, officers may create “if. . .then” conditions in their mind that would lead them to
make the decision to fire their weapon at a suspect, thus entering the final frame. For
example, if an officer is involved in an encounter with an armed individual, the officer
may tell himself or herself that if the suspect raises his or her weapon in the direction of
this officer, other officers, or citizens, then they will shoot.
This notion of drawing “lines in the sand” and how the creation of such lines are
not exclusive to shooters are illustrated by Incident 123, which involved two officers in
the sample (plus two who were not interviewed) who ultimately made different decisions
regarding their use of deadly force. These officers were responding to a call of an armed
individual at a local high school. While Officer #182 considered that they could have a
suicidal subject on their hands, Officer #188 explained that he believed it was an active
shooter inside the high school. Both officers arrived separately at different locations on
the high school grounds, but near the suspect, who was pacing back and forth outside the
school and carrying a rifle. Officer #182 took a position facing the suspect, while Officer
#188 ended up arriving at a location behind the suspect. Officer #182 and other officers
on scene (who were not interviewed) were issuing commands to the suspect to put his
weapon down, but the suspect failed to comply; instead he reportedly raised and lowered
the weapon in the direction of other officers on scene. At this point, Officer #188, who
had positioned himself behind the armed suspect, drew a line in the sand, explaining:
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I was looking. . .really trying to pay attention to everything was going on because
I was waiting for that moment when [the suspect] turned around and came back
[toward me]. If he saw me there, I thought in my mind [that] if he saw me, he was
gonna be like, “Oh, fuck” and he was gonna just draw and come up just out of
instinct. . .there's an officer there. . .boom. I had made my mind up. If he turned
towards me, I would have killed him.
The suspect had lifted and pointed his rifle in the direction of other officers, but
not at Officer #188, the witness officer. Had he fired at this point, he would have shot the
suspect in the back, something he was not willing to do. The suspect never turned around
to face Officer #188, which meant he did not cross this officer’s line in the sand, so
Officer #188 did not fire. He did make it clear, however, that had the suspect crossed that
line he drew in his head, he would have fired, explaining:
I watched [the suspect] point that gun towards [other officers] multiple times. It
was like three or four times he points his rifle. He just flat armed pointed.
Obviously, he's doing it in a threatening manner. I mean, if I'm gonna shoot
somebody with a rifle, I'm gonna come up, draw up, and the whole bit. But he
never really does that. There was no doubt in my mind if he had flipped around
and that gun had come up [toward me], he'd have been dead. I had a great shot.
Although Officer #188 chose to hold fire, another officer (Officer #182)
eventually fired shots at the armed student, bringing the standoff to a close.
Another example of an officer drawing a mental line in the sand but who held fire
was found in Incident 68. This incident, which involved three officers in the sample,
began when officers received a call reporting an individual with a grenade in a
courthouse. Officers #91 and #92 arrived on the scene and both agreed to enter the
courthouse to assess the situation. They took time to find a safe location relative to the
position of the suspect inside the courthouse and were soon joined by a few additional
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officers. Officer #92, the witness officer, recalled receiving a command for his supervisor
over the radio about how to handle the situation, explaining:
. . .you know, one of the lieutenants comes over the air and says. . .I mean to me
at the time it seemed really asinine, “Do not allow the man to move freely around
the building. Use any force necessary to prevent that.” It’s like well, I don’t care
about moving around the building – if he takes a step towards me he’s. . .I’m
going to use whatever force necessary.
At this point in the encounter, the suspect did not move and because of this,
Officer #92 held fire. As the situation progressed, however, the small group of officers in
the building made the decision as a collective that deadly force was necessary in order to
prevent the suspect from detonating the grenade and causing serious harm or death to
anyone in the blast radius. Officer #92 was ready and prepared to fire at the suspect, but
other officers on scene had fired before him and by the time he went to pull the trigger on
his weapon, he could see that the suspect had been hit by police gunfire and was no
longer a threat.
One final example of officers’ decisions to establish conditions under which they
would fire was found in Incident 59, which was the incident involving a student who had
barricaded himself in the classroom of his high school and to which four of the officers
interviewed responded. Once officers entered the school, located the suspect, and allowed
additional officers to arrive, the designated crisis negotiator (Officer #80) began verbally
communicating with the suspect. As this was going on, Officer #89 described how he
considered the circumstances under which he would use deadly force, explaining:
. . .that was the advantage of having had so much time to anticipate and pre-plan
and schema what he was going to do. So, you know, the decision in my mind had
already been made. If [the suspect] comes out with a gun pointed at anybody or
even in his hand, he’s probably going to get shot.
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Verbal communication with the suspect went on for about 45 minutes until the
suspect stood in the doorway of the classroom and raised his arm with the gun in his
hand, at which point Officer #89 fired at the suspect. When asked if he made a conscious
decision to fire his weapon and use deadly force, Officer #89 described his pulling the
trigger as a reaction to the suspect’s behavior, but felt this reaction was grounded in
considerations he had already made, saying:
I was reliant upon my own judgment and perception of what was happening to
make that decision for me. And fortunately, I guess, [the suspect] presented
himself in a schema that I had already anticipated or expected and I just reacted to
it, as opposed to him coming out in some unorthodox way where I would have
had to actually consciously say “Can I shoot him now?” or “Am I supposed to?”
or “Do I need to?” That thought never occurred. It was pure reaction.
Another officer involved in this incident, Officer #133, echoed Officer #89’s
mindset, explaining that he too had considered conditions under which he would shoot if
the suspect engaged in certain behaviors, explaining:
For me, it was pretty clear that – he was told numerous times not to grab the
weapon, not to touch the weapon, to set the weapon down, to leave the weapon in
the classroom and come out. He was given ample opportunity to do that over this
period of time. And when he grabbed that weapon and started to come up with it,
I was not waiting to see – or waiting for him to fire a round at us first. As soon as
he reached for the gun and became – I had made a decision that if he reached for
the gun and I saw him actually grab the gun that I was going to deploy my
weapon on him.
Officer #133 described his decision to fire his weapon at the suspect as a
conscious one, saying that he had already made the decision to fire had the situation
matched the conditions noted above. When the suspect moved toward the doorway and
toward officers with a gun in his hand, this officer fired multiple shots.
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These examples demonstrate that officers do, in fact, consider potential situations
in which they would make the decision to use deadly force, thus drawing a line in the
sand or creating an “if. . .then” scenario in their minds. These examples also show that
this behavior was not limited to officers who ultimately decided to fire shots. An officer
may fire shots when the suspect’s behavior matches that which the officer has designated
as his or her line in the sand, but if a suspect’s behavior does not cross this line, this may
explain why, at times, officers who held fire did just that. The creation of “if. . .then”
scenarios and mental models among shooters and witness officers in the information
exchange phase is yet another example of the similarities that exist in the decisionmaking of officers in potentially violent police-citizen encounters regardless of their
decision in the final frame.
In sum, the findings from the first three phases reveal that, regardless of whether
an officer chose to use deadly force, certain factors consistently impacted officers’
decision-making throughout their respective incidents. Both groups of officers, shooters
and witness officers, engaged in similar behaviors and decision-making patterns as they
related to retrieving and processing information in the anticipation phase, making direct
observations and refining their situational definitions in the entry phase, and the use (or
lack thereof) of verbal communication, perceptions of the suspects’ behavior and/or
demeanor, and “if. . .then” scenarios in the information exchange phase.
Once arriving at the final frame phase, however, notable differences among
shooters and witness officers began to emerge.
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FINAL FRAME
According to Binder and Scharf’s decision-making model, the final phase of the
incident is marked by an officer’s decision to use or not to use deadly force. That is, at a
certain point in high-risk police-citizen encounters, Binder and Scharf assert that an
officer will either decide that deadly force is necessary and make the decision to shoot, or
the officer will decide that the use of deadly force is not necessary and will choose to
hold fire. This decision was observed in the majority of the cases included in the sample
wherein officers made the decision to either fire their weapons or hold fire and executed
this action immediately following the decision to do so. There were instances, however,
in which officers did not make a decision to either use or not use deadly force during the
final frame of the incident. The following section will detail findings from the analyses
drawn from the final frame phase of officers’ decision-making process in order to finish
out these basic findings.

THE DECISION TO SHOOT OR HOLD FIRE
As noted previously, of the 83 police officers in the sample under analysis, 46
officers fired shots during the incident under consideration and 37 officers did not. Of the
46 officers who fired shots during their respective incidents, 32 of these officers made the
conscious decision to use deadly force and pull the trigger. These officers made the
decision that deadly force was necessary and executed this decision by firing at the
suspect for a number of different reasons. The most frequent reason reported by officers
for using deadly force was to protect himself or herself or a fellow officer from what they
believed to be an immediate threat to innocent life (n=21 officers). Additional reasons for
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why the shooters reported making the decision to fire included furtive, potentially
dangerous motions or other behavior exhibited by the suspect that led the officer to
believe the suspect posed a deadly threat (n=7), returning fire at a suspect who began
firing shots at him or her (n=2), being asked to fire shots at the suspect by a fellow officer
(n=1), and firing at the suspect because he/she saw the suspect was armed with a firearm
(n=1).
When analyzing the decision-making process during the final frame phase of the
37 officers in the sample who did not shoot, 19 of the officers reported that they did
consider shooting during the final frame but ultimately decided it was not necessary.
When asked why they considered shooting but ultimately decided against it, officers’
explanations included: another officer had already fired at the suspect (n=4 officers), the
officer did not feel threatened by the suspect at the time (n=3), by the time the officer
considered shooting, the suspect was no longer a threat (n=3), a fellow officer was in
his/her line of fire (n=3), he/she did not have a clear view of the suspect (n=2), he/she
could not see that the suspect was armed (n=2), and he/she did not feel they would be
justified in using deadly force at the time (n=2).
The descriptions of the above officers’ decision to either fire or hold fire are
consistent with how Binder and Scharf describe an officer’s decision-making during this
phase of the potential violent police-citizen encounter. Most of the officers in the sample
who used deadly force did so because they had determined that the use of deadly force
was necessary and they followed through with this decision. In addition, most of the
witness officers who did not fire did so because they made the decision that the use of
deadly force was not necessary at the time they considered shooting and, therefore, chose

85

to hold fire. What is perhaps most interesting, however, was that upon analyzing officers’
accounts during the final frame phase of their incident, it became clear that not all of the
officers in the sample fell into one of these two categories described by Binder and
Scharf.

IS THERE ALWAYS A DECISION?
Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making model is predicated on the
notion that all police officers involved in high-risk encounters with citizens make a
decision to either use deadly force or refrain from doing so, with the exception of
instances in which an officer’s firing behavior is the result of unconscious reaction. Some
of the narratives in this sample, however, suggest that not only do shooters not always
make the decision to shoot, but that witness officers do not always make the decision to
hold fire.
When analyzing the decision-making of the officers who decided to use deadly
force, it became clear that not every officer who fired shots made the decision to do so.
Where shootings go, 14 officers reported that pulling the trigger was not the result of a
conscious decision to fire their weapon, but rather, was a subconscious reaction to what
they perceived or defined as a threatening action by a suspect they faced. To demonstrate
this finding, three examples of this sort of shooting are provided below.
In Incident 18, two officers in the sample were involved in a vehicle pursuit of a
robbery suspect who police had been searching for over a four month period. When other
officers called out that they had located an individual driving the car associated with the
suspect, Officer #22, who had been involved in the investigation of the robberies,
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believed him to be the man he had been looking for and decided to join the pursuit. The
suspect later crashed his vehicle and fled on foot, leading officers, including Officers #22
and #119, to chase him on foot through a local neighborhood. As other officers were
attempting to set up a perimeter throughout the neighborhood to catch the suspect,
Officer #22 reported that at one point during the chase, the suspect drew a gun on Officer
#119 and threated to hurt him. Officer #22 issued commands to the suspect to drop his
weapon, but the suspect did not comply. Rather, he said to Officer #119, “I don’t want to
hurt you, but I’m going to [have to]. I’ll do [it]. You know I will.” Upon hearing the
suspect threaten his fellow officer, Officer #22 fired shots at the suspect. When asked
why he fired at the suspect, Officer #22 reported:
I don’t remember pulling the trigger. I remember seeing the gun. . .I don’t
remember the actual trigger pulls. I remember [the] gun, Kevin’s in trouble, get
your sights on target, and as soon as I got sights on target that’s when I started
shooting. That’s when the recoil started happening, you know? But I remember,
you know, as soon as those sights came on line that’s when the recoil started
happening and I don’t remember the trigger pull. And I really. . . I don’t
consciously remember thinking, “I need to shoot this guy.” I saw [the gun] and I
did it. You know, I saw, I did. There is that gap of. . .you know. . .I don’t
remember the thought process of “I need to shoot this guy” and I don’t remember
the thought process of “squeeze the trigger,” you know? So, all’s I remember is
“Get your sights up” and boom! That’s. . .you know. . .that’s how fast it was.
Officer #22 went on to describe that he had seconds to take action, as Officer
#119 was in danger of being seriously injured or killed by the suspect. Furthermore,
Officer #22 explained that Officer #119 did not have his weapon drawn at the time, so he
could not have fired shots to defend himself. He was able to process that the suspect was
armed, that Officer #119 was in trouble, and that he needed to raise his weapon, but he
had no sense that he made a conscious decision to pull the trigger.
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Two officers involved in Incident 59 provide additional examples of unconscious
firing behavior. As previously mentioned, this incident involved four officers who
responded to a local high school where an armed student had barricaded himself inside a
classroom. During the extensive negotiations that occurred (about 45 minutes to an hour
long), officers who had been waiting outside the classroom considered many possible
outcomes. Officer #89 described how he had created a line in the sand in his mind for the
suspect: if the suspect exited the classroom with the gun in his hand, he was going to
shoot. Later in the encounter, the suspect attempted to exit the classroom with a gun in
his hand in a raised position and pointed in the direction of the officers, at which time
Officer #89 fired shots.
Officer #89 explained that because he had considered this as a possibility and
made the conscious decision to fire if the suspect’s behavior met these conditions, his
shooting behavior was more of a reaction to the suspect’s behavior, explaining:
You know, there was no. . .you know, I prepared for it and obviously all my
training had prepared myself to take a shot like that. . .but there was no conscious
decision to do it. It was pure reaction. I mean, I had already made that conscious
decision beforehand, you know. . .if the threat presents itself I’m going to take the
shot. And so there was no thought process in it. It was just, you know, well, here’s
the scenario.
Another officer involved in this incident, Officer #135, had not drawn any sort of
proverbial line in the sand during negotiations, but rather described pulling the trigger as
an unconscious reaction to the suspect emerging from the classroom with a gun in his
hand, saying:
I don’t actually remember consciously pulling the trigger or coming up on target.
So it was just – just based on training. [I] just kind of just kicked into training
mode. I do not consciously remember in my brain saying, “I need to pull the
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trigger.” It just. . .I pulled the trigger. It was just a reaction to [the suspect]
presenting the gun.
The examples provided by Officer #89 and Officer #135 both demonstrate how
officers’ firing behavior can occur without conscious choice, but also provide two
different pathways to such behavior. For example, although Officer #89 reported that he
did not make a conscious decision to fire his weapon, he did acknowledge that he had
previously identified conditions under which he would fire and, when the suspect’s
behavior paired up with the mental boundaries that he had created, he fired his weapon
without conscious thought. In comparison, Officer #135 explained that he had not
previously considered conditions under which he would fire, but rather that his shooting
behavior could be best summed up as a simple reaction to the armed suspect emerging
from the classroom. This behavior on the suspect’s part was something Officer #135
recognized from training, which led him to shoot without consciously deciding to do so.
One last example of an officer’s unconscious decision to use deadly force comes
from Officer #92. This officer, along with one other officer (#106) in the sample, was
involved in Incident 69. These officers received a call of a man with a gun in a local
neighborhood. Upon arriving on scene and engaging in a brief search for the suspect from
their vehicle, the officers believed they found the individual matching the suspect
description provided to them by dispatch. When they issued commands to the suspect to
stop so they could talk with him, he fled on foot. Both officers chased after him.
At this point, Officer #92 drew his TASER because he did not see the suspect in
possession of a gun and, therefore, decided to use less-than-lethal force to prevent the
suspect from escaping. As he began to raise his TASER to fire, the suspect turned around

89

and faced Officers #92 and #106, lifting his sweatshirt up and reaching down into his
waistband. This movement suggested to Officer #92 that he was reaching for a weapon.
In the next moment, Officer #92 shot the suspect. He explained, starting when the suspect
first reached toward his waistband:
So, as he’s doing this, I’ve got the “Oh shit”. . .He’s reaching. I can’t see his right
hand. I don’t want my TASER in my hand anymore. I want my gun. Sight wise, I
can clearly remember him turning. I can clearly remember his right hand finally
coming into my view. I can remember [the suspect] doubled over tugging on that
gun. I mean, he was yanking on that gun. I can remember seeing that. I have the
visual memory of that, but my inner dialogue is, “I want to get rid of my TASER.
Oh crap, who just shot?” I don’t remember drawing my gun. I don’t remember
sighting my gun. And I do not remember the decision to pull the trigger.
Based on his narrative, Officer #92 was cognizant of his desire to switch from
holding his TASER to holding his gun, but when he heard the sound of a gunshot, he
struggled to understand where the shot came from. Little did he realize that he had not
only drawn his weapon and aimed it at the suspect, but that the shot he heard had come
from his firearm and that he was the one who had pulled the trigger. In sum, the three
aforementioned examples demonstrate how, consistent with Binder and Scharf’s
conceptualization of the final frame phase, not every officer who fires shots during a
high-risk police-citizen encounter makes the conscious choice to do so.
Upon analyzing the responses provided by officers who fired shots, there were
three officers whose decision to fire could not be classified as either conscious or
unconscious. For example, when asked directly if his decision to use deadly force was the
result of a conscious decision, one officer struggled with labeling how he came to pull the
trigger. In addition, there were two officers who fired shots at different times during their
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incident and shared that while one of their shots was the result of a conscious decision to
shoot, others may not have been. The stories of these three officers appear below.
Officer #117 became involved in Incident 88 when he and a fellow officer were
called to complete a welfare check at a local apartment complex. A neighbor reported
hearing loud moaning from the apartment next door and was concerned for the resident
inside. The officers arrived at the location and, when the resident was non-responsive to
their knocking, they located the maintenance man for the apartment complex who was
able to let them into the apartment. Once they entered the apartment, they were
confronted by a knife-wielding male. Both officers drew their weapons and issued
commands to the suspect to drop his weapon. The suspect was not compliant and, soon
after, Officer #117 used oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray in an attempt to disorient the
armed man. Because he thought the suspect would be subdued by the OC spray, Officer
#118 moved close to the suspect in an attempt to apprehend him. Instead, the suspect
began moving rapidly toward the officers and the maintenance man. At this point during
the encounter, Officer #117 shot the suspect. Officer #117 described the moment of his
trigger-pulling thusly:
The guy was like right on top of me. I mean within, you know, basically a little bit
further than arm’s length. So, you know, I had the barrel [of the gun] trained I
guess. . .basically center mass [on the suspect]. And, you know, I couldn’t have
really missed. So yeah. . .it could have been more of a reaction. . .I mean as I was
firing. . .it was happening so quick. I don’t know if I really had any conscious
thoughts going through my head.
When the interviewer returned to this portion of the incident at another point in
the interview, Officer #117 clarified his mindset at the time he fired the weapon, saying
that he believed his decision to fire was “a little bit of both” (conscious and unconscious).
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When asked to clarify why he classified his decision to fire as both conscious and
unconscious, he stated:
The unconscious I think it was more a reaction, but the conscious being, you
know, part of your training and, you know, aiming center mass and putting him
down. And, once again, you know, if I’m put in that situation, I’m going home at
night. So, I think that may have played a part as well. Yeah, it could be a little of
both.
Officer #117 recognized that his decision to shoot may have been a reaction to the
suspect approaching him with a knife at a rapid pace, but he also acknowledged that he
was cognizant of his training at the time (i.e., what he could or should do under such
circumstances). Furthermore, he reported being cognizant of his desire to survive the
encounter. To Officer #117, this consideration of training and thoughts of survival led
him to believe that there was some conscious thought behind his decision to shoot, but he
could not say with any sense of certainty if his was a conscious or unconscious decision
to pull the trigger.
The two officers whose trigger-pulling included some based on conscious choice
and some rooted in unconscious thought had a much clearer sense of how they came to
fire their guns. The first of these officers, Officer #29, was involved in Incident 20, the
case involving 16 officers who were pursuing a man who had fired shots at one of their
sergeants. He was one of the officers shot at when the suspect jumped from the bushes in
which he had been hiding. Officer #29 gave chase, along with other officers, and made
the conscious decision to fire multiple rounds at the fleeing suspect. When the suspect
collapsed, Officer #29 was one of the officers who surrounded the suspect and began
issuing verbal commands to him. When the suspect moved, Officer #29 fired a
reactionary shot at the suspect. He explained:
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I can’t tell you if [the suspect] reach[ed] for his gun or he just turn[ed] toward his
gun. But I remember movement towards the gun. What it was exactly, I don’t
know. I remember clearly the lieutenant yelling out, “He’s getting up!” “He’s
getting up!” or “He’s going for it!” or something he was yelling. Something of
that nature. And I fired first. . . At the time, it wasn’t. . .I don’t know so much
surprise as much as. . .[I] just reacted to it. I wasn’t consciously thinking about it.
It was just. . .he moved, I shot.
It is clear from Officer #29’s account that he made the conscious decision to fire
at the suspect early in the encounter (i.e., during the foot chase), but later fired a shot at
the suspect that was not the result of a conscious decision, but rather was an unconscious
reaction to the suspect’s movement.
The second officer who fired both consciously and unconsciously in a single
incident was Officer #104, who was one of two officers in the sample who responded to
Incident 46, the incident wherein officers responded to a call of shots fired at a nearby
community center. Soon after arriving on scene, the officers spotted the armed suspect
and followed him into the community center and issued commands to the suspect to drop
his weapon. The suspect had raised his shotgun a number of times as if he was going to
shoot, but never pointed it in the direction of the officers. When the suspect pointed his
weapon at the officers, however, Officer #104 fired. When asked if he made a conscious
decision to fire at the suspect at this time, he explained:
I don’t, I don’t think I actually said, “Ok, now!” It was just, “Okay, drop the gun,
drop the gun!” And the [the suspect] turned toward me and I let loose. So yeah, I
don’t. . .I don’t think I actually, you know, [thought] “Okay, now it’s time to
shoot the bad guy.” I reacted.
Although he fired shots at the suspect, the suspect was still able to move and
began running up the stairs in front of him. At this point, Officer #104 described his
conscious decision to hold fire at the fleeing suspect, saying:
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I followed [the suspect] for a good one to two seconds up those stairs as he ran
with my gun pointed directly at his back. And I actually made a conscientious,
conscience decision not to pull the trigger at that point because of bad press.
The suspect made it up the stairs and began poking his head and his shotgun
around the corner. Once the suspect had moved his weapon so that it was in a firing
position and directly facing the officers, Officer #104 made a conscious decision to fire,
explaining:
[The suspect] had both feet firmly planted and he swung the gun towards me
again. This time, having a good clean platform, I shot and I kept shooting until he
dropped. . . the second volley was absolutely 100 percent a conscious decision.
Findings from the officers described in this section indicate that not all officers
make a decision to use deadly force during the final frame of the incident. The notion of
firing as reaction, however, is addressed by Binder and Scharf. In their description of the
final frame phase, they do acknowledge that, at times, an officer’s shooting behavior can
be characterized as an “impulsive reaction” or a decision requiring “minimal rational
input” in response to a suspect’s behavior (Binder and Scharf, 1980, p. 118). Therefore,
while it is noteworthy that the decision to use deadly force was not made by all 46
officers who fired their weapons, this finding is consistent with the authors’ description
of the final frame.

NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE
When analyzing officers’ decision-making in the final frame and attempting to
pinpoint what would make one officer shoot and another hold fire, it quickly became
clear that many of the officers who held fire did not actually make a decision to hold fire,
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but rather never considered shooting at all during the final frame. Of the 37 witness
officers in the sample, 16 of these officers stated that they never considered the
possibility of shooting at any point during the encounter. There were many reasons why
these officers did not consider firing shots during their incident, including: they were
assigned to another task at the time (n=5 officers), they did not have their weapon out
(n=3), they were focused on attending to someone else (e.g., an injured officer) on scene
(n=3), their perception of their role prevented them from considering whether to fire shots
(n=2), the suspect was not facing them at the time (n=1), the suspect had already been hit
by police gunfire (n=1), and the incident transpired rapidly and they did not have time to
consider firing shots (n=1).
To provide additional understanding of why some of the officers present at
officer-involved shooters did not even consider using or not using deadly force, a few
examples of such occurrences are provided below.21
Officer #34 was involved in Incident 20, wherein 16 officers were involved in the
chase of a suspect who had fired upon one of their fellow officers. Upon his arrival on
scene, Officer #34 spoke with a citizen who lived in the neighborhood reporting that she
saw the suspect in the area and believed he could be hiding in the bushes nearby. Officer
#34 then found a group of officers standing near said bushes and alerted them that the
suspect may be close and recommended they back away from the bushes and find cover.
No sooner did he say this than the suspect jumped out of the bushes and open fired on the
officers.

21

Additional details regarding the five officers who did not consider shooting or holding fire because of
their assignments and the three officers who did not consider shooting because of their perceived role
during their incident will be discussed in a subsequent section of the dissertation (see Chapter 5).
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Along with other officers, Officer #34 began chasing after the suspect as he fled
down the street, but he never fired. When the suspect eventually collapsed from other
officers’ gunfire and multiple officers converged on the downed suspect, Officer #34 had
his gun out and ready should he need to use it. While standing there, he noticed that the
officer standing next to him was acting strangely. Officer #34 stated:
My gun is trained on the suspect and I can see [Paul] and he’s not focused. His
gun is up and he puts his gun down and he looks at himself and puts his gun back
up and he does it, like, twice. And for whatever reason, I got annoyed. I said,
“[Paul], what are you doing?” because this is a trained guy. He knows better than
to let his guard down and not be behind cover. And he says, “I think I’m hit.” And
I holstered my gun and I put my flashlight on his shirt and there was the tiniest,
tiniest, little hole in his shirt. And that’s the first time I remember being scared.
Upon seeing the hole in the other officer’s shirt, Officer #34 realized his fellow
officer had been shot and turned his attention away from the suspect and focused on
getting the injured officer from the scene and to a space where he could receive medical
attention. He stated:
I remember holstering my weapon and grabbing his right arm, kind of under his
arm and kind of supporting his arm. I think my goal was to get him down past all
the cars and get him down maybe, down below. . .so, you know, an ambulance
[could] respond there.
Because he chose to help the wounded officer, Officer #34 stopped focusing on
the downed suspect and, therefore, never considered shooting or not shooting the suspect
at this point during the encounter.
Another example of never considering shooting comes from Officer #118’s
account of Incident 88, which was the incident in which two officers responded to a
welfare check call at an apartment complex. Once the officers were able to enter the
apartment, they were confronted by a knife-wielding man inside and both officers began
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issuing commands to him to drop the weapon. After Officer #117 had used OC spray on
the suspect, Officer #118 made the decision to get close to the suspect and grab him
while the spray distracted him. He soon realized that the suspect was coming toward
Officer #117 and that Officer #117 may have no choice but to shoot. Officer #117 stated:
I took one step towards [the suspect] with the intention of grabbing him and it
only took one step and I realized that [Jimmy] wasn’t going to have a choice - he
was going to have to shoot him because he didn’t have the room and I didn’t have
the time to get to [the suspect] before he got to [Jimmy]. So, I immediately. . .and
everything started going through my head really quick. I go, “Okay he’s gonna
shoot him and I’m down range of this bullet.” I said, “This bullet [is] gonna go
through [the suspect] and from that point I don’t know where it’s gonna go.”
At this point, rather than contemplating whether to use deadly force, Officer #118
was trying to figure out how to avoid being hit by Officer #117’s bullets. Officer #118
continued:
So, I immediately start thinking what do I do. I just went to the right side wall and
I just put myself in front of it and I just held myself as close to that wall as I could
and I got there just about the time the first shot went off. After the first shot went
off, I looked over and I saw [the suspect]. He just stood there and he still had the
knife in the air. And then about maybe a second later, [Jimmy] shot a second time
and at that point I saw [the suspect] fall backwards to the ground.
As one can see from Officer #118’s description, he never considered whether he
should use deadly force because he was focused on his own safety (re: his partner’s
gunfire). His description suggests that he was confident enough that his partner was going
to use deadly force against the suspect that he needed to focus on his own safety.
Therefore, Officer #118 never considered whether to shoot or hold fire, as he was
preoccupied with removing himself from his partner’s line of fire.
Lastly, in addition to the 16 officers who never considered shooting and the 19
officers who considered shooting but chose to hold fire, there were two officers whose
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decision to hold fire may not have been a decision at all. When asked why they chose not
to shoot during their respective incidents, Officers #28 and #113 could not articulate why
they chose to hold fire. For example, Officer #113, was still in training at the time of
Incident 43, the previously mentioned incident wherein a non-compliant male armed with
multiple knives confronted her and her partner. Officer #113 explained that although she
had her gun drawn and pointed at the knife-wielding suspect approaching her and her
partner, she was unsure why she did not fire, explaining:
In my mind I was thinking this is exactly, you know, this is a perfect academy
scenario. There’s a guy with a knife approaching, he’s well within twenty-one
feet, and so I took the slack out of my trigger and at some point after that I heard
[my partner’s] shot. . .I don’t know [why I didn’t shoot]. I guess, you know,
whether I don’t know how much time there was between the time that I took the
slack out and the time that [my partner] shot or that [the suspect] was actually
shot. I really don’t have an answer to that question.
The other witness officer who struggled to understand why he held fire was
Officer #28 who was one of the 16 officers involved in Incident 20. His situation was
unique as he was the lone officer struck by the suspect’s gunfire. As he and other officers
were chasing after the suspect who had open fired on them, Officer #28 considered
shooting, as he put it:
I remember thinking about shooting his head. I don’t know why, but the thought
of shooting his head kept popping in my mind. When I think back about it. . .I
couldn’t have put my sights more centered on the back of his head than anything
else. I mean, I had it there. . .I remember I was squinting. I was looking through
my sights. I was looking at the back of his head and I had my trigger halfway
pulled. And I was ready. And uh. . .I don’t know what made me stop.
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SUMMARY
Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) provided scholars with a framework to analyze
police officers’ decision-making during high-risk police-citizen encounters that may or
may not conclude in police use of deadly force. They hypothesized that the difference in
whether an officer chooses to shoot or hold fire is best attributed to differences in
decisions and considerations that officers make throughout such incidents. The results
from this analysis disclose, however, that regardless of the decisions officers make in the
final frame, many officers thought and acted the same way during the time that preceded
the final frame phase.
In the anticipation phase, both shooters and witness officers collected information
about the situation and/or the suspect they would be encountering prior to arriving on
scene. It was also observed that both shooters and witness officers considered the source
of the information they were receiving (e.g., from a fellow officer, dispatcher, or citizen).
Once they arrived on scene and entered the entry and initial contact phase, both shooters
and witness officers continued to collect more information about the situation and the
suspect through direct observation and used these observations to alter their
understanding of the situation at hand. Furthermore, both shooters and witness officers
reported communicating with other officers on scene to share the information they had
about the suspect or the situation at hand. Finally, both shooters and witness officers
reported considering their personal safety and the safety of other officers during the entry
phase, leading many of them to make decisions that they felt reduced their likelihood of
being injured or killed (e.g., considering safe, tactical approaches to the scene or toward
the suspect, and drawing their firearms).
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When officers did enter in the information exchange phase, both shooters and
witness officers used this time to communicate with suspects, most commonly issuing
commands to suspects to drop their weapon. It appeared that these officers, both shooters
and witness officers, issued commands with the goal of gaining control over the suspect
and the situation. In addition, both shooters and witness officers made similar
interpretations of suspects’ physical demeanor and described how this impacted their
view of the situation and subsequent decision-making. Lastly, both shooters and witness
officers formed “if. . .then” mental models (or drafted lines in the sand) to help frame
their shooting behavior. Regardless of whether they eventually followed through with
such thoughts, it is important to note that both officers who later fired shots and those
who did not sometimes considered during the information exchange phase the possibility
that deadly force may become necessary.
After reviewing officers’ decision-making behavior in the anticipation, entry, and
information exchange phases, it is clear that more similarities than differences exist in the
thought processes of shooters and witness officers. This leads to the following question:
if stark differences between shooters and witness officers do not exist during the first
three phases of police-citizen encounters, what explains why some officers shoot and
others hold fire? This question is addressed in subsequent chapters of the dissertation.
Before doing so, however, some consideration of what the analysis in this chapter says
about the final frame is in order.
Conception of the final frame is predicated on the notion that police officers make
the determination that deadly force is either necessary or unnecessary and, based on this
determination, follow up with a decision to use or not use deadly force. Binder and
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Scharf do acknowledge, however, that there may be times when officers’ shooting
behavior can be best described as a mere reaction to a suspect’s action, not a conscious
decision to pull the trigger. Some of the findings presented in this chapter support this
argument.
Additional findings, however, indicated that some officers who did not shoot
never considered using deadly force at all. The results suggest that not all officers enter
Binder and Scharf’s final frame, which Binder and Scharf fail to consider. This finding
thus indicates that there exists a notable hole in the Binder and Scharf deadly force
decision-making framework. This matter will be revisited later in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DEADLY FORCE DECISION-MAKING AND THE IMPACT
OF OTHER OFFICERS
The first research question this study was designed to assess was how well Binder
and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework accounted for officers’ thoughts
and actions in police-citizen interactions in which some officers present discharged their
firearms and some officers held fire. The core finding was that officers processed through
the decision-making framework in a linear fashion and made decisions and carried out
actions in each of the four phases encompassed in the framework.
To explain why some officers shoot and other officers hold fire in similar
situations, Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) assert that the two sorts of officers make
different decisions as they move through the phases that precede the final frame of the
encounters. That is, perhaps officers who choose to use deadly force consider different
situational factors or make different decisions in the first three phases compared to
officers who choose to hold fire.
To assess whether Binder and Scharf’s hypothesis described above holds, the
second research question this study examined was: Given the same situation, do stark
differences in how police officers move through the Binder and Scharf decision-making
process account for why some officers chose to use deadly force and some chose not to
use deadly force? The results described in the previous chapter indicate that although
officers sometimes made different decisions in the final frame phase, shooters and
witness officers did not always consider different factors or make significantly different
decisions during the anticipation, entry and initial contact, and information exchange
phases. In their work, Binder and Scharf (1983) assert that differences in how officers
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move through this decision-making model (i.e., decisions they make and factors that
impact these decisions) account for why some ultimately choose to use deadly force
while others choose to hold fire. In contrast, the results from this study suggest this is not
the case. If a significant difference in how officers move through high-risk situations does
not account for why some officers shot while others did not, what does explain this
difference in action during the final frame phase?
This chapter will begin with a brief review of the similarities observed among
shooters and witness officers in the first three phases of Binder and Scharf’s deadly force
decision-making framework. Next, the stated reasons for shooting or holding fire
provided by the officers in the sample will be reviewed in order to shed light on how the
presence of and actions of other officers on scene impacted officers’ decision-making
during the final frame stage of encounters. The chapter will then conclude with a
discussion of how social roles during a deadly force incident can influence officers’
decision-making throughout a potentially violent police-citizen encounter where multiple
officers are present.

EARLY PHASE CONSIDERATIONS
The majority (n=55) of the 83 officers in the sample, regardless of their decision
in the final frame phase, used the first phase of Binder and Scharf’s decision-making
framework to collect and review known information about the situation and/or the
suspect. Of the 55 officers who engaged in this behavior, 30 eventually fired shots during
their incident and 26 held fire. While there is a slight difference between these figures,
that many officers on both sides of the shooting divide comported themselves similarly
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indicates that differences in phase one do not account for different outcomes. Eleven (11)
additional officers reported that they relied on information they had previously acquired
about the suspect who, when alerted to the incident by dispatchers, they believed to be
involved. Rather than taking the time en route to the scene to collect additional
information about the suspect, these officers made the decision to work with the
information they already had. Of these 11 officers, six (6) officers ended up using deadly
force during their incident and five (5) did not. Again, while there is a very slight
difference in these figures, it is certainly not enough to say that stark differences in
officers’ behavior during this first phase account for their behavior differences in the final
frame.
When analyzing officers’ behaviors in the entry phase, one can see that the
majority of the officers in the sample, regardless of their decision to use deadly force in
the final frame, continued to collect information about the situation and the suspect
through direct observation (54 officers; 27 shooters, 25 witness officers). Furthermore,
both shooters and witness officers used the additional information collected during this
phase of the encounter to assess and adjust their definition of the situation at hand. In
sum, while there were slight differences in the counts of shooters and witness officers
who engaged in these behaviors, they are not enough to suggest striking differences in
how officers processed through this second phase.
Finally, when analyzing officers’ decision-making and considerations made
during the information exchange phase, more similarities as opposed to differences were
discovered among shooters and witness officers. Of the 38 officers in the sample who
made verbal contact with the suspect in their incident, 24 of them fired shots during the
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final frame phase and 14 did not. Furthermore, of the 46 officers in the sample who did
not enter the information exchange phase (either because their incident unfolded quickly
or because they did not issue verbal commands to the suspect), 23 officers ultimately
used deadly force and 23 did not. Binder and Scharf note that information collected
through verbal exchanges between officers and suspects and the suspect’s response to
said communication can ultimately impact officers’ decision-making in the final frame
phase. Findings from this study suggest, however, that even when verbal communication
was used and exchanges between the police and suspect occurred, there is still variation
that existed in the decision to shoot. Furthermore, in instances where officers did not
verbally communicate with the suspect (which, arguably, limited their ability to collect
additional information about the suspect’s intentions, state of mind, etc.), a variation in
the decision to use deadly force also existed. Given the number of similarities that are
present in the decisions and behaviors of officers throughout the first three phases of
Binder and Scharf’s framework then, what accounts for the difference in officers’
decision to use deadly force?
The analysis suggests that rather than being the result of significant differences in
decision-making or factors considered by officers in the first three phases of Binder and
Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework, the difference in whether officers
used deadly force or held fire in their incidents was largely influenced by the presence of
other officers on scene. The remainder of this chapter explores and expands on the nature
of this social influence. It begins with an examination of officers who made conscious
choices to fire their weapons, then follows with an examination of officers who did not
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consider using deadly force, and concludes with the examination of officers who
unconsciously fired their weapons.

OTHER OFFICERS AND THE DECISION TO USE DEADLY FORCE
As noted previously, 32 police officers in the sample made the conscious decision
to use deadly force. During their interviews, officers were asked directly if they made a
conscious decision to fire their weapon and, if so, why they chose to do so. The 32
officers who made the conscious decision to fire gave numerous explanations for why
they chose to fire. All but two of these officers indicated that the presence of or the
decisions made by other officers had some influence on their choice to shoot.
Incident 9, which involved four officers in the sample, included two officers who
made the conscious decision to fire in order to protect one of their own. Two officers
(Officer #9 and Officer #16) had been conducting an investigation of an armed robbery of
a gas station that had occurred the previous night. In addition to surveillance video of the
incident, a witness had come forward with the license plate number of the suspect’s
vehicle. The officers ran the license plate number and found that the make and the model
of car registered to those plates matched the vehicle in the surveillance video. These
officers then made the decision to drive to the residence associated with the vehicle
registration to see if, in fact, this was the vehicle – and suspect – for which they were
looking.
They called two additional officers to assist them in the case (Officers #10 and
#13) and once all four officers arrived on scene, they drafted a plan to make contact with
the suspect: Officers #9 and #16 would stay in the front of the suspect’s home and
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attempt to knock on the door to initiate contact while Officers #10 and #13 would keep
watch around the back of the suspect’s home in case he attempted to flee. Officer #9
approached the front door to the suspect’s home, knocked, and then announced himself as
a police officer. The suspect proceeded to open the door with a gun held at his waist.
Officer #9 issued commands to the suspect to drop the weapon and made sure to do so
loud enough that the other officers on scene could hear that the suspect was armed. When
the suspect did not comply with his orders and began to point his weapon in the direction
of his partner, Officer #9 decided to shoot, saying:
. . .When he comes up and I see that gun and I yell “Police! Drop the gun! Police!
Drop the gun!” I mean, that’s all the time it took. I mean as soon as I yell
“Police!” the first time, I mean, I got the words out the second time, and it was. .
.it was trigger time. You know, it wasn’t like I was waiting for him to point at me.
That was not the deciding factor cause, uh, the way he was coming out and
pointing the gun, waist-level, that’s until in the general direction of [my partner]
behind this truck.
During this interview, the interviewer asked Officer #9 for clarification about his
decision to fire, asking him that if his partner had not been in the area where the suspect
pointed his weapon, would he have still made a decision to fire? Officer #9 responded by
saying, “No—if I’d been the only officer there, nobody else around, and [the suspect]
was pointing at nothing, I would not have fired until that gun came towards me.”
His partner, Officer #16, also made the conscious decision to fire shots at the
suspect, citing that his decision to fire was based on his concern for Officer #9 who was
right in front of the suspect. He explained:
[My partner] knocked on the door a second time, knocked on the door a third
time, [and] by that time the door opens slow and shuts. Now we’re yelling,
“Police! Police! Come out. We want to talk to you. Show us your hands! Step out
of the door!”. . .you know, all these commands are starting to come across. I
believe we’re both yelling. And uh not only do [I] see the gun, [but my partner]
107

sees a gun and I’m yelling, “Gun” to make sure he’s aware of the gun and he’s
doing the same thing to make sure that I’m aware of it. . . I’m firing to protect
[my partner]. The gun looked like it was first going up in his direction.
The responses provided by Officers #9 and #16 highlight how both were
concerned for each other’s safety during the incident. Although Officer #9 was closer to
the armed suspect and feared for his safety, the reason he decided to shoot was to protect
his partner who he believed would be in the line of fire had the suspect started shooting.
Similarly, Officer #16 made the decision to fire at the suspect based on his perception
that his partner was at risk of being shot.
Although both of these officers fired shots at the suspect, the suspect was still able
to shoot a number of rounds at the officers, leading these two officers to fire multiple
rounds at him. A third officer involved, Officer #13, who was originally assigned to the
back of the suspect’s home in case he attempted to flee, heard the gunfire and made his
way around to the front of the house to assist the two officers who were firing shots.
Officer #13 was the one officer in the sample who made the decision to use deadly force
at the request of another officer, saying:
I immediately said “Shit!” to myself. And I took off running. I came around the
opposite end of the trailer where they were at. While I was running I heard several
shots. As I come up around the corner of the trailer I saw [Officer #16] engage
some more rounds and I could see that the front door was opened and [Officer
#16] was shooting into the trailer. And he looked at me [and] he goes “Mike,
cover me, I got to reload.” So I came around, I positioned myself and . . .knowing
[another officer] was on the other side [of the house] if I was going to shoot, I
kind of squatted down, so I would shoot upwards at an angle and I shot two-two
round bursts.
Later in the interview, Officer #13 was asked to clarify his decision to fire his
weapon. While he acknowledged that part of his decision was a response to a fellow
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officer asking for cover so he could reload his firearm, the other part of his decision to
fire was to ensure that the suspect did not harm other officers, saying:
. . .my major concern was that this guy would come out while [Officer #16] was
trying to reload. And then when I knew the location where [the suspect] was at, I
thought that there was a good chance I could hit him if I shot where I shot. So my
thought was to stop the threat as soon as possible. And um, that’s why I engaged.
. . what I want to do is put an end and put a stop to what I thought was an
aggressive act towards the other officers.
While his decision may not have been as straightforward as the decisions made by
Officers #9 and #16, the two main influences on his firing decision involved other
officers. Not only did Officer #16 ask for Officer #13 to provide cover (in the form of
gunfire) while he reloaded his weapon, but Officer #13 also acknowledged his concern
for other officers on scene and the impact it had on his decision to pull the trigger. In
sum, Incident 9 included three officers whose conscious decisions to use deadly force
provide clear examples of how this decision was influenced by other officers on scene.
The fourth officer involved in the incident, Officer #10, did not fire shots, but rather
chose to hold fire.
Incident 103 provides another example of an officer making the conscious
decision to use deadly force to protect a fellow officer. This was the incident that
involved two officers and began when an officer on his way to work spotted a highway
patrol officer in a physical altercation with a driver he had stopped. He explained his
initial observations, saying:
I remember seeing [Officer #152] at the side of the [driver’s] car trying to yank
this guy out from the driver’s seat and the driver’s door was open and I hear gears
grinding and I hear tires squealing and I see the car start to gun forward and I see
Bruce still in trying to get this guy out of the driver’s seat. . ..[Officer #152] is
between the door and the car frame and seconds later, as the car started moving, I
see [Officer #152] drop out of the picture. I yelled, “Trooper, are you okay?” and
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I got no response. . .all I could think of was him getting crushed between that door
and the car or getting crushed between the car and the jersey wall and I realized I
had to stop that car.
At this point, Officer #147 fired multiple shots at the suspect, with the goal of
stopping the driver from moving the vehicle forward and potentially running over Officer
#152 (the highway patrol officer). Officer #147 later stated in his interview that at the
time he pulled the trigger, he was completely sure that if he did not use deadly force at
the moment he did, Officer #152 would have been seriously injured or killed. When
asked to rate the likelihood that he or citizens in the area would have been injured or
killed had he not fired when he did, Officer #147 reported that these outcomes were
highly unlikely. Therefore, it was clear that his sole concern, and reason for using deadly
force, was to ensure the safety of a fellow law enforcement officer.
One last example to demonstrate how officers’ conscious decision to use deadly
force was influenced by concern for the safety of other officers can be observed in
Incident 123. This was the incident that involved two officers in the sample who
responded to a call reporting a student armed with a rifle outside of a local high school.
Officer #182 was the second officer to arrive at the school and soon witnessed the suspect
raising the rifle up and pointing it at himself, explaining:
At the time, [the suspect] was pointing [the gun] at his head and even brought it
down and held it up to his chin. He had pointed it in all different directions. He
leveled off at two of the officers that were basically together at the same car very
briefly, and then he lowered it, returned to putting it at his head and so forth
during the times they were trying to negotiate with him to put the gun down. .
.you know, “You don’t want to do this,” this and that, and everything. He leveled
that gun off again and this time he more or less buried it in his shoulder as to
steady the weapon, to fire it, aiming for the officers. I just told myself this [had
gone on] far enough. I had to do something so I did. I shot three times and hit him
twice.
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Officer #182 went on to clarify that he never personally felt threatened by the
armed suspect. Instead, his primary concern was for the two officers who were standing
in the direction where the suspect continued to aim his rifle, saying:
At no time did I feel threatened. I felt that I had positioned myself tactically. I was
behind a car to where, you know, I could fend for myself. [The suspect]
concentrated his efforts on the two officers and himself and the second time he
pointed it at the two officers I just thought to myself, “I’m not gonna let this
happen,” so I shot.
In sum, the examples provided above demonstrate a common pattern observed
among officers who made the conscious decision to use deadly force: the decision to pull
the trigger made by many officers in the sample was influenced by other officers. That is,
the majority of those who made a conscious decision to use deadly force did so with the
goal of protecting other officers on scene.
In their summary of the final frame and factors they believe influence an officer’s
decision-making at this point during an encounter, Binder and Scharf do not address how
other officers may impact a single officer’s decision to pull the trigger. Again, their
failure to address the potential for other officers to impact an individual officer’s
decision-making may have been due to the data they analyzed and a lack of interviews
with officers involved in violent police-citizen encounters in which more than one officer
was present. The findings from this study then contribute to what is known about
officers’ decision-making in the final frame when multiple officers are involved,
specifically that an officer’s decision to use deadly force can be strongly influenced by
their perception of other officers’ safety and their desire to protect other officers from
serious injury or death at the hands of a suspect.
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OTHER OFFICERS AND THE CONSCIOUS DECISION TO HOLD FIRE
As previously mentioned, 19 of the 37 officers in the sample who did not shoot
made the conscious decision to hold fire. In their conceptualization of the final frame
phase of their decision-making framework, Scharf and Binder (1983) assert that a nonshooting officer enters this phase when he or she makes the determination that, based on
the situation and level of threat in front of them, the use of deadly force is not necessary.
The officer will then make the conscious decision to refrain from firing his or her
weapon. The findings from the analysis reveal that, similar to the officers described in the
previous section whose decision to use deadly force was impacted by other officers,
officers’ decision to hold fire can also be influenced by other officers involved in the
incident.
First, it should be stated that nine (9) of the 19 officers who made the decision to
hold fire in their incidents did so independent of any influence by the presence of or
decisions made by other officers on scene. Three (3) officers reported making the
decision not to shoot because they did not feel personally threatened by the suspect at the
time. Two (2) additional officers shared that they held fire during their incident because
they could not see the suspect at the time other officers fired shots. Two (2) officers
reported that they did not fire because they could not see the suspect’s weapon. Lastly,
two (2) officers stated that they did not feel their use of deadly force would be justified at
the time, so they made the decision to not to shoot.
The remaining 10 officers who made the decision to hold fire in their incidents
reported that their decision to refrain from shooting was influenced by other officers in
one of two ways: by the presence of another officer or by a decision made by another
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officer. For example, three (3) officers reported that they made the decision to hold fire
not because they had determined that the suspect was no longer a threat, but instead
because a fellow officer was in their line of fire. Therefore, their decision to refrain from
shooting had little to do with the perceived threat level of the suspect in their incident and
more to do with maintaining the safety of other officers involved in the incident.
An example of this can be found in Incident 46, during which two officers in the
sample responded to a call of shots fired at a nearby community center. One of these
officers, Officer #69, made it clear that his decision to hold fire had everything to do with
ensuring he did not hit his partner with gunfire. Soon after arriving on scene, the officers
spotted the armed assailant, followed him into the community center, and issued
commands for him to drop his shotgun. The suspect failed to comply with the officers’
request and instead continued to make his way through the community center. Officer
#69 explained:
We see [the suspect] moving up the stairs and he stopped and kind of turned about
halfway up and was yelling at us “Don’t come in here!” And we’re continuing to
yell, “Put the weapon down!” [My partner] is in front of me. . .right in front of
me. I’m behind him as we move up to the first pillar and we see the suspect kind
of turn and go to the left behind a wall. . . Suspect comes back, shotgun lowered
at us. [My partner] was in front of me [and he] fires several shots. I had my finger
on the trigger. I think I was starting to press, but [my partner’s] head was just
right in front of me. So, I didn’t.
As one can gather from this example, Officer #69 considered the suspect to be a
serious threat. After all, this officer had his weapon drawn and his finger on the trigger
ready to fire. At the moment where he presumably was going to make the decision to fire,
however, his partner was directly in front him. The fact that his partner was in his line of
fire directly influenced Officer #69’s decision to hold fire because had he made the
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decision the fire, his partner could have been very seriously injured or killed by his
gunfire.
Another example of similar behavior was observed in Officer #217’s decision to
hold fire in Incident 118, the one in which two homicide detectives were searching for a
suspect wanted in a recent homicide. When the officers first approached the suspect and
issue commands for him to get down on the ground (as he was under arrest), the suspect
instead charged at Officer #168 and engaged him in a physical fight and attempted to
steal his firearm. Officer #217 watched as this unfolded, aware that the suspect posed a
threat to his partner, but cognizant of his partner’s close location to the suspect and how
the use of deadly force would factor in, saying:
I’m watching the [suspect] and he turns towards [my partner] and he gets right up
on my partner. . .I’m thinking holy shit. . .I have no idea why this is happening.
I’ve never seen this before. And I think I started some back steps, continued the
commands, and you know, a split second later [the suspect] makes his turn. [My
partner, myself, and the suspect are] no longer in a triangle. Now we’re in a
straight line. Me, looking at the back of the suspect and going towards the front of
my partner. So, we’re in a crossfire now.
As he was recounting the incident, Officer #217 voiced his concern that the
suspect would be able to maneuver his partner’s weapon away from him and potentially
use it against both officers. This led Officer #217 to fear not only for his partner’s safety,
but also for his own. Although he had his weapon drawn and he recognized that the
suspect posed a deadly threat, Officer #217 made it clear that because his partner was in
his line of fire, he made the decision to not shoot. His partner was eventually able to
shoot the suspect, concluding the incident.
The interviewer later asked Officer #217 if his decision-making at this point
during the encounter would have been different had his partner not been able to fire a
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shot at the suspect when he did (thus incapacitating him). Officer #217 found the
question tough to answer, saying that, “. . .at the moment that [my partner] took the shot,
the distance that I had was still a little more than I would have liked to take a shot with
[my partner] being that close [to the suspect].” It is clear that the positioning of his
partner in relation to the suspect was a critical concern for Officer #217 and ultimately
impacted his decision to hold fire even though the suspect continued to fight his partner.
One last example was observed in Incident 53, which involved two officers in the
sample. These officers were on patrol together when they received a call from another
officer reporting that he had spotted a robbery suspect they had been searching for and
needed back-up. They drove to the reported location and saw a man matching the
description of the suspect wanted for the robbery. The officers exited their vehicles and
attempted to make verbal contact with the man, at which point the suspect took off
running. Officer #91 began chasing the suspect on foot, with his partner, Officer #75,
close behind him. Both officers reported seeing the suspect draw a weapon, which led
them both to draw their weapons as well. When the suspect began to turn around toward
officers with his weapon, Officer #75 reported that she was aware of the deadly threat
posed by the suspect to herself and her partner and she had made the conscious decision
to fire, but when she went to raise her weapon to shoot, she quickly opted to hold fire,
explaining:
So then [the suspect] starts running and then he ends up pulling a gun out and
kind of turning towards us, but [my partner and I] were both kind of like running
at him. . .and Nick was kind of in front of me at that point, so I didn’t shoot
because there were people down the street from me and because Nick was just a
little bit ahead of me, so he kind of. . .he would have been in my line of fire.
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Her partner, Officer #75, had fired shots at the suspect just seconds prior to
Officer #91 making the decision to hold fire. After she had recounted her incident and the
decisions she made, the interviewer asked Officer #75 to consider whether she would
have used deadly force had her partner not fired. She replied no, reasoning that “because
[my partner] was in my way and because I was really concerned, you know, because. . .at
the end of the block there’s a bunch of people in the crosswalk. It’s the middle of the
afternoon.” Furthermore, when asked what she would have done had her partner not been
in front of her and had citizens not been down the block and in her line of fire, Officer
#75 responded that, given that situation, she would have most likely decided to use
deadly force. Based on these findings, it is apparent that her concern for possibly striking
her partner (as well as citizens) with gunfire played a pivotal role in her decision to hold
fire.
In addition to other officers’ presence impacting officers’ decision to hold fire,
the decisions made by other officers on scene also factored into officers’ decisions to
refrain from using deadly force. For example, seven (7) officers reported holding fire in
their incident because a fellow officer on scene had already shot the suspect, thus
eliminating the threat posed by this individual. A good example of this type of decisionmaking was observed in Officer #172’s thinking during the final frame of Incident 26, the
one wherein four officers went to a bail bondsman’s office to arrest an individual wanted
on a family violence warrant. Once the altercation began, Officer #172 saw that the
suspect was holding a firearm. Upon seeing the weapon, and coupled with the suspect’s
non-compliant behavior, Officer #172 decided that the use of deadly force was necessary.
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In his mind, this suspect was now “a cop killer. . .I wasn’t thinking anything other than
we gotta put him down.”
Officer #172 soon realized that, based on the position of other officers, that he
could not use deadly force against the suspect without potentially hitting another officer
with police gunfire. Similarly, he realized that other officers could not shoot without
endangering him. As Officer #172 said, “I wasn’t helping the situation anymore, so I
kinda looked at [another officer] and went, “Sorry, man” and I jumped off of [the
suspect] and I gave him a shove on the way out. And then that’s when the shots were
fired.”
By distancing himself from the suspect, Officer #172 was giving other officers the
space they needed to use deadly force against the suspect without compromising officer
safety. Once he pushed off the suspect and created space between himself and the
suspect, however, Officer #172 was knocked down on the ground. He still managed to
draw his weapon and, up until this moment, was still moving forward with the decision to
use deadly force, explaining:
So, I landed on the ground and I fell on my butt, and then when I got up and unholstered my weapon the fight was over. . . I popped up ready to fight and [the
suspect is] not anywhere where I can shoot him anymore. . . If I’d shot him it
would’ve been murder even at this point.
As one can see, this officer had made the decision to use deadly force, yet when
other officers were able to fire rounds at the suspect before he could, Officer #172 made
the decision to refrain from shooting. This example demonstrates two important points to
consider. First, an officer’s determination that deadly force may be necessary and their
decision to use or not use deadly force are not always made at the same point in the
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encounter. Although Officer #172 determined that he was going to use deadly force
against the suspect when he spotted that the assailant had a weapon in his hand, he did
not immediately fire, instead holding off on pulling the trigger until his fellow officers
were out of his line of fire. Second, decisions made by the other officers on scene (i.e.,
the decision to shoot) ultimately altered the original decision he had made, leading
Officer #172 to hold fire as opposed to following through with his original decision
which had been to use deadly force.
Another example of how other officers’ decisions to fire caused an officer to
decide to hold fire was observed in Officer #185’s account of his participation in Incident
124, the one in which four officers in the sample were executing the search warrant of a
home suspected of being using to house illegal narcotics. Officer #213, one of the first
officers in the entry line, quickly spotted one of the shooting assailants and fired shots.
Another officer, Officer #185, explained that once gunfire rang out and officers saw a
fellow officer drop out of the line because he had been struck by a bullet from one of the
suspects, “everybody went into defensive mode.”
Officer #185 helped a few other officers carry the downed officer out of the house
to safety, but then quickly made his way back into the home, weapon drawn, and ready to
apprehend the suspects who had opened fire on them. Once he entered the home for the
second time, however, he soon found another officer near one of the suspects and
determined that the use of deadly force was no longer necessary, describing that “the guy
was down. He was dead.” During the interview, the interviewer asked Officer #185 if he
could have fired at the suspect prior to exiting the house with the downed officer, to
which he responded, “Oh, yeah,” but made the decision not to, explaining:
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Well, you don’t – first of all, initially you had three people who discharged their
weapon, then down to two, then you’re – because you’re in the back, you don’t
want to reach over somebody or somebody getting in front of you. . .
Officer #185 recognized that multiple officers were returning fire at the suspects
in the home and, even if he had made the decision to fire, he was in the back of the entry
line. Based on his positioning then, he had other officers in front of him engaging in a
very dynamic situation. There was no guarantee that if he had used deadly force that a
fellow officer would not have inadvertently crossed into his line of fire. In sum, Officer
#185 explained that although he identified this as a situation that warranted the use of
deadly force, he decided not to shoot because other officers had already fired.

OTHER OFFICERS AND THE CONSIDERATION OF DEADLY FORCE
As mentioned in the previous chapter, 16 of the 37 officers who did not shoot
never even considered firing during their respective incidents. Similar to how the
presence and actions of other officers on scene impacted the decision-making of officers
in the sample who made the conscious decision to fire or the conscious decision to hold
fire, other officers played a pivotal role with regard to the decision-making of officers
who never considered using or not using deadly force.
How is it that an officer can impact whether another considers using deadly
force? When analyzing the decision-making processes of the 16 officers who did not
consider shooting, it became clear that the presence of (or actions of) other officers can
eliminate the need for another officer to consider whether to use deadly force. Of the 16
officers who did not consider shooting, six (6) of these officers found themselves in such
a position because of decisions made early in the encounter or because of situational
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circumstances that were beyond their control. That is, three (3) of these six officers did
not consider using or not using deadly force because they did not have their firearm
drawn and ready by the time other officers took the suspect under fire, one (1) officer
explained that he never had to make the decision to shoot or not to shoot because of the
position of the suspect in relation to himself, one (1) officer reported that he simply did
not have time to consider using deadly force before the conclusion of the incident, and
one (1) officer reported that he did not have to consider whether to use deadly force
because by the time he came into contact with the suspect in his incident, the suspect had
committed suicide.
The remaining 10 officers who did not contemplate whether to fire, however,
were arguably in that position either because of actions undertaken by other officers or
because an injured officer on scene needed assistance. For example, three (3) of these 10
officers were unable to consider whether to shoot or hold fire because they were
preoccupied by someone else on scene at the time that another officer (or officers) fired.
A clear example of this was observed in the account of Officer #34, who was involved
with 15 other officers in Incident 20, wherein officers searched for a suspect who had
fired at one of their sergeants. After the first gunfire exchange between arriving officers
and the suspect, officers continued to pursue and fire at the suspect, who eventually
collapsed on the ground and officers converged around him. At this time, Officer #34 had
his weapon drawn, pointed at the suspect, and was prepared to use deadly force if it was
necessary, but soon noticed that the officer next to him was “not focused” on the downed
suspect but instead was examining his shirt. Officer #34 asked this officer what his
problem was, only to find out that this officer had been struck by the suspect’s bullets
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during the first exchange of gunfire. At this point, Officer #34 decided to transport the
injured officer to the hospital and removed himself from the scene of the incident. In this
case then, Officer #34 never made a decision regarding whether to shoot or not to shoot
at this point because his focus was on attending to a fellow officer who he believed to be
seriously injured.
The additional two officers who did not consider using deadly force were
involved in Incident 124, the incident in which multiple officers were executing a search
warrant of home suspected of housing illegal narcotics. While one of the officers
involved in this incident (Officer #213) made the decision to fire at the suspects to
prevent other officers from being injured or killed, two other officers in the line-up,
Officers #183 and #184, never made a decision regarding whether to shoot because they
made the decision to attend to the downed officer and remove him from the house. By the
time these two officers had safely removed the injured officer and went back into the
home, the incident had concluded.
As one can see in the two just-mentioned incidents, these three officers had
focused their attention on someone else besides the suspect in their respective incidents,
thus removing the need for them to make a decision about whether to use deadly force.
But they were able to do this because other officers were involved and focused on the
suspect. In fact, when recounting his incident and his decision to leave the scene and take
his fellow officer to the hospital in Incident 20, Officer #34 explained that once they
arrived at the hospital, he made the decision to stay there with the injured officer because
“nobody [else] would have been with him for a period of time.” Officer #34 felt that it
was important that he did not leave this other officer alone, but made it clear that he felt
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comfortable staying at the hospital and not returning to the scene because there had been
enough officers there to handle the situation. When asked if he would have made the
same decision (i.e., to take the injured officer to the hospital) if he and that officer had
been the only ones on scene, Officer #34 replied, “Oh, that’s hard. I don’t know. . .I don’t
know. . .”
These three cases demonstrate how the mere presence of other officers can impact
a single officer’s decision-making during a dangerous police-citizen encounter, giving
him or her the opportunity to direct their attention to an individual other than the suspect.
As exhibited in the cases described above, this can eliminate the need for an officer to
make a determination that deadly force is or is not necessary and a decision to use or not
use deadly force because he or she is focusing on another issue on scene. Furthermore,
one could argue that these three officers may not have made these same decisions had
they been the only officers on scene at the time that the suspect in their respective
incidents took them under fire.
The additional seven (7) officers who never found themselves in a position to
make a decision regarding whether to use deadly force represent an important finding that
emerged from this study. Remember, Binder and Scharf (1983) identified a number of
social influences that they believed could impact an officer’s decision-making in each of
the four phases in their model. For example, in the anticipation phase, Binder and Scharf
argued that from whom officers receive information and whether they believe it to be true
can impact their decision-making at this early point in the police-citizen encounter. Upon
arriving on scene, an officer’s perception of his or her safety can impact the decisions he
or she makes in the entry phase. Should an officer verbally communicate with the suspect
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during the information exchange phase, the suspect’s response (or lack thereof) can
influence the officer’s decisions at this point in the incident. Lastly, an officer’s decision
in the final frame may be influenced by the suspect’s movements, behavior, or the overall
level of threat he or she poses to the officer at the time the officer makes the decision to
fire or hold fire.
An additional social influence that emerged from this analysis, however, that
Binder and Scharf failed to identify was an officer’s perception of his or her role or his or
her assigned role during an incident. The following section will explain how officers’
decision-making during a high-risk police-citizen encounter can be influenced by their
perceived or assigned role during the incident, why this behavior occurred, and why this
finding is an important contribution to what we know about police officers’ use of deadly
force.

THE IMPACT OF ROLE DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENT ON WITNESS OFFICERS
Of the 10 officers who never considered shooting or not shooting, seven (7) of
them were influenced by their perceived or assigned role during their incident. Because
of these officers’ perception of their role or their assigned role during their respective
incidents, they did not have to make a decision regarding whether to use deadly force
during the final frame phase of the encounter. For example, four (4) of the officers in the
sample described taking a leadership role during their incident and noted how this role
influenced their decision-making throughout the incident, including eliminating their
need to consider using deadly force. While their perception of their role as one of
leadership or scene management ultimately prevented them from entering the final frame
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phase of the encounter, their adoption of their perceived role also influenced their
decision-making in early phases during the encounter.22
An example of how an officer’s perception of his or her role during an incident
can eliminate his/her need to make a decision regarding the use of deadly force was
found in the account of Officer #7, who was serving as acting sergeant during Incident 8,
which included three other officers in the sample. Officers received a call alerting them to
a suicidal subject who had shot himself in the buttocks at a local residence. They were
also told that there were others in the residence with the subject when the shooting had
occurred. Officer #7 decided to drive to the location of this call and, en route, alerted
other officers who were on their way to the scene to wait for him to arrive before
approaching the residence.
Upon arrival, Officer #7 described how he immediately took the lead on scene.
This was observed in his decision to direct other officers to various locations around the
suspect’s home. Shortly after arriving at the location, officers heard another shot ring out
from the house, indicating to them that the suspect had not been successful in his suicide
attempt and was currently a danger to himself and anyone else in the home. Officer #7
then made the decision to speak with other officers on scene to draft a plan of entry into
the home should they need to rescue innocents from the residence.
Officers soon saw that the suicidal subject had exited the home with a gun in his
hand and at that point, Officer #7 made the decision to initiate verbal contact with him,
explaining:
I start talking to him [and] the other officers are trying to get a position of cover. I
confront [the suicidal subject] an tell him to put the gun down, start trying to talk
22

The influence of an officer’s perception of his/her role was not only limited to witness officers, but was
observed among officers who used deadly force as well.
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to him about putting the gun down [and] about what’s going on. . . I’m trying to
get people situated where I need them to go to set up a perimeter. Um, so not
only am I sitting there talking to him watching what he’s doing but I’m also on
the radio uh at times, um, out on the phone trying to figure out where we need to
put out people and where was best to put everybody to get this maintained.
Officer #7 then described how he was aware that he was the only supervisor
working that night. Although he had taken it upon himself to issue commands to the
suspect and attempted to continue this dialogue with the armed individual, he also
explained that he felt his role as the supervisor was not to be intimately involved in the
incident (i.e., in terms of using deadly force against the suspect), but rather to focus on
scene control, saying:
Being as I’m the only supervisor working that night. . .and my thought process
was this: I need to get this contained and I need to get somebody to replace [me]
so I can step back and start taking incident control. Start doing the command
control of it. Um, so I just wasn’t solely focusing on what was going on between
me and him, but also trying to get the whole picture in, you know? I had a lot of
stuff to deal with at that time.
Officer #7 then requested that a specific officer he knew to have solid
communication skills drive to the scene and take over communication with the armed
man. Shortly after, the suspect made his way back into his home and fired another shot
from his rifle, leading Officer #7 to instruct nearby officers that they were going to form
a team to enter the house and rescue the residents. The officer who Officer #7 had
requested to take over commands, Officer #8, then arrived on scene. These officers saw
the suspect manipulating his weapon (appearing to move the slide in his rifle to load
another round) and Officer #7 decided at this point that this incident had gone far enough,
stating:
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I look at [Officer #8] and I said, “This is going to end pretty quick. I want you
take over commands. I want you take over what to do.” Basically putting him in
line as the shooter. . .we were both on the same page. So, at that point [Officer #8]
starts giving him commands. The [armed individual] starts doing the same thing
[i.e., manipulating his weapon], at which point I’m turning around looking to see
who I have available, at which point the round goes off from [Officer #8].
Because Officer #7 knew he was the only supervisor on duty, and thus the only
supervisor available to attend to this incident, he made the decision to try to remove
himself as much as possible from interactions with the suicidal subject because he felt his
attention should be centered on overall scene management and control. This mindset
ultimately led him to call on an officer who he trusted to take over verbal communication
with the suspect, Officer #8, which later led to the two officers having a conversation
about the incident and coming to an agreement that Officer #8 would use deadly force if
the armed individual continued to manipulate his weapon and attempt to move from his
currently location (thus putting officers in danger). Because of his decision to essentially
step back and supervise, Officer #7 designated another officer, Officer #8, to make the
decision to use deadly force should the man’s behavior call for such action.23 Therefore,
Officer #7 never had to make a decision regarding whether to use deadly force, as he
delegated that task to another officer.
Another example of how an officer’s perception of his role eliminated his need to
make a decision about whether to use deadly force was Officer #35, who was one of the
16 officers involved in Incident 20. Officer #35 was the officer who initiated the incident,
as it was his decision to make initial contact with the suspect involved. He explained:
23
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I see this guy walking by. I see he’s heavily tattooed. He’s got the big mustache,
bald head, definitely a parolee. No doubt in my mind the guy’s been to the joint.
He knows who I am, I know who he is, we lock eyes. Clearly identify our roles in
society. I continue to drive eastbound at a very slow speed, but I clearly see him
in my rearview mirror, looking over his right shoulder to see what my move is
going to be.
This man’s behavior toward the sighting of an officer led Officer #35 to turn his
car around and make contact with the individual. When Officer #35 exited his car and
tried to catch the man’s attention, the man immediately dropped what was in his hand and
took off running into a local neighborhood. Officer #35 made the decision to give chase
on foot, explaining that this was his “ten thousandth [pedestrian] stop. On a scale of one
to ten, my alertness was up to about a seven, only because the guy is a gangster, I think
he’s a parolee, so it’s not just stopping granny.” No sooner had he engaged in a foot
chase than the man he was chasing drew a firearm out of his waistband and fired shots at
Officer #35. Rather than drawing his weapon and firing back, Officer #35 decided to seek
cover behind a nearby vehicle and radioed for assistance from other officers.
Because this incident continued until officers eventually caught the suspect,
Officer #35’s original encounter with the suspect was not the only opportunity he had to
make contact with the suspect. As other officers arrived on the scene, however, rather
than joining in on the search for the suspect with other officers, Officer #35 focused on
ensuring that arriving officers were establishing a perimeter in order to contain the
fleeing suspect, explaining:
I had already formed in my mind that. . .we’re going to lock it down, we’re going
to set up a command post right here. . .my intent now was not to run down here to
help these [other officers]. My intent was to keep [the suspect] corralled. My
thought was he’s going to shoot at these [officers] and run back towards me. So
I’m trying to corral [this street] here. Keep a tight perimeter. Unbeknownst to me,
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he’s running northbound, but my goal is to get enough forces over here to hold
this so we keep him corralled.
While other officers eventually located the suspect and shots were exchanged
between some of these officers and the suspect, Officer #35 continued to focus on
making sure other officers were keeping a tight perimeter in case the suspect continued in
his attempts to flee. Officer #35 soon heard a barrage of gunfire. At this point he
communicated with a lieutenant who was on scene (and near where the gunfire had
occurred) and received an update from him that the suspect was down. He soon received
word via the radio that a fellow officer had been shot by the suspect. Again, instead of
focusing on whether he was needed at the location where other officers had shot the
suspect, Officer #35 decided not to get involved in that aspect of the incident and instead
concentrated on the status of the injured officer and communicated with the lieutenant
about how to handle the scene and direct officers in post-shooting procedure.
Similar to the experience of Officer #7 in Incident 8, Officer #35 in Incident 20
never considered whether to fire. Instead of running after the suspect who initially fired
shots at him, Officer #35, being a supervisor, perceived his role as one of scene
organization and management. Because of this, he decided to place his attention on
directing arriving officers in the direction where the suspect fled in an attempt to set up a
perimeter and capture the suspect. Officer #35 was still focused on this when he heard
other officers firing shots at the suspect and, therefore, did not have to make a decision
regarding whether to shoot at that point either. He was preoccupied with tasks that he
perceived to be his job based on his position within the department.
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Another example of how an officer’s perceived role can influence his or her
decision-making was observed in Incident 47, the incident in which four officers in the
sample were patrolling a high-crime area and made contact with an elderly man acting in
a strange manner.
The officers began to make contact with the man but, unbeknownst to them, he was
armed with a gun and quickly drew the firearm out of his waistband and fired at one of
the officers (Officer #127).
Three officers, including the officer who was fired at, fired back at the suspect,
but Officer #103, the supervisor in charge of the unit, never drew his weapon. This
officer believed that because he was the supervisor it was his duty to attend to the officer
who fell to the ground instead of firing at the suspect. Officer #103 described that he
could not fire at the suspect and attend to the downed officer simultaneously and
protecting his fellow officer took precedence, saying:
My first [thought] here is I’ve gotta protect [the downed officer]. I’m moving
forward. I’m not shooting. My weapon’s out, but I can’t [attend to the officer] and
pay attention to [the suspect] too. [The other officers] are moving in, doing what
they’re doing, but I’ve got to get up there and defend my officer.
In his account, Officer #103 made it clear that his role as supervisor of this unit
had bearing on his decision-making and the actions he took at this point during the
incident. He also stated that although it did not appear that he had a clear shot at the
suspect at the time, he did not feel he needed to worry about shooting at the suspect
because he placed his trust in his team. This then allowed him to fulfill his duty as a
supervisor, which he thought was to focus on attending to the downed officer and
protecting him from additional gunfire from the suspect. This officer could have made the
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decision to change positions to have a clear shot at the suspect, as this was an option, but
he chose to attend to the fallen officer. Thus, Officer #103 did not make any
determination that deadly force was or was not necessary because he never considered
using deadly force, as his attention was placed on protecting his subordinate.
One last example of this observed pattern was captured in the account of Officer
#80 who participated in Incident 59, the incident involving an armed student barricaded
in the classroom of a high school and in which four officers in the sample participated.
Officer #80 had experience with being a crisis negotiator for the department’s SWAT
team, so upon his entry into the high school and after locating the suspect barricaded in a
classroom, he took it upon himself to make verbal contact with the young suspect and
attempted to convince him to drop his weapon and exit the classroom.
According to Officer #80, he continued negotiations with the armed student for
about 90 minutes. During this time, Officer #80 explained that the suspect was “going
back and forth” in terms of his attitude toward the police. At times Officer #80 thought
negotiations would be successful and that he was making progress with the suspect.
During other times, he felt that the suspect was going to be non-compliant and considered
the possibility that this incident would end in police use of deadly force. Eventually, the
armed suspect attempted to come toward the officers outside the classroom with his
weapon raised in his hand, leading officers to fire shots. Officer #80 did not fire, but it is
important to note that because of his role as the negotiator, he did not consider firing,
explaining:
Well and I didn’t shoot him at that point because I had put my weapon away. I
was doing the negotiation. . . It was [other officers’] job to protect me, but my job
to [negotiate with the suspect].
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Because of his role as negotiator during this incident, Officer #80 had made the
decision to re-holster his weapon when he began conversing with the suspect. As one can
see from the aforementioned quote, Officer #80 perceived his role as negotiator as one
that required him to focus on talking the suspect down. As a consequence, he did not
have to make a decision regarding whether to fire because he had previously put away his
weapon. Officer #80’s success as a negotiator would likely impact the decisions that
other officers would subsequently make later in the encounter, but it appears that he also
recognized that if deadly force was going to be used, that task belonged to the other
officers, not him.
In addition to officers’ perception of their roles during an incident, three (3)
officers in the sample did not have to make a decision whether to use deadly force
because of an assignment they were given prior to police gunfire. In the sample, such
assignments arose out of incidents involving the use of special weapons and tactics
(SWAT) teams. The use of such specialized units may require participating officers to
have designated roles during an incident. Therefore, as the findings from the analysis
suggest, the decision of whether or not to shoot is, at times, a function of the role to
which officers have been assigned.
The three (3) officers who did not have to make a decision regarding whether to
use deadly force because of their assignments were involved in the same incident
(Incident 127). Members of the SWAT team were called to respond to an incident
involving a man armed with a knife who had barricaded himself in the room of a local
motel. Officers had been trying to negotiate with the individual, but he was unrelenting
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and the leader of the SWAT team made the decision that an element of SWAT officers
would need to enter the motel room to apprehend the suspect.
Four of the officers in the sample participated in this incident and each recounted
the entry plan that they were asked to execute: the windows to the motel room would be
broken and two officers would stand outside the windows and discharge TASERs to
subdue the armed individual. Once the suspect was briefly incapacitated by the TASERs,
three officers would make entry into the motel room and apprehend the suspect. Of these
three officers, two were assigned to “go hands,” meaning that one would physically hold
the suspect down while the other placed handcuffs on him. The third officer was assigned
“lethal cover”, meaning that if at any point during the encounter the armed individual
posed a deadly threat to anyone on scene, it was this officer’s job to shoot him.
Officer #186 was one of the two officers assigned to use less lethal force (i.e.,
discharge the TASER) on the suspect and Officers #187 and #212 were the two officers
assigned to enter the motel room and physically apprehend the suspect and take him into
custody after the TASERs had been deployed. Lastly, Officer #211 was also tasked with
entering the motel room and assigned to provide lethal cover should it be necessary.
The plan was put into motion and Officer #186 (along with another officer who
was not interviewed) deployed their TASERs at the suspect. Officers #187, #211, and
#212 soon made entry into the motel room where they encountered the armed individual.
Officers #187 and #212 moved toward the suspect to take him into custody, but the
TASERs had only briefly tempered the suspect who still held on to the knife in his hand.
The suspect made a movement toward one of these officers, which led Officer #211 to
shoot the suspect.
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Officer #187 (one of the officers assigned to take the suspect into physical
custody) explained that the role assigned to him essentially eliminated his need to make a
decision regarding whether to fire. He explained:
I had come in there with both my hands empty because to effectively and
aggressively handcuff someone, I am going to need both hands for that. And the
other part is that with this specific task assigned [to me], I had full faith and
confidence with the officer whose job it was to provide us with lethal coverage
that he was going to be able to do that. I knew I had lethal cover, so I basically
relied on [him].
Because of his assigned role, Officer #187 never considered shooting. He was
focused on his assigned task, which required him to have his hands available to handcuff
the suspect. He made it very clear, however, that he knew another officer had been
assigned the task of shooting if it became necessary to use deadly force against the
suspect. Furthermore, Officer #187 emphasized that he completely trusted the officer
who was assigned lethal cover (Officer #211), that he would shoot if necessary.
Officer #212, the other officer who was assigned to take the suspect into physical
custody, mirrored Officer #187’s response in that his assignment in this incident required
him to go into the motel room with his hands free. Although he had his weapon with him,
and he could have drawn it and fired if he felt the need, Officer #212 never reached that
point, saying:
Obviously if I felt that I needed to draw my weapon that I could have freely done
it, [but] my focus was hands. We try to control the amount of gunfire that may
happen on a scene. It’s not necessary for everybody to get into gunplay. We try to
keep that under control. And my job was to go hands. I knew I had lethal
coverage. So, I basically relied on them.
While an officer may be assigned to a role (re: the use of deadly force) during an
incident, Officer #212 made it clear that he could have strayed from the requirements of
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his assignment (i.e., having his hands free) and could have drawn his firearm if he wanted
to, but he knew another officer had been assigned the job of providing lethal force and he
trusted that officer to make that decision if it were necessary. Therefore, an officer’s
assignment may impact his or her behavior and decision-making to a certain extent, but a
key factor that may also have bearing on an officers’ decision-making process regarding
the use of deadly force is the amount of trust they place in those officers assigned to
provide lethal cover. Should there be a lack of trust in that officer, for whatever reason,
one could argue that an officer assigned to a task other than lethal force may forego their
assignment and take it upon themselves to use deadly force should they decide it is
necessary.

THE IMPACT OF ROLE DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENTS ON SHOOTERS
It is important to note that officers’ perception of their role or their assigned role
during an incident and the impact this can have on their decision-making was not limited
to the witness officers in the sample. When analyzing officers’ decision-making during
the final frame phase, it was clear that the perception of one’s role during the incident
also influenced some officers’ shooting behavior.
An example of how an officer’s perception of his role impacted his decisionmaking throughout the incident, and specifically in the final frame, was found in Officer
#16’s account of his participation in Incident 9. As previously mentioned, this incident
involved four officers in the sample who were attempting to make contact with a man
suspected of committing multiple robberies of gas stations around town. When
recounting his participation in the incident, it was clear in Officer #16’s account that his
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rank (he was a sergeant at the time) drove his decision-making during crucial parts of the
incident.
For example, during the entry phase when the two additional officers arrived on
scene, Officer #16 took it upon himself to provide these officers with details about the
robbery case and what they knew about the man suspected of committing the crimes. He
also made the decision to assign these two officers (Officers #13 and #14) to cover the
back while he and his partner stayed at the front of the home and made contact with the
suspect. This decision seemed to be guided by the fact that Officer #16 viewed this as
“their” (he and Officer #9’s) investigation and, therefore, they should be the ones who
took the lead on the operation. He explained that he and his partner agreed that his
partner (Officer #9) would approach the front door and attempt to make verbal contact
with the suspect, but that he would be close by, saying:
I used the front of that truck [for cover]. I thought well, we knew it was an armed
robbery, the guy used a handgun, [and] somebody’s got to knock on the door and
since I’m sergeant, I’m taking the front of the truck. [Officer #9] said he’d knock
on the door and I will cover him. . .and the truck engine or a car engine is one of
the best covers you can have. So, your rank has its privileges sometimes.
When Officer #9 knocked on the suspect’s door and was confronted by the
suspect armed with a pistol, he alerted his fellow officers that the suspect was armed by
shouting, “Gun!” Officer #16, who was behind a truck near the front of the house, also
saw that the suspect was armed and believed he was about to shoot his partner, Officer
#9. Both he and Officer #9 fired shots at the suspect at this time, and soon after, Officer
#13 came to the front of the home from around the back to assist these officers and
eventually fired shots at the suspect as well.
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As Officer #16 described his decision to fire, he explained that he felt a high level
of concern for his fellow officers at the time he pulled the trigger, particularly for Officer
#9 whom he believed may have been struck by the suspect’s gunfire, but that he did not
feel any fear for his personal wellbeing. He stated:
I’m always concerned. I was a supervisor. This was my unit and I’m trying to take
care of my people, you know? I feel like I’m, I mean, I’ve had my own kids and
that, but I feel like, you know, these are my people to take care of, to make sure
they’re good. . . and I’m not trying to say that I’m some super hero or anything
like that. I think I’m thinking more of this is what we’ve got to do and we’re
going to take care of business and I want to make sure that my people are safe.
Officer #16 explained that he fired at the suspect to protect his partner, Officer #9,
and to prevent the suspect from firing additional bullets at the officers on scene, but as
one can see from the aforementioned quote, Officer #16 felt very protective of the
officers during this incident because of his rank and the perception of his job that is
attached to that rank. There is a protective factor that he associated with the rank he held
at the time, leading him to make decisions that, in his mind, would preserve the safety of
his fellow officers. One such decision was to use deadly force against the armed suspect
with the goal of protecting Officer #9, who was directly in the suspect’s line of fire.
One last example of how an officer’s perception of his or her role influenced his
or her decision to use deadly force was captured in the account of Officer #213 who
participated in Incident 124, wherein four other officers in the sample were executing the
search warrant of a home suspected of housing illegal narcotics. Participating officers had
met prior to attempting to enter the home and had drafted and reviewed their plan for
entry. Officer #213, who had been involved in the narcotics investigation associated with
the home, wanted to be the first officer to enter the home. After talking with other
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officers, however, it was decided that another officer would hold the first position, as he
had more experience with this kind of operation. This left Officer #213 to be the second
officer in the entry line-up. When recounting his experience in this incident, Officer #213
explained that in his mind, being second in the entry line-up meant that his job was to
provide lethal cover, should they need it, to the officers behind him in the entry line-up.
Unfortunately, the officer tasked with breaking down the front door took longer
than expected to break through, which gave the occupants of the home time to figure out
what was going on. Soon after entering through the front door, the officers were
ambushed by gunfire from two assailants in the house. Officer #213 explained that the
third officer in the line-up (who was right behind him) was struck by the assailant’s
gunfire and Officer #213 immediately started returning fire in the direction of the armed
suspect. This officer reported that even though he thought he was the one being targeted
by the suspect, he did not have any fear for himself, but was very fearful for the safety of
his fellow officers. To explain this, he recounted an exchange he had with a fellow officer
prior to being involved with this incident, saying:
[A] close friend of mine, we’ve talked about running warrants and I’ve been in. .
.in one of my incidents, you know, he shot a guy and it was a good shooting, but
you know, the guy wasn’t armed. It was just the way it went down. It was cleared.
After the shooting was over with, I went and met with him and I was like, “Man,
you shot an unarmed dude.” And I wasn’t wanting to. . . I had a little bit of a
problem with it. . .and my buddy told me, he goes, “Dude, you’re here telling me
this.” And he said, “Wouldn’t you rather be pissed that [I] shot an unarmed dude
than pissed that [I] didn’t shoot?” And it really. . .it rang true and hit home for me
as far as he was point. He went home that night. . .so, when I got asked to run
point, I liked what he said. I agreed with what he said. I thought I could deal with
making a mistake and shooting somebody, but I couldn’t deal with not [shooting]
and somebody getting hurt as a result of it. So, I wasn’t worried about me. I was
worried about, “They put me here. They gave me this. This is my job. I’ve got to
deal with this shit.”
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Officer #16’s conversation with the fellow officer mentioned above drove his
perception of his role during Incident 124. He perceived his role as one of the first
officers in the line-up to be one of protection. His aforementioned comments also suggest
a sense of responsibility that he felt to provide this protection to his team because, in his
mind and based on a previous conversation with another officer, that was the job of the
officers who entered the location first. Therefore, that was his job during this incident. He
was there to provide lethal cover should it be necessary to protect his fellow officers from
being seriously injured or killed as they entered the house. This perception of his role is
also supported by the fact that although one of the suspects was specifically targeting him
and firing shots at him, his concern did not lie with himself, but with the officers behind
him who could have been, and were, struck by these bullets.
Finally, there was one officer in the sample whose decision to use deadly force
was directly influenced by his assigned role during the incident in question. Incident 127
involved four officers in the sample and the accounts of three of these officers (Officers
#186, #187, and #212) were discussed in the previous section detailing how officers’
assigned roles can preclude them from making a decision about whether to use deadly
force. The fourth officer, Officer #211, was the officer assigned to provide lethal cover.
To briefly recount the incident, members of the SWAT team were called to a
motel where officers were attempting to negotiate with a mentally unstable individual
who was armed with a knife and who had barricaded himself in a motel room. After
negotiations failed to convince the knife-wielding man to come out of the room, members
of the SWAT team drafted a plan to first use TASERS to subdue the suspect, then have a
three-man team enter the motel room to take the man into physical custody; two officers
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did not have their guns drawn (as it was their assigned task to physically overcome the
suspect and place him in handcuffs and, therefore, they needed both their hands) and one
officer, Officer #211, who carried a .223 rifle because he was assigned to use deadly
force against the armed individual if it was necessary.
Once they entered the room, the suspect, who had been hit with the TASERs fired
from officers outside through the broken window of the motel room, was slightly
incapacitated by the less-lethal force, but was still able to stand up and get close to the
two officers who were assigned to bring him into physical custody. Because of this, and
the fact that the motel room was small and the officers and the suspect were in close
quarters, Officer #211 knew he was going to have to make a decision, explaining:
I saw the knife that was in [the suspect’s] hand. My first thing was not about me –
it was about the officer that was close. [That officer] was unarmed. He was
basically going hands, so he didn’t have a weapon in his hands at the time. We
designate certain roles. . . I was up front on lethal. I figured [that officer] was so
close that if [the suspect]. . . but I mean, there was no doubt in my mind that if he
went direct[ly] at us, I was going to start shooting [the suspect] right then.
Although Officer #211 ultimately had a choice regarding whether to use deadly
force, his decision-making process appears to have been greatly influenced by the fact
that he had been assigned to provide lethal force if it was necessary. This was coupled
with the fact that, due to their assigned roles, the two officers inside the motel room with
him did not have their weapons drawn at the time. Therefore, this case highlights two
very interesting findings: the first that an officer’s assigned role during an incident can
impact his or her decision to use deadly force, and second that other officers’ assigned
roles may increase or decrease the likelihood that another officer on scene may need to
shoot.
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SUMMARY
The results from the analysis discussed in this chapter provide a unique
perspective regarding police use of deadly force: how officers’ decision-making
processes can be impacted by the presence of or decisions made by other officers
involved in the same incident. When multiple officers are involved in the same
encounter, it can be argued that officers may make decisions they may not otherwise have
made had they been the only officer involved in the encounter. Furthermore, the presence
of other officers allows each individual officer, in a sense, to adopt their own social role
within the context of the incident.
First, findings from this study demonstrate more broadly that the mere fact that
other officers are involved in the incident may have direct implications for officers’ use
of deadly force. For example, many of the officers who did choose to use deadly force
did so not to protect themselves, but to protect a fellow officer from serious injury or
death. In addition, many of the officers who chose not to shoot did so because another
officer on scene had already fired and, therefore, eliminated the need for other officers on
scene to shoot. Finally, some officers in the sample did not have to make a decision
regarding whether to use deadly force because of decisions made by other officers on
scene. This finding demonstrated that not all officers in a potentially violent policecitizen encounter make a decision about whether to use deadly force, thus never entering
the final frame phase of Binder and Scharf’s framework.
To craft a more accurate deadly force decision-making framework then, Binder
and Scharf’s model would need to be adjusted to address these findings. Binder and
Scharf’s framework, as it stands now, only addresses instances in which an officer
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consciously made the decision to fire, made the conscious decision to hold fire, or
unconsciously fired. The framework does not account for cases in which an officer
neither considered using deadly force nor holding fire, but for whatever reason did not
consider either option.
Furthermore, that the Binder and Scharf model does not account for the present
finding that officers’ perceived or assigned roles influence their decision-making during
high-risk encounters is another weakness of this model. More specifically, an officer’s
perception of his or her role during an incident has the ability to shape their decisionmaking not only during the final frame phase (should they enter it), but in earlier phases
of the encounter. These perceptions, at least among the officers in the sample, were often
driven by officers’ rank or supervisory position, which influenced where their focus was
directed on scene (e.g., toward the suspect, to scene management/organization,
negotiation, or toward the safety of other officers), which, in turn, eliminated the
perceived need for them to make a decision regarding the use of deadly force.
The results from the analysis also demonstrated how an officer’s assignment
during a potentially violent police-citizen encounter can influence their decision to use or
not use deadly force. This finding may be especially relevant to SWAT teams or other
specialized units, but the role assignments carried out by four officers in Incident 127
showed how a task handed down to an officer can increase or decrease the likelihood that
they will use deadly force. In addition, the roles assigned to other officers on scene can
inadvertently impact decisions available to other officers on scene. Because two of the
officers in this incident were assigned to take the suspect into physical custody, which
requires the use of both hands, they did not have their weapons drawn when they
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confronted the knife-wielding assailant. The officer who was assigned lethal cover fully
acknowledged that because of their assigned roles, these officers could not have had their
weapons drawn, leaving him to be the only viable option for the use of deadly force. He
recognized this role, the decision he had to make, and ultimately chose to fire shots at the
suspect to protect his fellow officers.
It is imperative to note that the aforementioned findings are derived from officers
who were involved in an incident wherein other officers were present and participating.
This may explain why these findings were not addressed by Binder and Scharf, as most
of their analyses were limited to police-citizen interactions that ended in police gunfire or
could have ended in police gunfire, but only involved one officer. While it is possible for
potentially violent police-citizen encounter to involve only one officer and one suspect or
one officer and multiple suspects, the results from this analysis provide insight into how
individual officers’ decisions may be impacted by other officers. In many of the incidents
captured in this sample, it was clear that a difference in the use of deadly force was not
due to significant differences in the way officers processed the events in which they were
involved, but rather greatly hinged on other officers’ presence and actions.
Because of this, incidents involving multiple officers that conclude in police
gunfire may be best understood as social events in which multiple individuals play off
one another. One could argue that had other officers not been present in the incidents
captured in the sample, many – if not all – of the officers would have arguably made
different decisions. For example, three (3) officers in the sample made a conscious
decision to hold fire during their incidents because a fellow officer was in their line of
fire and they did not want to compromise the safety of another officer. Had another
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officer not been involved in the incident, would these three officers still have held fire? In
addition, seven (7) officers reported holding fire because another officer on scene had
already used deadly force against the suspect. Had another officer not been there to fire
first, would these seven officers have still made the decision not to shoot? It seems
apparent that the answers to both questions is no, that but for the presence of other
officers these witness officers would have shot.
The same sort of question can be raised and answers given regarding officers’
perceived or assigned roles. Some of the officers in the sample who held ranked positions
in the department or played supervisory roles attended to on-scene issues other than
deadly fire (e.g., scene management/organization), but their perception of their role may
not have had the impact it did on their decision-making and their behavior had they been
the only officer involved in the incident. In addition, the impact of role assignment would
not be relevant in cases involving a single officer, as this officer would not be formally
assigned a role during the incident, but instead would, by definition, have to make a
number of independent decisions throughout the duration of the encounter.
In sum, although the aforementioned findings may only be applicable to deadly
force incidents involving multiple officers, many high-risk police-citizen encounters
involve multiple officers. Therefore, it is important that scholars work hard to understand
the contextual and situational conditions present during officer-involved shootings that
involve more than one officer and the impact this has on individual officers’ decisionmaking throughout this type of incident. Doing so will substantially expand our
understanding of how police officers make decisions to use deadly force or to hold fire.
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CHAPTER SIX: DEADLY FORCE DECISION-MAKING AMONG MULTIPLE
OFFICERS
Having established that the presence of other officers can influence a given
officer’s decision regarding the use of deadly force during multi-officer high-risk
encounters with citizens, attention turns to the moments that precede the final frame. As
previously noted, the Binder and Scharf model posits that differences in how officers
process information and act during high-risk interactions prior to the final frame account
for whether an officer shoots or holds fire. Because Binder and Scharf focused on officers
as singular actors, they did not consider the possibility in depth that the presence and
actions of other officers might influence how any given individual officer acts during
high-risk police-citizen encounters. This chapter does so and thus seeks to shed light on a
potentially important matter that is missing from Binder and Scharf’s deadly force
decision-making framework.
To accomplish this, the interview transcripts of each of the 83 officers in the
sample were grouped according to their corresponding incident and were coded at the
incident-level. That is, officers’ decisions and factors impacting their decision-making
were compared to the decisions made by other officers involved in the same incident.
This allowed for similarities and differences in decision-making among officers present
at the same police-citizen encounter to be identified within the confines of the three
antecedent phases of Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework. The
results will be presented below in terms of patterns that emerged in each of the three
phases - anticipation, entry, and information exchange – in their temporal order.
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ANTICIPATION
To recap, according to their assessment of high-risk police-citizen encounter,
Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) state that the anticipation phase begins when an officer is
notified or dispatched to a call and ends when the officer arrives on the scene of the call.
They define this phase as “crucial” to early decision-making, as this is the time when
officers are attempting to collect as much information as possible about the incident and
the suspect they are about to encounter. Because of this, Binder and Scharf identify mode
of information as an important factor that can impact an officer’s decision-making in this
phase. Is this information coming from dispatch? Directly from the citizen? Or via some
other vector?
One possibility that Binder and Scharf did not address, but was a pattern that
emerged in some of the officers’ accounts during this phase, was that an officer can be
specifically requested by another officer to become involved in an incident. Ten (10) of
the officers in the sample reported that their involvement in their respective incidents
began when they were personally requested to make their way to the scene by another
officer in their department. These officers were personally requested by other officers to
provide support for a number of reasons, such as a type of expertise they held that was
recognized by the officer(s) requesting assistance, their access to and experience with a
specialized weapon (e.g., department-issued rifle or shotgun) that other officers thought
would be useful in the specific incident at hand, or simply based on past experiences with
the officer(s) requesting their help.
This is an important finding because being personally requested by a fellow
officer may increase the chances that an officer would agree to participate in an incident,
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thus influencing their decision to become involved in the encounter. In fact, some of the
officers who noted that they were requested by a fellow officer and asked to become
involved in the incident in question noted that their personal connection to the officer
who requested their assistance is what drove their decision to respond to the call.
An example of this mindset was expressed by two officers involved in Incident
90, a case in which a surveillance operation led to a vehicle pursuit that ended in a wild
shootout and involved three officers in the sample. Officers #112 and #167 were
requested by a fellow officer, Officer #123, to assist him in apprehending a known gang
member who was suspected of being involved in multiple armed robberies around town
and in possession of a stolen car. Officer #167 had previously worked with Officer #123
in his department’s gang unit, but was now assigned to the agency’s narcotics unit. He
detailed his mindset the night he received a call from Officer #123 asking for his help in
observing the residence he believed the suspect to be residing in. Officer #167 explained:
I was on my way home and my wife was eight months pregnant. I kind of wanted
to get home and got a call from [Officer #123] who said, “Hey, we’ve got a stolen
car down here and I need [an undercover] car to sit on it.” And I said, “You know,
I’m going home,” and he said, “No, I need a car down here dude, come on.” So I
finally turned around, threw my vest on real quick. I was in plain clothes, had a
beanie, and just a jacket on and turned around.
After reporting that he was initially reluctant to help out Officer #123 because he
wanted to go home to his wife, the interviewer asked Officer #167 why he agreed to
assist the officer, to which Officer #167 replied:
[It was] personal. [Officer #123] was my best friend and my partner and I worked
with him every night, and off duty we drink beers together, and [we were] good
friends, and he would do the exact same thing for me. . . I didn’t want to go. I
figured this is just another stolen car at a doper’s house. Big deal. Why did they
need me? [But my] buddy was like, “I need [an undercover] guy and I need you.”
This [suspect] is supposed to be a bad dude and [Officer #123] needed [my] help.
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The aforementioned excerpt demonstrates how Officer #167’s personal
relationship with the officer who requested his help drove his decision to become
involved in the incident. Although he did not initially want to get involved, he made it
clear that he knew Officer #123 would have been there to help him had he asked him to,
so he made the decision to turn back around and head to the location of the suspect’s
residence.
Once Officer #167 arrived on scene and made radio contact with Officer #123,
both officers agreed that because they were both in undercover vehicles and thus may not
be recognized as law enforcement, they should call a uniformed officer in a marked
police vehicle to assist them. In fact, Officer #167 insisted “that we need[ed] to have a
marked car there” in case the suspect initiated a pursuit. Officer #167 then called a patrol
officer he had worked with in the past, Officer #112, and asked him if he would make his
way to the location of the suspect’s home. When asked why he made the decision to
oblige the officer’s request for assistance, Officer #112 stated:
I mean I was a brand new baby cop and those two guys were really good friends
of mine. One of them I went to the police academy with [and] socialized [with].
Good friends of mine. And I would have done it for anyone, but I especially. .
.they’re my buddies asking for help. I would do it in a minute.
While Officer #167 was honest and shared his initial reluctance to respond to his
friend’s request for assistance, Officer #112 stated that never once did he consider not
responding to Officer #167’s request for help. He also noted that although he would have
helped any officer who had asked, a request from Officer #167 had more meaning to him,
as the officers he would be assisting were personal friends of his. The officers later
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engaged in a vehicle pursuit with the suspect, during which the suspect fires shots at the
officers. At the termination point of the pursuit and still believing the suspect to be a
lethal threat, two officers fired shots (Officers #123 and #167) and one held fire (Officer
#112). In sum, the decisions made by Officers #167 and #112 demonstrate how their
personal relationship with a fellow officer who requested assistance influenced their
decision to become involved in this incident.

INITIATING THEIR INVOLVEMENT: IS IT ALWAYS A CHOICE?
In addition to having a personal relationship with the requesting officer, some
officers reported that a request for their participation by a supervising officer initiated
their involvement in their incident. That is, five (5) officers in the sample reported that
they initially became involved in the incident in question because their assistance was
requested by a direct supervisor or an officer holding a ranked position (i.e., was their
superior).
An example of this was demonstrated among three (3) of the officers who were
present at Incident 26, the incident in which four officers attempted to take a wanted man
into custody at a bail bond agency. Officer #172, the sergeant who received the initial call
alerting him of the location of the suspect, decided to call three additional officers to help
apprehend the suspect: Officers #48, #54, and #180. Interestingly enough, these three
officers did not elaborate on their decision to respond to their sergeant’s request, but
perhaps this finding highlights a reflexive response to a superior’s request that may be the
result of the sergeant-line officer relationship. For example, Officer #180’s account of
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how his sergeant notified him of this incident suggested that he had a choice regarding
whether to become involved, saying:
My sergeant just sends me a text message asking if I was busy. I call him on the
phone and he says, “Hey, a bail bondman calls the station” and says, ‘Hey, I got
this guy that’s got a warrant. . .I think he’ll skip bail,’” so if we wanted to come
get him, to come get him. So [instead of] sending patrol, sergeant says, “Hey our
guys will do it.” So he calls me on the phone and says, “Hey, do you want to join
in?” So then we get to the gas station that’s near the location to meet up and talk
about the incident.
Officer #180 does not expand on his decision to respond to his sergeant’s request,
but clearly he made a decision to drive to the gas station, meet up with this superior, and
draft a plan of entry into the bondsman’s office to apprehend the suspect.
Officers #48 and #54 also offered brief explanations as to how they became
involved in Incident 26. Officer #48 explained:
Our supervisor, or sergeant, he gives me a call, says, “Hey, I got a guy that called
up to the station that says he’s a bondsman. He’s got a guy coming in to. .
.reconfigure his bond,” which they don’t do. The [bondsman] knew he had a
felony family violence warrant out for assault and he wanted us to go pick him up.
[My] supervisor said, “Hey, meet me.” We met about a mile and half from the
actual location to develop our plan.
Officer #54 had a similar account of this initial call from his supervisor, stating:
We were on patrol. Some of the other officers were helping a deployment on a
deal and our Serg called us and said, “Hey, got a warrant. Family violence
warrant. We need to go pick this guy up. He’s supposed to be showing up to the
bail bonds place. . .” So he’s like, “Meet me here. Meet me at this location and
we’ll discuss it.”
Contrary to Officer #180’s account, these officers’ recollections of how they
became involved in the incident appear to have been orders issued by their supervisor,
Officer #172. While one may argue that officers are independent actors and, as such,
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make their own independent decisions, one can also argue that an individual’s decisionmaking process regarding whether to initiate involvement in an incident has the potential
to be influenced by who is either requesting their assistance or issuing orders for them to
respond to an incident. Binder and Scharf do note that mode of information is an potential
influence on officer’s decision-making during the anticipation phase, but they do not
specify whether (and how) other officers’ position in the department hierarchy can have
bearing on whether officers comply with their requests or orders to respond to an
incident.
The accounts of other officers who chose to become involved in their incidents
and who fell into this category were more explicit in the role their supervisor played at
this point in the encounter. Officer #23, who participated in Incident 8 (the incident in
which officers responded to the call of a suicidal subject possibly posing a lethal threat to
innocents in his home), described how he was initially handling another call that had
been assigned to him when his superior instructed him to attend to Incident 8, explaining:
I remember. . .my first call and what I was on. It was just like a property damage
[incident] at [a local hotel]. So, I was there and my sergeant came by. . .and then
that call came out for a subject that shot himself in a basement. Our sergeant said
he was going to that [and to] just leave this [incident] alone for right now. And
then. . .so I just left that call and then followed him over there.
In the aforementioned example, it appears that Officer #23 did not have much of a
choice but to become involved in Incident 8, as his sergeant directed him to end the
incident he was involved in and make his way to the location where a male had attempted
suicide. Again, Officer #23’s behavior suggests that in certain cases, an officer’s
“decision” to become involved in an incident may not be a decision at all, but better
understood as a following through of an assignment or command handed down from a
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superior officer. In order to fully understand how police officers initiate or become
involved in potentially violent encounters with citizens, it is necessary to acknowledge
that other officers in supervisory or ranked positions may impact individual officers’
decision-making.

COMMUNICATION
Another pattern that was common in the anticipation phase among officers
involved in the same incident was the use of communication prior to arrival on scene. In
their writings, Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) acknowledge that at this stage of the
encounter, officers are often attempting to collect as much information as possible about
the situation and/or suspect they are on their way to deal with. Possible sources of
information identified by Binder and Scharf include dispatchers, direct calls from
citizens, prior direct contact with the suspect, or other officers. The latter was a strong
pattern observed among officers in the sample, both shooters and witness officers.
Twenty-two (22) officers in the sample engaged in communication with a fellow officer
during this phase. They did so for three main reasons: to update other officers about any
information they had regarding the incident and/or the suspect involved (to make sure all
officers were on the same page prior to arriving on scene), to confirm information about
the incident and/or the suspect they had received, and to preserve the safety of other
officers who would be arriving on scene.
The majority of these 22 officers used communication to update their fellow
officers on information about the incident and/or the suspect that they had received en
route to the location of the call (n=14). Some of the officers involved in Incident 20 (the
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one involving 16 officers in the sample who were pursuing a man who fired shots at a
fellow officer) reported using communication to receive updates on the “shots fired” call
they had been alerted to and directions on where they should deploy upon arriving on
scene. For example, Officer #39 reported that he used the broadcasted information to
decide where he should deploy, explaining:
[Officer #35] was giving out a location and at some point he said. . .I think he had
lost the guy, and so he started to set up a perimeter and other units started
arriving. And um, they’re just trying to set up a perimeter and [announcing] where
we need to be and where [the suspect]. . .[where officers] thought he was going to
be. And then um. . .at that point, I had decided where I was going to go based on
where everybody else was going.
Officer #36, who was also involved in this incident, reported similar behavior,
using the information broadcasted by Officer #35 (the officer who was originally shot at
by the assailant who had taken off on foot) to determine where he was going to arrive on
scene, saying:
So “shots fired” call comes out. I immediately hear where. I was probably a mile
and half away, two miles away. I responded to the scene immediately. I was
hearing other officers respond and as they were responding and setting up for
containment, I was hearing where everybody was at. . . and I wanted to make sure
that I set up a. . .there was no other officers in that area and I wanted to make sure
I set up for containment.
Arriving officers knew of the plan to set up a containment perimeter because
Officer #35 had communicated this plan to all officers via the radio. The two officers
mentioned above used the information communicated by Officer #35 to make decisions
regarding the routes they would take to get to the scene and where they would park their
cars to set up a containment perimeter upon their arrival. In sum, many of the first
officers who arrived on this scene relied on communication with one another when
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choosing their initial deployment locations on scene and receiving situational updates
from those who had already arrived at the location.
Another example of how communication impacted officers’ decision-making
during the anticipation phase was observed among multiple officers involved in Incident
105. This incident involved four officers in the sample who were members of a street
crime unit. They were tasked with patrolling (in unmarked cars) an area that had been
experiencing an increase in auto thefts and break-ins during the day with the goal of
catching the thief in the act. Each officer was in a different undercover vehicle and was
driving around the area when one of the officers used the radio to alert the others that he
had spotted someone he believed to be breaking into a car. Based on this information,
each of the four officers immediately turned around and headed to that location with the
goal of confirming whether that was their suspect and, if so, placing him under arrest.
Officer #154 explained:
And a guy who was no longer with our department called and said, “Hey, I have
this minivan that just came down. The guy parked. It was a black male. Got out,
went up and checked one of the van doors –” like the white construction vans.
“Checked the van door, walked down, checked another van door. Came back and
got in the minivan he drove up in and then drove down the street.” So I remember
thinkin’ this is good. . .so we all started convergin’ on that specific area.
Officer #166, another member of the street crime unit involved in Incident 105,
echoed Officer #154’s experience, saying:
And from what I remember, probably about – I’d say no more than 20 minutes
into us sitting there, one of the other officers got on the air and said that he’s – he
had eyes on a black male who was going into one of the construction vans. He
reported this and he was probably about – I want to say about three to four blocks
away from me. . . So pretty much everyone got mobile.
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The officer who spotted the presumed suspect used communication not only to
alert officers of his observation, but also to report why he believed the man he was
observing to be the suspect (i.e., he matched the physical description of the suspect they
had all received and was currently breaking into a vehicle). The other officers then used
this reported information to all make the same independent decision to head to the
location called out by the observing officer. Soon after, all officers converged on the
suspect’s location and attempted to bring him into custody using an apprehension plan
they had drafted prior to going out on patrol that day. Unfortunately, the suspect was noncompliant and nearly ran an officer over with his vehicle, thus initiating police gunfire.
One last example of how some officers in the sample used communication during
the anticipation phase and how this influenced their decision-making was captured in
Incident 124, the one in which officers were tasked with executing a search of residence
suspected of being used to house illegal narcotics. Two officers assigned to the narcotics
unit (Officers #183 and #213) had been involved in the investigation of the home and its
residents. These officers had called on the assistance of other officers who did not
typically work with them in the narcotics unit and thus did not have access to the
information they had collected during the investigation. Officer #213 took it upon himself
to share this information with these officers prior to driving to the home and executing
the search, explaining:
We briefed that morning. . .I think at 6 o’clock. My partner and I had shot the
location the day before with one of our narcotics trainers. He brought out his
video camera so we could film it and he was taking still pictures as well. Drove
by it a few times – got some photos, got some video. So we could. . .the
information was that the house was a stash house and while we were there that
day. . .and that people didn’t live there. They frequented it, but nobody stayed
there was what we had been told.
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Officer #185, another officer involved in Incident 105, reiterated Officer #213’s
account of this phase of the incident, saying:
[Officer #213] said, “Okay, we’re gonna do this and this is what we’re gonna do.”
We’re good with it. I say, “Okay.” So, we all briefed. . .this is the position we’re
gonna be in the stack to go hit the door, and so we approach like we normally did,
like we planned.
Officer #184 also briefly described this briefing process, highlighting their use of
additional officers (who were not members of the regular warrant-serving team) and how
they provided these officers with necessary information, stating:
Yes, sir, we briefed. We were actually short a couple of guys so we actually asked
a couple officers – actually, the officer that got injured we asked him to come up
and him and his partner met us. We briefed them with our raid plan, what we were
gonna do. He volunteered to run point. So, we briefed it.
Each of these examples from the officers who participated in Incident 105
highlight how officers can use communication during the early part of the incident to
share information, discuss plans, and ensure that all officers are on the same page prior to
arriving on scene and making contact with the suspect(s). The investigating narcotics
officers who had conducted surveillance knew, based on this collected information, that
this residence housed drugs and that those who lived in the residence were typically not
home during the day (see Officer #213’s account above). This information was not only
distributed to the participating officers, but was used by the officers when planning how
they were going to execute the search warrant (i.e., during the day when the residents
were not home). Unfortunately, upon their entry into the home, two individuals were
home and began firing shots at the arriving officers.
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In sum, the experiences of 14 officers demonstrate that communication with other
officers during the anticipation phase is just as crucial as communication with dispatchers
or citizens who are phoning in a situation. This finding is especially relevant for policecitizen interactions that involve more than one officer. If multiple officers are assigned to
a call, it is logical that officers would want to converse and exchange known, pertinent
information prior to arriving on scene. Perhaps most importantly, the information
collected from other officers can influence individual officers’ decision-making at this
point in the encounter, as well as in subsequent phases. It is necessary then to note the
potential impact of information collected from other police officers and its significance as
a possible social influence on officers’ decision-making during the anticipation phase of
the violent police-citizen encounter.

CONFIRMATION
Another way in which some officers in the sample used communication during
the anticipation phase was to confirm initial information they had received about the
situation and/or the suspect involved, as well as receive confirmation from other officers
to validate their decision-making. Five (5) officers in the sample exhibited this behavior
during the anticipation phase of their incident, relying on responses from other officers to
dictate their decision-making.24
Two officers who used communication to confirm details about the situation they
were preparing to enter participated in Incident 20, in which 16 officers in the sample
24

A total of 22 officers engaged in communication during this phase, but a few officers used
communication for more than one reason. Therefore, these counts will not add up to 22 (but
rather will add up to 24), as two of these officers utilized communication to both update
officers/provide information and preserve officers’ safety.
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pursued a man who fired shots at a fellow officer. Both of these officers were
preoccupied with another incident when they heard the broadcast from Officer #35
reporting that shots had been fired and back-up was needed. Officer #42 was with his
partner searching the vehicle belonging to some individuals who were suspected of using
stolen credit cards at a local auto shop when they both heard the broadcast from Officer
#35. As Officer #42 explained:
I heard. . .well, I thought I heard somebody yell out, “Shots fired!”. . .and I go,
“No.” I was a little in disbelief. I was like, “Nah, that’s not what they said.” I
stopped, I looked back at [my partner] and I said, “Did they just say ‘shots
fired’?” He goes, “Yeah, that’s what I think they said.” And I said, “Oh shoot”
and gave back these guys’ IDs and everything and I said, “We’re out of here.”
And we responded.
His partner, Officer #28, reported this same verbal exchange in his account of the
incident, stating:
We’re searching their car [and] we hear [Officer #35] get on the radio and yelling.
So we kind of looked at each other because he didn’t come through clear. “Did he
just say something? Is he in foot pursuit? Did he just say, ‘Shots fired’?” And I
look at the officer who is handling that case and said, “We need to go.” And he
said, “Ok yeah, let’s go.” Because [Officer #35] wasn’t that far from us. Less than
a mile away. So we just [released] those guys. . .I think he even gave back the
credit cards and everything and we just took off.
In the aforementioned example, these officers, who were partnered together that
night, relied on one another to confirm the information that had been broadcasted by a
fellow officer. It is clear that both officers were originally unsure of what they had heard,
but each officer reported a different reason behind this confusion. Officer #42 reported
that he was in disbelief that this type of incident (i.e., shots fired by or at another officer)
was taking place and that the officer involved needed assistance, while Officer #28 stated
that his perplexity about what he heard in the broadcast was due to an unclear radio
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transmission. Regardless of the reason behind their need for clarity, the behavior of these
officers demonstrates that, during the anticipation phase of encounters, officers may rely
on one another to confirm information they have received about an incident that requires
their attention.
In addition to relying on one another to confirm information, three officers in the
sample described how they used communication with other officers to provide them with
confirmation about their decision-making in this phase. A good example of this pattern
was found in the behavior of Officer #104 who was involved in Incident 46. He was one
of two officers who were working a traffic detail when a call came out reporting shots
being fired at a nearby community center. When he heard this information, Officer #104
described how he immediately looked to a fellow officer, who was a sergeant at the time,
for confirmation that they could respond to the call, explaining:
Call comes out on the radio. . .shots fired at the community center. And we get,
you know, we get these calls not all the time, but you know, it’s ok, shots fired
and radio dispatches a couple of other cars to respond. . . we were tied up and so
the other officers are going, no big deal. . .radio then advises us that they’re
getting multiple calls, that they have a woman down, and that they have a man
with a shotgun running around the center. We now go from the typical shots fired
call to pretty much a confirmed shots fired call. I looked up at my partner, the
acting sergeant at the time, and he was like giving me the signal, “Go, go, go,
go!” [We] got in my patrol car, spun around, drove down the block to the end of
the road, made a left and we were there.
This example not only demonstrates how Officer #104 searched for confirmation
from another officer before making the decision to respond to a call, but it also represents
a relationship dynamic that may very well have played a role in this interaction: the
officer he was seeking confirmation from was a sergeant. Officer #104 does not explicitly
say that this power dynamic played a role in his choice to seek approval for his action
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from his partner that day, but the fact that he mentioned his partner’s rank in the
description above suggests it may have played a role in this interaction. Regardless of
whether his partner’s seniority influenced his behavior, Officer #104’s experience
demonstrates that when an additional officer is present and available, an individual
officer may seek confirmation from him or her before making the decision to become
involved in an incident.
Another example of officers relying on communication with one another to
confirm their thoughts or decision-making during the early phases of an encounter was
observed in Officer #9’s account of his involvement in Incident 9, the incident in which
officers attempted to apprehend a suspect wanted for a recent string of gas station
robberies. Officer #9 described how he and his partner planned to drive to this
individual’s home with the hope of talking to him and seeing whether he matched the
description they had of the robbery suspect. In the midst of this planning, Officer #9
reported that he and his partner talked about potential outcomes of the situation and
decided that it would be best if they called and requested two additional officers to help
them, explaining:
Before we do anything, before we approach, we want[ed] to get additional
officers. Absolutely, we don’t know who’s in [the suspect’s house]. There could
be seven, eight, nine guys inside that house, you know, uh, who knows, you
know? And there’s another thing to it. I mean, let’s say it is just him, we would—
what we would normally do, if someone gives us consent, you know, we’ll step
outside, two detectives can talk to you and the other two can go inside and do the
search, you know? That’d be preferable to us, uh, and it’s time-proven and it
works for us. So, that’s why we wanted more people out there as well.
While Officer #9 did not go into detail about the “what if” scenarios he and his
partner had talked about, he does make it clear above that one of the potential outcomes
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they considered was that they could arrive at the suspect’s house, only to be outnumbered
by others who could possibly be in the home. Because of this, these officers agreed that
requesting additional officers to travel with them to the suspect’s home was the best
course of action and Officer #9’s partner took it upon himself to make the request.
It is necessary to note that while this behavior only occurred among a small
number of officers in the sample, it still highlights an important finding: when officers
are working together, they are able to take advantage of a second opinion regarding the
actions and/or decisions they are considering in the anticipation phase. This feedback
provided by a fellow officer may influence the decision(s) an individual officer will
ultimately make. Therefore, it is important to consider that individual officers may rely
on other officers’ feedback about thoughts they are having or decisions they are
contemplating at this stage of the potentially violent police-citizen encounter. It is also
important to examine more closely how feedback from other officers may impact
individual officers’ decision-making.

SAFETY
The final way in which officers used communication with one another in the
anticipation phase was to preserve their own safety of the safety other officers who were
either already involved, or about to become involved, in their incident. For example, five
(5) officers in the sample reporting sharing information with other officers or requesting
that officers make certain decisions with the overall goal of ensuring that they maintain
safe operations during their encounter. Again, although this pattern was only observed
among a small number of officers, these findings still represent a theme that emerged
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from incidents involving multiple officers, and thus enhance our understanding of how
other officers’ actions can impact an individual officer’s actions and/or decisions early in
the incident.
An example of this behavior was observed in Officer #7’s account of his decisionmaking during Incident 8, the incident wherein officers were called to respond to a
suicidal subject who may have posed a threat to innocents in the home. On his way to the
scene, Officer #7 learned that another officer had made it to the scene of the call before
him. Officer #7 advised this officer to wait for additional officers to arrive before making
his way to the home, explaining:
We get a call of a suicidal subject who had shot himself and they gave the address
out. Prior to my arrival, another officer from the other district - cause it’s right on
the dividing line of the districts - arrived on scene. At that point I advised that
officer to stop right where the beginning of the block was, cause it was about half
way down the block where the house is at, so we could all make the approach
together since shots had been fired.
Officer #7’s communication with the arriving officers was driven by his concern
for the safety of these officers based on what was known about the incident. Because it
had been reported that gunshots had already been fired, Officer #7 did not want a single
officer to handle that type of call alone. Therefore, he requested that the first-arriving
officer wait to approach the scene until additional officers, including himself, arrived and
they could proceed together from there.
Another example of how an officer relied on communication to preserve officer
safety was found in Officer #123’s account of his participation in Incident 90, the
incident in which officers engaged in a vehicle pursuit and shootout with a known gang
member. At the time, Officer #123 was a detective assigned to a multi-agency gang task
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force. One of his informants had alerted him to the location of a gang member who was
suspected of committing a number of armed robberies that had occurred across town.
Given all this information, Officer #123 described how it factored into his decision to
preserve his own safety by requesting back-up, saying:
Well, [the informant] calls at, I wanna say at 12:30 that night and says we're at
this house, dope house in the mornings that I was well aware of, and the car's
parked in the driveway and oh, by the way, he's got a gun and he's been doing
jewelry store robberies So I called dispatch just because I thought things might
get a little sideways and say, “Hey, we're in this area. If we start yelling for
anything, this is what's going on.” And I come to find out as I was on the phone
with [the informant], she was telling me more and more about that day, that the
suspect had already shot at a homeowner who came out and interrupted a car
prowl. And so I’m trying to formulate a plan and I was like okay, this guy's nuts. I
mean, he's a bad dude and just really has a potential of going stupid. So, I called. .
.I had my unmarked patrol vehicle and I put my other two partners in a civilian
car to have the eyes on the house in case the car left and then I called [another
officer] who was in a marked patrol car and working patrol to come assist.
Upon learning that the suspect he was searching for was currently at a home
known to be associated with narcotics distribution and that he had fired shots at an
individual earlier in the day, coupled with the fact that he was suspected of committing
multiple armed robberies, Officer #123 made the decision to call additional officers and
ask for their assistance in this operation. The information that Officer #123 had received
led him to label the suspect as “a bad dude” who “really [had] the potential of going
stupid.” Therefore, not only did he call additional officers for back-up, but he also alerted
dispatch of his location and operation. Lastly, it should be noted that Officer #124 also
requested the presence of an officer in a marked police car in addition to the two officers
he called for back-up (who were in unmarked cars). This was another safety precaution
taken by Officer #124, who recognized that should the officers be forced to engage in the
suspect in a pursuit or place the suspect under arrest, it would be smart – and safe – to
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have a uniformed officer there in a marked police car so the suspect knew he was being
pursued by the police.
One last example of how communication was used to preserve officer safety was
observed in Officer #184’s account of his early decision-making in Incident 124, during
which he and other officers executed a search warrant of a home suspected of being used
to store illegal narcotics. Prior to serving the warrant and conducting the search, Officer
#184 drafted a plan detailing how many officers he would need and what each officer
would be doing during the operation. He ended up requesting the assistance of two
officers who did not regularly work with his team, explaining:
We were actually short a couple of guys so we actually asked a couple officers –
actually, the officer that got injured we asked him to come up and him and his
partner met us. We briefed them with our raid plan. . .what we were gonna do.
Officer #184’s assessment of the situation was similar to the previous officer’s
(Officer #9). Based on what he knew about the home and the inhabitants (e.g., “We knew
that when there’s dope in there they want to be able to destroy the evidence. We knew he
had a weapon or could have had a weapon in that house”), he wanted to ensure that they
had enough officers to execute the search warrant safely. Officer #184 recognized that his
unit was short on officers at the time, so he made the decision to call on two additional
officers and requested their assistance.
In sum, the 22 officers in the sample who communicated with other officers
during the anticipation phase demonstrated behaviors that were recognized by Binder and
Scharf in their summary of officers’ actions in this early phase. The analysis revealed that
officers who did engage in communication in this phase did so for three primary reasons:
to share information about the incident and/or suspect with one another, to provide other
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officers with confirmation about the information they received or decisions they were
considering or had made, and to preserve officer safety. Communication with officers,
regardless of the reason behind it, impacted individual officer’s decision-making during
the anticipation phase.

ENTRY AND INITIAL CONTACT
To review, in Binder and Scharf’s framework, the entry phase begins when
officers arrive on the scene of their incident and continues until the officers makes verbal
(or non-verbal) contact with the suspect. Moreover, the authors identify multiple factors
that they believe can influence officer’s decision-making during this segment of
encounters, such as the officer’s distance from the suspect, the availability of cover (to
protect the officer should the suspect pose a physical threat to the officer), and the
officer’s assessment of the suspect’s overall demeanor (e.g., calm, agitated, aggressive,
etc.). The authors do not, however, discuss whether or how the presence or actions of
other officers on scene might impact an individual officer’s decision-making once he or
she arrives on scene.
The present analysis disclosed a number of ways in which the actions of other
officers can influence individual officers’ decision-making during the entry phase. Some
of the patterns identified among officers in the anticipation phase continued to hold
strong in the entry phase as well. That is, officers continued to use communication with
one another to gather information about the situation and/or suspect on scene, to preserve
officer safety, and to provide confirmation and/or support regarding options and/or
decisions they were considering. In addition, the results from the analysis suggest that at
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times, officers followed the lead of other officers on scene when making decisions during
this phase, thus mirroring the behavior of their fellow officers on scene. Each of these
four aspects of how fellow officers affected subject officers’ actions are addressed in turn
below.

COMMUNICATION
During the entry phase, officers in the sample continued the communication
patterns observed in the anticipation phase. Twenty-five (25) officers in the sample
verbally communicated with other officers during this phase. They did so for one of two
primary reasons, both of which were observed during the anticipation phase: 1) to share
information about the situation and/or the suspect and 2) to preserve their personal safety
and/or the safety of other officers on scene. In addition, a new communication purpose
emerged among officers in the entry phase. Twenty-five (25) officers communicated with
at least one other officer to draft a plan to take some sort of specific action (e.g., to make
entry into a building, to make contact with the suspect, etc.). It should be noted that
officers’ engagement in these three sorts of communication was not mutually exclusive.
For example, officers sometimes communicated to both update other officers about the
situation and/or the suspect and draft a plan with his or her fellow officers.

Situation/Suspect Update
Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) state that upon arrival on scene (and their
entrance into the entry phase), officers begin making direct observations, which lead to
individual interpretations of the situation at hand. They then take these observations
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based on interpretations and compare them to the information they received in the
previous phase (from dispatchers, citizens who reported the incident, or other officers) to
craft a more complete assessment of the situation at hand. Analysis of the interviews used
in the present study suggest that when multiple officers are involved in the same incident,
they often communicate with one another to ensure that they are all working with the
same information and the same interpretations of the situation in order to handle the
incident.
Upon arriving on scene, 15 officers reported communicating with other
responding officers about what they knew about the incident, the suspect, and what they
had observed since their arrival to the location. An example of this behavior was
observed among all four of the officers involved in Incident 9, wherein the officers were
attempting to speak to a man suspected of a recent robbery. The two officers involved in
the robbery investigation, Officer #9 and Officer #16, decided to call two additional
officers to meet them at the suspect’s residence. Once the additional officers arrived,
Officers #9 and #16 shared with them the information they had collected from the
investigation about the suspect and the crime he was suspected of committing. As Officer
#9 described:
We briefed them on, you know, the robbery the night before and suspect
information, [gave] them a description of what the suspect from the night before
looks like, showed them pictures from [the crime scene] and we came up with
what we were going to do.
Officer #16, who had worked the investigation with Officer #9 the night prior,
made similar comments about this exchange with arriving officers, saying:
We clued them in on what we had and what we were doing, they probably, I think
they already knew a little bit—we were doing this robbery investigation. . . we
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want to go up and knock on the door and, and just talk to this guy, but I want two
people watching the back door.
Officer #10, one of the additional officers who was requested by Officers #9 and
#16, reported the same information exchange between the officers, saying:
We met up and discussed what they’d come up with prior to making contact [with
the suspect]. . . I knew that the robbery [occurred] in our city. They’ve gotten him
identified, gotten him tracked down to the house out there. All the specifics as far
as how they had him ID’d. . .how they knew it was him.
Communication about the situation here was key because although Officers #9
and #16 had played a role in the investigation, the other officers they called to join them
had not. Therefore, two officers in this incident knew more about the situation and the
suspect going into the situation. Officers #9 and #16 were cognizant of this and took it
upon themselves to update the two officers who they asked to join them. At this point,
they also drafted and discussed a contact plan, which will be discussed later in the
section.
Another example of an officer using communication with other officers to draft an
updated assessment of the situation and/or the suspect was captured in Officer #15’s
account of his participation in Incident 12, the SWAT call-up to a home where an armed
individual was holding his child hostage. Upon his arrival on scene, Officer #15
described how he tried to get as much information as he could from the patrol and SWAT
officers already on scene about what had transpired prior to his arrival. He stated:
I’m starting to put on my gear and a supervisor came up to me and he goes, “Hey
this guy, he came home from work, got in a fight with his wife,” and. . .he goes,
“they started fighting and he pulled a gun and started throwing his two year old
daughter around and threw her into the wall and broke the dry wall”. . .and he
goes, “He’s negotiating with us, but he’s kind of back and forth.”
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After receiving more information from a fellow officer about the suspect and his
past behavior toward his daughter, Officer #15 began considering what else this man may
be capable of. Prior to arriving on scene, it appears that the only information Officer #15
received was that a man was holding his child hostage, the address of the home where the
incident was taking place, and that he was needed immediately. Once he arrived on scene
then, Officer #15 took it upon himself to learn more about the situation from officers who
had been on scene longer than he had and who most likely had more information about
the suspect.
During his interview, Officer #15 also voiced his frustration with the negotiation
process during this incident. In this case, the communication between the negotiator and
the suspect was not consistently relayed to the SWAT officers who had been tasked with
making entry into the home should they need to initiate a hostage rescue. Although this
finding is isolated to this incident, it brings attention to a situational aspect not considered
by Binder and Scharf. They argue that the entry phase is when the officer is able to make
direct observations of the suspect based on his or her actions or verbalizations. But what
if an officer cannot visibly see the suspect or directly communicate with him or her? In
this case (and in other incidents that involve a barricaded suspect and rely on the use of a
negotiator), Officer #15 could not make direct observations of the suspect’s behavior or
hear any of the suspect’s comments. Therefore, his only sources of information at this
juncture were other officers.
One last example was noted in Officer #91’s behavior in Incident 68, which was
the incident that involved three officers in the sample who were called to respond to a
man with a grenade at a nearby courthouse. In his interview, Officer #91 recounted that a
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large number of officers responded to the location, but very few were willing to go in
when he and another officer attempted to form an entry team. He explained:
I pulled up out front [of the courthouse]. Lots of cops. Everybody is looking in the
windows and I was like, “Well, this is stupid – he’s inside and we’re all outside.”
So. . .there was one of the court security guys there and I said, “Is there a way that
you can bring me inside without going through the front door and getting [the
suspect’s] attention?” And he’s like, “Sure, follow me.” So I grabbed another guy,
another officer. We ran after him. We went in. . .we just tried to provide as much
information and intelligence as possible over the radio.
Eventually, additional officers made their way into the courthouse, one of whom
was an officer with SWAT experience. When this officer arrived, Officer #91 explained
that he moved to the location of this officer, as he had found a better location that
provided officers with more cover should the suspect detonate the grenade. Once he
moved closer to the newly arriving officer, Officer #91 “just discussed the situation
briefly” with the SWAT officer and a supervisor before the other officers began issuing
commands to the suspect to drop the grenade and surrender to police.
In this incident, Officer #91 used communication not only to update the few
officers who eventually made their way into the courthouse, but also used his radio to
update officers who were outside the courthouse as to what was occurring on the inside.
Because of the type of deadly weapon possessed by the suspect in this incident, it is
understandable that those managing the incident did not want a large number of officers
entering the courthouse. This officer’s perceptions of the early phases of the incident,
however, imply that other officers who arrived on scene were too nervous or scared to
become involved in this incident. While this perception cannot be verified25, the fact that

25

The three officers who were interviewed and participated in this incident were inside the courthouse
throughout the incident, not outside. Therefore, perspectives representing officers outside the courthouse
were not represented in the sample.
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very few officers were inside the courthouse and thus were able to make direct
observations of the suspect and his actions and demeanor made Officer #91’s
communication via the radio crucial to other officers’ understanding of the situation.

Officer Safety
In addition to using communication with one another to provide situational
updates, officers in the sample also communicated with each other during the entry phase
with the goal of enhancing or preserving their personal safety or the safety of other
officers. In their outline of this phase of the encounter, Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983)
identify officer safety as a potential social influence on an individual officer’s decisionmaking (i.e., an officer being concerned for his or her own safety, thus making decisions
that enhance their safety, such as maintaining distance from the suspect or seeking
cover). The results from this analysis, however, suggest that an individual officer may
also be concerned for the safety of other officers on scene in addition to their own safety,
which can impact the decisions they make during this phase of an incident.
Upon their arrival on the scene of their respective incidents, 10 officers in the
sample communicated with other officers in order to promote both personal safety and
that of the other officers present. An example of this behavior was observed in the
account of officers involved in Incident 47, during which four officers encountered and
later engaged in a gun battle with an elderly man. Officer #103 first noticed the elderly
man, who was making his way toward a few of the officers who were engaged in
conversations with other citizens. Officer #103 reported feeling uncomfortable about this
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man, stating that “if I feel uncomfortable, [my officers] need to feel uncomfortable.” He
explained:
And this guy comes up and for some reason both Scout and I just caught a
glimpse of him. I remember that because we just sort of. . .something didn’t seem
right. And I said to Will, I said, “Will, pay attention”. . . when I first paid attention
to the guy and when I told Scout to catch on him, and then I sort of pointed to
Will who was off to the right. It’s just an automatic thing. It was we know what to
do, but I’m still making sure that other people are paying attention to what I’m
paying attention to.
The behavior of the elderly man that first caught Officer #103’s attention was him
actively avoiding the officers on scene by taking a roundabout path out of the area instead
of simply walking straight through on the cleared, paved pathway. As Officer #103
mentioned above, there was something about this behavior that did not seem quite right
to him and he made the decision to communicate this feeling of uneasiness to other
officers by alerting them to the man’s presence. Soon after, the elderly man began to
urinate on a tree, at which point other officers made their way toward him and instructed
him to stop. The man then pulled a firearm out of his waistband and fired in the direction
of the officers. Three of the four officers interviewed fired shots back at the man.
Two other examples of officers communicating with one another to preserve their
safety were captured in the accounts of two officers involved in Incident 20. This
incident, which involved 16 officers in the sample, was unique in that some participating
officers initiated and engaged in Binder and Scharf’s four phases at different time points
based on their arrival on scene. For example, some of these officers were the first to
arrive on scene after one of their fellow officers reported shots had been fired and, as
such, these officers were present when the suspect first engaged them in gunfire. Some of
these officers fired back at the suspect, thus entering the final frame phase. The incident,
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however, did not conclude there, as the suspect continued to flee down the street and
officers gave chase. As this was happening, additional officers were arriving on scene
and initiating their involvement in the incident at this point. Therefore, although some
officers had already made it to the final frame phase, others were just beginning the entry
phase. This is important to note, as the two examples that will be discussed here involve
two officers who entered the entry phase at two different time points during the same
incident.
Officer #34 was one of the first officers to arrive on scene. Instead of responding
to the exact location that Officer #35 reported, Officer #34 explained that he decided to
report a few blocks down from the location with the goal of adding to the police
perimeter that Officer #35 was attempting to organize. Once he stepped out of the car,
Officer #34 was contacted by a resident who told him that she believed she saw a man
running in the area and that he was hiding in some nearby shrubbery. Officer #34 quickly
relayed this information on the radio, stating:
I immediately called that out. . .dispatch responded and I said, “Hey, I have a
suspect. Suspect may be here at this location. I need [assistance.]” And
immediately heard sirens in the background headed my way. So the information
turned out to be correct in the long run.
Soon after communicating this information via radio, additional officers joined
Officer #34 at his location. In his interview, Officer #34 made it clear that because he
believed the suspect to be nearby in the bushes, he was careful to use his car as cover
while talking to arriving officers in case the suspect fired at officers. One of the arriving
officers was a rookie whose actions upon arrival concerned Officer #34. He explained:
And there was at least one unit, came down the street and parked here, and it was
Jackson, who is one of our SWAT officers, and he had a trainee. Brand new guy.
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And then brand new guy gets out and he’s standing right here next to his car,
because he’s new, he’s waiting for direction from his training officer. And I didn’t
know that guy’s name. So I started yelling at Jackson, who had also gotten out. .
.and I remember yelling at Jackson, “Move! Move!” because I didn’t know this
kid’s name and I knew if I told Jackson to move, the kid would follow. “Hey
move! The guy’s right here! The guy’s right here!” and in the process of me
saying that, the guy jumps out of the bushes [and shoots].
This example illustrates two instances where Officer #34 used communication
with his fellow officers during the entry phase. First, shortly after arriving on scene and
talking with a witness who believed she saw the suspect and knew his location, Officer
#34 communicated this information with his fellow officers over the radio. In this
instance, Officer #34 used communication to share information about the situation and
the suspect, perhaps with the goal of ensuring all officers (incoming or already present on
scene) were working with the same information. After he broadcasted this newly
acquired information about the suspect’s possible whereabouts, other officers began to
drive to his location. Once they arrived (and as described above), Officer #34 then used
communication to warn officers that they needed to be aware of their surroundings and
use cover in case the suspect was, in fact, nearby in the bushes and posed a threat to the
officers.
One of the officers mentioned in Officer #34’s account was Officer #29. He was
the training officer to the trainee whose lax behavior on scene concerned Officer #34. In
his account of the incident, Officer #29 reported that Officer #34 did alert him to the
potential threat that the suspect posed if he was, in fact, nearby in the bushes, but the
behavior of the other officers led to some confusion on Officer #29’s part. He explained:
I yelled at my [trainee], “Get my shotgun!” So he goes in my trunk and gets my
shotgun. Just as he’s walking up to hand it to me. . .there were four cops there. .
.one of the cops there yells at me, “Hey, those are the bushes right there. Get
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cover!” And it didn’t really sink in because all four of them were standing straight
up behind the trunks or engine compartments and if they were so worried about it,
why didn’t they crouch down? So it didn’t really sink in. . .and it didn’t really
seem like a threat because they weren’t covering, so I turned to [my trainee] to get
my shotgun and. . .just as he’s handing it to me [the suspect] busts out through the
hedge.
Both Officers #29 and #34 provide similar accounts of Officer #34’s use of
communication to alert Officer #29 and his trainee of the suspect’s possible location and
the importance of seeking cover in case the suspect decided to ambush the officers.
Officer #29’s read of the situation, however, was interesting in that although he may have
been aware that they were close to the suspected location of the armed man, he did not
immediately seek cover or report being outwardly concerned about safety because based
on his observations, the other officers were not all that concerned either. This example
not only demonstrates the pattern of communication for the sake of preserving officer
safety, but this is also an example of how other officers’ behavior can shape the behavior
and choices of individual officers, which will be discussed in a subsequent subsection of
this chapter.
One last example of how officers used communication to preserve and/or enhance
the safety of other officers was captured in the account of Officer #37 who was also
involved in Incident 20. She was, however, one of the later-arriving officers. This means
that she did not arrive on the scene until after the suspect had fired shots at the group of
officers (as described in the example above). In fact, in her description of her initial
arrival on scene, she reported that she could hear gunfire as she was driving in her
vehicle, but she was not present for, nor a part of, this initial police-suspect exchange.
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By the time Officer #37 saw the suspect, he was down on the ground and
wounded from shots fired by other police officers. Although some of these other officers
had fired, thus entering the final frame phase, Officer #37 had just arrived on scene and
had not yet made verbal contact with the suspect, placing her in the entry phase of Binder
and Scharf’s framework. At this point during the incident, Officer #37 was one of the
officers who made the decision to surround the downed suspect. She soon noticed that a
fellow officer was in a crouched down position in front of her, thus placing him in her
line of fire should he decide to stand up and she decide to shoot. At this point, she used
communication to alert this officer of her position behind him, saying:
There’s an officer, and I don’t remember when he got there, whether he was right
in front of me or he was already there. . .and I don’t even know. . .he was just in
front of me. . .but I don’t remember seeing him stop. I just remember when I got
there, he was stopping or he was in front of me. . . I also didn’t remember at the
time, until the other officer told me that that. . .it’s actually a Sergeant that said
that when I came up behind him and I put my hand on his shoulder because he
was crouched down and said, “It’s Denise.” I didn’t remember doing that and then
when he told me I did it, that’s when I remembered I did it.
In this instance, Officer #37 relied on communication to alert the officer in front
of her of her position. Therefore, Officer #37 took it upon herself to tell this officer of her
position so as to avoid injuring or killing another officer because this officer was unaware
of her presence. As an aside, it is interesting that Officer #37 did not remember engaging
in this behavior until another officer brought it to her attention after the incident.
To conclude, the present analysis highlights that officers rely on communication
with one another during the entry phase to preserve or enhance the safety of their fellow
officers. Again, this is a finding that is specific to incidents involving multiple officers,
but is a contribution to Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework.
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Binder and Scharf argue that a concern about safety is a factor that can impact an
individual officer’s decision-making during the entry phase. Rather than viewing this as
limited to a concern for that officer’s personal safety, the results from this study indicate
that officers’ concern for the safety of their fellow officers can also impact the decisions
officers make and the behaviors they engage in during the second phase of the encounter.

Planning
Analysis of the transcripts disclosed a new pattern of communication that affected
officers’ decision-making and behavior during the entry phase. In addition to using
communication with other officers to provide them with situational updates and/or
preserve or enhance their safety, individual officers also used communication with other
officers during this phase of encounters to craft various types of plans. Such plans
included: how to make entry into a structure, how to establish a search perimeter, how to
establish verbal communication with a suspect, and how to apprehend a suspect. In total,
25 officers in the sample reported discussing plans with their fellow officers at this time,
which ultimately impacted their decision-making during this phase, as well as in
subsequent phases of the encounter.
This is exemplified in Incident 118, which involved two officers in the sample
who, as previously mentioned, were homicide detectives searching for the suspect in a
recent homicide. When the officers eventually spotted a man who matched the
description of their suspect, they began conversing with one another about what they
should do: should they exit their vehicle, make contact with the suspect, and apprehend
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him? Or should they call for back-up and wait to contact the suspect until other officers
arrive? Officer #217 explained:
I grabbed the radio and I spoke to our detective group, which is not monitored by
dispatch, and I said, you know, “I’ve got the suspect. This is where he’s at. He’s
on the move. He’s moving in this direction.” . . . I start to hear sirens. And the
sirens are coming in. And my partner and I are going back and forth in our very
short. . .I don’t even remember the words we used, but I’ve been working with my
partner long enough that we don’t have to say much. We’ve got a pretty good
sense of what the other is thinking and going to do. And we were discussing do
we want to take him down? Do we want to wait for patrol? That was the first
decision we were trying to make and that’s when the sirens started coming in.
And I think I verbalized something similar to, “He’s going to run when those
sirens get much closer.” And I don’t know how we communicated, but we agreed,
“Ok, we are going to contact this guy. We are not going to wait for the arrival of
patrol.”
Once the partners agreed that they were not going to wait for additional officers to
arrive, these officers then began to discuss how they were going to approach the suspect
in order to apprehend him. Officer #168 stated:
I say to my partner, “Okay, I’ll pull in behind him and we’ll stop him here.” And
he says, “No, drive forward and let him walk into us. We’ll take him.”. . . and as
we stop, I say to my partner, “You take the commands so that the suspect’s only
dealing with one person”. . . then we both basically – my partner and I - both
basically leave the car simultaneously.
In this example, one can see that Officers #168 and #217 communicated about
two important decisions: whether they were going to make contact with the (potentially
armed) homicide suspect before additional officers arrive and how they were going to
make contact with the suspect. This example provides a clear demonstration of how
officers can use one another as sounding boards for courses of action they are
considering. Once they had spotted the suspect, Officers #168 and #217 discussed the
options they had available to them (i.e., waiting until back-up police units had arrived to
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approach the suspect or attempting to make contact with him prior to other officers’
arrival) and were in agreement about the option they were going to take. Once they made
the joint decision to contact the suspect before additional officers had arrived, they then
communicated with one another about how they were going to approach and make verbal
contact with the suspect. They discussed how they were going to approach the suspect in
their undercover vehicle, where they would park and exit their car, and, once they left the
car and made their way toward the suspect, who would be the one issuing verbal
commands.
Another example of how officers used communication with one another to craft a
plan was captured in Incident 7, which involved three officers in the sample. These
officers were called to respond to a report of a suicidal subject armed with a gun at a local
park. Officer #7, normally assigned to carry a rifle, decided to respond to the call because
other officers had requested an officer with a rifle. Unfortunately, Officer #7’s rifle was
being repaired at the time, but he had been temporarily assigned a shotgun and, as such,
thought he could still be of some assistance to the officers on scene.
Once he arrived at the park, Officer #7 relied on communication with other
officers who were already on scene to direct him where they needed him to go. He made
it to the designated location and began talking with another officer who was already at
the location about the situation and sought to develop a plan of action. Officer #7
described that he and the other officer began talking about the type of ammunition he had
in his shotgun and whether it was the best option given the large distance between
himself and the armed suspect (approximately 45 yards). He explained:
So I was talking to [another officer] about. . .I even had a discussion with him, I
said, “Well”…cause we were about 45 yards out-somewhere around there, and
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based on that I was like, “Hey” - cause he had his shotgun out too - and I said,
“What do you have in there?” He goes, “Well, I’ve got the buckshot in there.”
And I’m like, “Well,” I said, “It’s probably best if we do slugs here just because
of distance, we don’t want that spread to get you know too far out to where we’re
not in control.” So I said, “Hey man, I’ll take over, you know, covering him while
you transition over to slugs and that way we might have a better way to resolve
this if it if something needs to happen.”
This example demonstrates how officers can use communication with one another
to discuss possible situational outcomes (i.e., the potential that they would need to use
deadly force) and plan for how they would handle a particular situation should it arise.
Based on the information they had received (i.e., the suspect was armed, suicidal, and
unresponsive to commands from other officers), these officers discussed the possibility
that they may need to use deadly force and, if so, the best ammunition for their weapons
would be one that provided more control over their shot, given the distance between them
and the suspect.
Another officer involved in this incident, Officer #17, explained that upon his
arrival on scene, he met up with two other officers and began talking to them about the
possibility of having to use deadly force and, if so, how they would do this. He stated:
Yes, we briefly state what positions we’re going to take. Um, if someone did
decide to shoot, to make note of it somehow, say, “Gun!” or some [way] of letting
the other one know that you’re about to fire, basically. Uh, can’t always be done,
but if we can make that happen let’s make it happen. . . And I recall, our
conversations were if [the suspect] were to pause long enough to pull that trigger,
what we interpreted as an opportunity for him to fire upon us, then we have [to]
react and have to be quicker at that reaction. So, we were really discussing what
are we going. . .are we going to fire. Almost trying to validate our decisionmaking is what I. . . remember about it. Are we all on the same page with this?
You’re kind of looking for reassurance from your peers.
Similar to Officer #7’s account, Officer #17 and the officers he was with took the
time to discuss how this situation could potentially play out. They agreed that if the
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armed man pointed his weapon in their direction and they felt the need to use deadly
force, they would do their best to alert their fellow officers of their decision. Later in the
encounter, the suspect began raising his gun in the direction of police officers, at which
point two officers fired (Officers #7 and #17) and one held fire (Officer #24).
In addition, these officers also conversed with one another about the dangers
associated with waiting too long to shoot, thus giving the suspect more time to pull the
trigger of his weapon and potentially harm or kill officers on scene. Officer #17’s
narrative also highlights an important matter that may arise from communication with
other officers: validation of one’s decision-making. By discussing potential situational
outcomes and conditions under which they believe they should fire, these officers
provided one another with valuable feedback about their individual concerns and
considerations. It also leaves one to wonder: if an officer’s consideration to use deadly
force is supported by other officers, does this factor into that officer’s decision to fire?

OFFICERS’ DECISION-MAKING AND THE IMPACT OF OTHER OFFICERS
In their outline of the entry phase, Binder and Scharf (1983) assert that an
officer’s decision-making at this point can be influenced by a number of factors,
including the suspect’s behavior and demeanor, the officer’s perception of his or her
safety, and the availability of cover and concealment. As previously discussed, findings
from this study have suggested that officers’ decisions during this phase can be
influenced by communication with other officers as it relates to their safety or the safety
of other officers, providing one another with additional or updated information, or
creating plans for how to move forward in the incident. Another interesting pattern that
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emerged from the present analysis is that during the entry phase of encounters, officers’
decision-making can be influenced by the actions and/or decisions made by other officers
on scene. Furthermore, the results from the analysis also revealed that upon arrival on
scene, officers often receive instructions or commands from other officers, thus
influencing the decisions they make in the entry phase and in subsequent phases of the
encounter.

Mimicking and Following the Behavior of Others
Thirteen (13) officers reported that the behaviors of other officers on scene
influenced the decisions they made during the entry phase of their respective encounters.
Often times, these officers engaged in “follow the leader” behavior. That is, they
identified an officer on scene who they trusted, admired, or who held a higher rank than
they did, and chose to emulate the behaviors made by this officer instead of making their
own independent decisions.
A number of officers involved in Incident 20 engaged in this sort of mimicry,
reporting that they selected their original deployment locations based on where they saw
other officers congregating. These officers participated in the incident wherein officers –
16 in total – were searching for a man who had fired shots at a fellow officer. Upon her
arrival on the scene, Officer #32, a canine officer, spotted another officer nearby. She
then made the decision to meet up with this other officer, explaining:
As I’m going to one location to set up, I hear another officer setting up at another
corner and I go over to that far corner. . .I think, right in that area, and just set up
and see what the officer had. Because the officer had, I don’t know if he put it
over the air. . .or if he told me, but at some point, I got the information from the
officer that a female walking by stopped him, he was holding that corner, caught
his attention and said, “Hey, I don’t know if this is who you are looking for, but I
181

thought I saw somebody hiding in those bushes” and pointed to some bushes just
a little ways from where the officer was. . .but that might have been the reason
why I went to that point specifically because I had the dog at that point. [To]
figure out what all we had.
Although she sounds unsure of the exact order of events, Officer #32 reported that
she chose to set up in the area near the officer who had arrived on scene before her
because she believed she could collect relevant information from him. One could argue
that had she not come across this officer, Officer #32 would have continued to the
original location at which she planned to arrive.
Another officer to arrive on scene soon after Officer #32 was Officer #29. He was
a training officer at the time of the incident and had a trainee with him. When detailing
his arrival on scene, Officer #29 explained how he selected the location where they
eventually stopped:
I’m driving, of course. I’m not going to let a rookie drive on this kind of call. I
pull up facing. . .I guess that would be southbound. . .in the southbound lanes,
against a curb. . .and I pulled up there because I saw two [police] cars parked right
at the corner. . .squad cars with two cops standing there. Two or three. I think it
was three. Yeah, it was three. At least three cops standing there, using the car as
cover.
It appears that Officer #29 made the decision to stop his car and exit the vehicle
with his trainee at this location because it was where other officers had also decided to
stop. He does not clarify specifically what drove this decision to join the other officers
(e.g., to collect additional information from them, draft a search and apprehension plan,
provide protection for other officers, etc.), but it is clear in the excerpt above that the
presence of other officers influenced Officer #29’s decision to stop his vehicle where he
did once he arrived at the location of the call.
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Officer #29’s trainee at the time was Officer #41. This officer engaged in this
“follow the leader” behavior as well, but the source of his behavior is more clear cut.
Officer #41 was a new officer and still completing his field training requirements when
this incident occurred. In congruence with Officer #29’s account, Officer #41 shared that
other officers warned him and his field training officer of the potential danger that
loomed nearby. Soon after, the suspect jumped out of the bushes and fired on the officers
and Officer #41 was forced to make quick decisions, saying:
I remember another officer down the street yelling, “He’s right there! He’s in the
bushes!” Basically as soon as that happened, we kind of looked to our side, we
see the bushes moving, and I think either simultaneous or very close after we both
kind of jumped around to the opposite side of our car, so we put the car between
us and the bushes, and then we heard. . .or I heard. . .gun shots almost a few
seconds after the rustling in the bushes. . . I basically remember just doing what
my [training officer] was doing. I knew he was pretty squared away. He was, you
know, in the military and on the SWAT team so I kind of just tried to follow his
lead.
In the above example, Officer #41 explained that he essentially followed his
training officer’s lead when the suspect’s bullets started flying in their direction. He made
it clear that this decision was based on what he knew about his trainer’s experience: he
was a military veteran and served on the department’s SWAT team. While Officer #41
does not explicitly say so, it can be assumed that because of his trainee status, this type of
encounter – and what to do under such conditions – was very unfamiliar to him.
Therefore, he made the decision to mimic his trainer’s actions by seeking cover behind
their vehicle and later pursuing the suspect on foot.
Officers #32, #29, and #41 were some of the first officers to arrive on scene, and,
when ambushed by gunfire from the suspect, chased the suspect down the street on which
he fled. As Officers #32, #29, #41, and others were pursuing the suspect, additional
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officers were continuing to arrive at the scene. One of these officers, Officer #39, arrived
on scene just in time to see other officers congregating around the downed suspect. He
explained:
. . .the next thing I heard was that there was shots fired again. . . I was coming up
onto the corner I believe. . .or I must not have been quite there, because they said,
“Shots fired” and then um. . .they said that an officer had been hit. I don’t
remember exactly what he said. . . .and at that point, I had just hit the corner and
everybody was running down to where [the suspect] was at. . . I got out of my car,
stopped, and took cover behind a tree.
This officer’s arrival on scene coincided with his observation of multiple officers
running in the same direction and gathering around the suspect who had been hit by
police gunfire and dropped to the ground. Officer #39 saw the other officers’ behavior
and made the decision to follow suit by exiting his vehicle, running to where the other
officers were, and taking cover behind a nearby tree (which is what some of the other
officers had done). In this case, it appears that the other officers’ behavior served as a cue
for Officer #39; he observed their actions and simply followed suit.
While such mirroring behavior on the part of officers may appear to be sound and
logical, there were instances captured in the interviews suggesting that in a few cases,
officers willingly put their safety at risk by following the lead of other officers on scene.
Continuing with examples from Incident 20, Officer #29’s explanation of his actions
shortly after arriving on scene and meeting with additional officers fell into this category.
On his way to the location, Officer #29 stated that he heard a second broadcast reporting
that the suspect was believed to be hiding in the bushes on the corner of two nearby
streets. As previously mentioned, Officer #29 and his training officer pulled into the
neighborhood where the original “shots fired” call had been made and decided to stop at
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a location where they spotted other officers standing near a squad car. Upon exiting his
car, Officer #29 described his behavior as mimicking that of the other officers, but he was
soon warned by one of the other officers that he needed to take cover, as the suspect was
believed to be in the shrubbery close by. Officer #29 explained:
There were four cops there. . .one of the cops there yells at me, “Hey, those are
the bushes right there. Get cover!” And it didn’t really sink in because all four of
them were standing straight up behind the trunks or engine compartments. And if
they were so worried about it, why didn’t they crouch down? So it didn’t really
sink in, but I said, “Ok.”
What is interesting about Officer #29’s decision to exit the vehicle without being
outwardly concerned for his safety was that he had heard the broadcast reporting that the
suspect had been spotted nearby the location where he stopped. He had this information,
yet still made the decision to exit his vehicle without immediately seeking cover because
that is what he had observed his fellow officers doing. Soon after another officer had
warned Officer #29 and his training officer to seek cover behind their vehicle, the suspect
jumped out of the nearby shrubbery and fired shots at the officers. Luckily, Officer #29
and his trainee were not struck by the suspect’s gunfire.
Another example of dangerous behavior was captured in the experience of Officer
#54, who participated in Incident 26, the one in which he and three other officers
attempted to take a wanted man into custody at a bail bonds office. Because of the
location (i.e., a local business) and lack of violence toward police on the suspect’s record,
these officers did not treat this task as they normally did. Officer #54 explained:
So we were just going to go down there and pick him up. We weren’t doing it. .
.like usually if we’re running a warrant on somebody’s house, we’d do it totally
different. We’d have a detail. . .any time we do a warrant, we’re going to go out
with our guns drawn already if we’re going to enter a house or going to a
suspect’s door like that. Like I said, this one. . .I guess because it was a business
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and the circumstances were just a little different, we were just going to try to kind
of go in there and cool breeze the guy and just get him to, you know, I guess
hoping he would cooperate with us.

Unfortunately, the suspect in this case did not cooperate with police. Once the
officers entered the bail bondsman’s office and told the suspect he was under arrest, he
stood up and began to withdraw a firearm from his waistband. Two of the officers
decided to become involved in a physical altercation with the suspect (to hold his arm
down to prevent him from pointing and shooting his weapon in the direction of officers)
and eventually two officers fired at the suspect. Officer #54, however, held fire, as he was
one of the officers who had been preoccupied with physically engaging the suspect.
When asked during the interview if he had ever considered drawing his weapon
prior to entering the bail bondsman’s officer, Officer #54 said, “I think I did,” but then
quickly noted, “I know I recall no one else having theirs out.” Officer #54 did not expand
on this, but it leads one to suspect that this officer would have made a different decision
in regards to drawing his weapon upon entry into the bondman’s officer had his fellow
officers decided to draw their weapons.
These examples shed light on an influence that is unique to multiple officer
shootings and critically important: the decisions made by other officers can impact the
decisions made by individual officers because an individual officer may choose to base
his or her decisions on the choices made by other officers on scene. In some of these
cases, the officers made it known why they chose to follow the behavior of others (e.g.,
recognized another officer’s knowledge and experience, wanted to communicate with one
another), but there may be other times when the reasons behind this mimicking behavior
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is unknown. This is an important aspect of group behavior that future research on officerinvolved shootings with multiple officers present should address.

Commands/Directions Issued by Other Officers
In addition to the findings reported above, the analysis also disclosed that the
behavior and decisions of 11 officers during the entry phase of their respective incidents
could be best understood as the execution of orders handed down by another officer on
scene. In many of these instances, officers received directions, commands, and/or
assignments from officers involved in the incident who held a superior position (e.g.,
senior officer, sergeant, lieutenant, district supervisor, etc.) compared to them at the time.
Because of this, these officers engaged in individual decision-making during this phase,
but some of the decisions they made were rooted in requests and commands made by
another officer.
An example of this behavior was captured in Officer #113’s account of her
participation in Incident 43, the incident in which two officers were confronted with a
man armed with two deadly weapons. As Officer #113 initially began to approach the
man, her training officer spotting something she did not: the man was armed with two
knives. Officer #113 explained that her training officer immediately said, “He’s got a
knife! He’s got a knife! Get back!” Once she heard this command from her training
officer – and without actually seeing the deadly weapon herself – she “turned around and
went back to. . .the rear of the car.” When asked why she followed these orders from her
training officer without taking any time to confirm for herself that the suspect was in fact
armed, she stated: “I just trusted what he saw enough that I ran back.”
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This instance is different from others because of the fact that Officer #113 was
still in training and, as such, may have been more prone and open to taking directions
and/or commands from other officers because of this. She does, however, report that she
completely trusted what her field-training officer was relaying to her (i.e., that the suspect
was armed with knives) and quickly followed the commands he gave her to retreat from
the suspect and toward protective cover. Although this trainer-trainee dynamic was only
captured in a few cases in the overall sample, two of these cases included officers in
training who either followed the lead presented by their field-training officer or followed
the instructions/commands issued by their field-training officer, thus eliminating
independent decision-making during the entry phase.
A second example of this behavioral pattern was observed in the accounts of
multiple officers involved in Incident 105, who, as previously mentioned, were searching
for a man suspected of breaking into vehicles at a nearby construction site. Four officers
in the sample participated in this incident, all of whom were members of a street crimes
unit charged with investigating a string of car daytime break-ins near construction sites
around town. When one of the team members broadcasted that he believed he had spotted
the suspect, the other officers made their way to this location while their supervisor spoke
with them over the radio and issued commands to team members to apprehend the
suspect once he successfully entered the car. Officer #149 reported: “Our supervisor
[said] to go ahead and take him off once he pops the van open. So he pops the van open,
[another officer] calls it, [and] we start moving in.”
Officer #154, another member of the street crimes unit who was working this
incident, reported hearing the same command from their supervisor, saying: “Our
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supervisor was one of the vehicles kind of in the stack. And he’s like, ‘If he does that
again or he stops, we’re just gonna take him right there.’” A third officer, Officer #190,
also shared a similar version of this command, stating:
Another officer called out a vehicle and a subject that was acting kind of
suspiciously, walking around and trying door handles on vehicles. Ran the tag of
the vehicle that he was driving. Car came back stolen. We began to follow it. It
pulled into a back alley, at which point the sergeant at the time said that if he pulls
over back here, we're gonna go ahead and take him.
While some of the minor details are inconsistent, the command issued by their
sergeant is clear: these officers were instructed to apprehend the man believed to be the
suspect if he engaged in a certain behavior (which varied in each officers’ account). In
this instance, these officers drove to the location where the suspect was reported (thus
initiating the entry phase) and attempted to apprehend the suspect based on a command
they had received from their supervisor. Therefore, the decision on each of their parts to
exit their vehicles and attempt to take the suspect into physical custody26 was guided, and
therefore influenced, by the directions issued to them by their sergeant.
In sum, the analysis of officers’ decision-making during the entry phase disclosed
a number of key findings relevant to police shootings involving multiple officers. First,
officers’ decision-making can be influenced by the mere presence of other officers. When
other officers are present, officers may engage in communication with one another for a
variety of different reasons. What transpires during this communication between officers
can then have bearing on their decision-making during the entry phase, which can impact
their behavior in subsequent phases of the encounter. In addition, the presence and
actions of other officers on scene can impact the decisions made by individual officers
26

All of these officers entered the information exchange phase at this point because they issued commands
(thus making verbal contact) to the suspect to exit his vehicle.
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through mimicking. That is, officers may choose to engage in certain behaviors or make
certain decisions because they witness other officers doing the same. Lastly, an individual
officer’s decision-making during this phase can be influenced by commands issued by
other officers. Although one may argue that officers are independent actors and as such
have the ability to disregard directions and/or commands from a fellow officer, this may
not always be the case (as observed in the examples noted above). To have a more
complete understanding of how officers make decisions during Binder and Scharf’s
second phase of high-risk encounters then, the aforementioned findings will need to be
recognized as potential social influences on officer’s decision-making during the entry
phase.

INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Binder and Scharf state that this third phase of the violent police-citizen encounter
begins when an officer initiates verbal or non-verbal contact with the suspect. When
reading through Binder and Scharf’s summation of the information exchange phase, it is
clear that they believe that dialogue between the officer and the suspect and the suspect’s
behavior/demeanor plays a crucial role in whether an officer will decide to use deadly
force during the final frame of the incident. Because this framework was primarily based
on their analysis of single-officer incidents, however, Binder and Scharf do not
acknowledge how the presence and actions of other officers on scene can impact the
decisions made by an individual officer. Actions taken by other officers involved in the
same incident can expand or restrict the options available to an individual officer.
Furthermore, an officer may make the choice to execute a specific action based on the
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actions of other officers. Lastly, having multiple officers involved in the same incident
places officers in a situation wherein they may need to essentially act based upon the
choices made by one another during certain points in the incident.
As mentioned in the fourth chapter, because Binder and Scharf were not explicit
about the police actions that constitute “non-verbal” contact with the suspect, I did not
attend to this matter in the present study. Therefore, officers were coded as entering this
phase only if they made verbal contact with the suspect in their respective incident. Using
these parameters, 36 officers in the sample entered the information exchange phase.
Patterns pertaining to officers’ decision-making in this phase were observed, but because
only 36 out of the 83 officers in the sample issued verbal commands during their incident,
the patterns that emerged were present among just a subset of officers interviewed.
Nevertheless, the findings from the analysis of these 36 interviews shed important light
on the dynamics present in officer-involved shootings.

OFFICERS’ DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DECISIONS MADE BY OTHER OFFICERS
Previous sections of this chapter demonstrated that the actions of other officers on
scene impacted the choices made by individual officers in the anticipation and entry
phase. The results of the analysis of decisions made by the 36 officers who entered the
information exchange phase indicate this pattern holds during the information exchange
phase of high-risk police-citizen encounters.
Safety continued to be a theme that was present among the officers interviewed
and not just their own safety. While many of the officers interviewed reported being
concerned about their own safety, six (6) officers who entered the information exchange
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phase described how decisions they made at this point were made to preserve the safety
of another officer. That is, they believed another officer on scene was in danger of being
seriously injured or killed and made decisions and took actions to prevent this from
occurring. Because Binder and Scharf limited their discussion of the role that safety
concerns play to safety of self, this finding identifies a weakness in their model and is
thus worthy of some detailed discussion.
One example of this concern for fellow officers’ safety comes from Officer
#149’s description of his participation in Incident 105, the case in which a street crimes
unit was attempting to catch an individual who had been breaking into vehicles near
construction sites. Once the officers received a report from a fellow officer that he had
spotted the suspect attempting to break into a car, Officer #149 and others converged on
this location in their undercover vehicles. When the suspect saw multiple vehicles
stopping where he was, Officer #149 believed the suspect “knew the jig was up.” The
suspect ran back to his vehicle, jumped in the driver’s seat, and attempted to flee. Officer
#149 explained that each officer had pulled up and parked their cars in such a way as to
block the suspect’s vehicle, thus preventing him from fleeing in his car.
While officers were exiting their vehicles and issuing commands to the suspect to
put his vehicle in park and slowly exit the car, Officer #149 noticed that another officer,
Officer #166, had exited her car and somehow managed to get behind the suspect’s
vehicle. This concerned Officer #149, as the suspect was still behind the wheel of his
vehicle and could very well pose a threat to Officer #166 if he successfully put his
vehicle in reverse. He explained:
I don’t know how this happened but [Officer #166] is on her hands and knees
behind his car. . .we’ve moved up to within maybe 10 feet or so of [the suspect’s]
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car and we’ve been telling him the whole time, “Stop! Put your hands up!”. . .that
kind of thing. And I look inside [to] sort of the cockpit area there and he’s trying
to go from reverse to drive, from drive to reverse. And I see him doing it and I
recognize that [Officer #166] is behind the car. Everything else he’d hit so far
he’d totally destroyed. I felt like if he hit her with that car that she would be either
crippled or killed.
In the example above, one can see how the actions of one officer can impact the
considerations and decisions made by another officer. In this case, Officer #166 took a
series of actions that placed her behind the vehicle of the suspect. At the same moment,
Officer #149 was issuing commands to the suspect to stop attempting to flee, park his
vehicle, and come out of the car with his hands up. He then looked into the suspect’s
vehicle and could see that the suspect was not intending to comply. Instead, the suspect
was continuing to try to move his car in order to escape. Officer #149 then had two pieces
of information that impacted his decision-making at this point: he had a suspect who was
non-compliant and attempting to flee in his vehicle and a fellow officer who had fallen
down behind the suspect’s vehicle and could be seriously injured or killed if the suspect
reversed. Officer #149 then made the decision to use deadly force, thus entering the final
frame, and fired shots at the suspect to prevent him from striking Officer #166 with his
car.
In this incident, Officer #149’s decision-making was impacted by his concern for
Officer #166’s safety. Had Officer #166 not ended up behind the suspect’s car, it is
possible that Officer #149 may have made a different series of decisions and taken
different actions. For example, he may have taken more time to continue issuing
commands to the suspect to exit the vehicle before deciding to shoot. In fact, had another
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officer’s life not been in danger, Officer #149 might well have determined that deadly
force was unnecessary and might never have shot.
Another example of how an officer’s concern for another officer’s safety
influenced his decision-making during the information exchange phase was observed in
Incident 118, in which two homicide detectives were searching for a man suspected of
committing a recent homicide. After they had decided to make contact with the man prior
to additional officers arriving, Officer #168 and his partner, Officer #217, drew their
weapons and began to make their way toward the suspect. Both officers issued verbal
commands to the suspect informing him who they were and that he was under arrest, but
the suspect did not comply. Officer #168 explained:
He’s looking directly at [my partner], but not doing anything, so I start yelling
out, “Police, freeze. Don’t move. Police.” He looks at my partner. . .and then
looks directly at me. He drops into a slight crouch, just gets a look of absolute
rage on his face, baring his teeth. I kind of describe it as a war cry, just starts
screaming. He throws his hands out directly in front of him and starts running.
At this point, the suspect charges at Officer #168 and the two become engaged in
a physical altercation. As Officer #168 stated:
I’m trying to strong-arm [the suspect] off because he gets me, he gets to me and
he’s reaching for the gun. . . and suddenly this picture started going off in my
mind that I’m going to lose the gun and he’s going to kill me, which for some
reason, didn’t bother me as much as the thought I had that he was going to
ambush. . .he was going to take my gun and ambush and kill my partner. This
overwhelming fear, this deadly fear that he was going to kill my partner.
Officer #168 had issued commands to the suspect, but rather than complying, the
suspect physically attacked him and attempted to take his service weapon. Rather than
fearing for himself – and letting fear for himself and concern for his personal safety drive
his decision-making – Officer #168 shared that he was more concerned for the safety of
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his partner. His greatest fear at the time was that the suspect would take his weapon away
and use it to kill Officer #217. This fear for the safety of his partner ultimately led Officer
#168 to the decision to shoot the suspect.
These two examples demonstrate how an individual officer’s decision-making can
be impacted by the presence and actions of other officers involved in the same incident.
In single-officer shootings, the officer may worry about his or her safety, as well as the
safety of citizens in the surrounding area. The findings from this analysis reveal that an
individual officer may be concerned for the safety of other officers on scene, and as such,
may make decisions in the information exchange phase with the goal of preserving or
enhancing the safety of a fellow law enforcement officer.
In addition to safety, another pattern that emerged from the officers’ experiences
in the information exchange phase was how the decisions made by other officers
influenced the decisions made by an individual officer. Binder and Scharf theorize that
decisions made by an officer can expand or constrict the options available to that officer
later in the encounter. Perhaps just as important, findings from this analysis suggest that
decisions made by other officers on scene have the ability to expand or constrict options
available to an individual officer.
Six (6) of the 36 officers who entered the information exchange phase fell into
this category. One of these officers was Officer #69 who participated in Incident 46,
wherein he and a fellow officer responded to a call of shots fired at a nearby community
center. Soon after seeing a deceased female on the ground (dead of an apparent shotgun
wound to the chest), the officers saw the suspect – a man walking inside the building
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carrying a shotgun. Both officers then issued verbal commands to the suspect. As Officer
#69 stated:
We had a verbal engagement [with the suspect] there for a very brief time. He
said, “Don’t come in!” We said, “Put the shotgun down,” those kind of things.
And then he turned and went through the second double doors into the facility. . .
So, we went in. . . Mike was ahead of me. I was trying to broadcast radio to radio
and we entered.
When reading through the entirety of Officer #69’s account, it is apparent that he
and Officer #104 operated as a team throughout the encounter, with Officer #104 taking
the lead position (i.e., serving as the first officer to enter the building) and Officer #69
following close behind. Because Officer #104 took what Officer #69 referred to as “the
point position,” Officer #69 was the secondary officer. He and Officer #104 never
conversed about who would broadcast the incident updates on the radio, but rather
Officer #69 took it upon himself to complete this task.
Later in his interview, Officer #69 was asked by the interviewer whether, once
they entered the community center, he had been essentially “playing off the lead” of
Officer #104 during the incident. Officer #69 agreed that he viewed Officer #104 as the
primary officer during the call, stating, “He was the point, yeah. I would use more of a
military term. He’s the point.” Although he does not explicitly state the reason why he
made the decision to take up the broadcasting duties during the information exchange
phase, it appears that this decision was influenced by his partner’s decision to take the
lead position during entry and Officer #69’s interpretation that he was the secondary
officer and thus in charge of broadcasting information to other officers via the radio.
A similar example was found in Officer #92’s account of his experience in
Incident 69. This was the previously mentioned incident in which two officers responded
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to a report of a man armed with a gun. Both officers eventually observed an individual
who matched the description of the armed man. Officer #92, who was driving the squad
car, pulled up near the man, put the spotlight in his direction, and issued commands to
him to stop so they could speak with him. The suspect then took off on foot down the
street and Officer #92’s partner gave chase. He explained:
[Officer #106] is in the passenger side and she, of course, knows we’re going
tactical, so she’s like out of the car before I even hit park, you know? And so she,
in my mind now, [Officer #106] and I worked together enough that. . .we were
pretty in sync as far as our tactics go. . .and so I know at this point she’s contact.
She’s running after the guy to make contact. I’m going to be cover. I’m her
bodyguard. And so I get the car in park, come around the front of the car, and then
I come up with my gun and chasing after the guy.
As Officer #92 explained, his perception of his job at this point is based on the
behavior of (and decision made by) his partner, Officer #106. His partner chose to
quickly jump out of the car and chase after the fleeing suspect on foot before Officer #92,
the driver of their vehicle, could park the car. Because his partner left the car first, Officer
#92 became the second officer in the pursuit by default, but his interpretation of this
position then dictates his decision to draw his weapon at this point of the encounter. He
stated above that because his partner is the contact officer (i.e., the officer who will make
physical contact with the suspect and apprehend him), he is “her cover” and he is “her
bodyguard.” He believed it was his job as the secondary officer to protect her, therefore
leading him to make the decision to draw his weapon as he exited the car and pursued the
fleeing suspect on foot.
Another officer in the sample whose decisions during this phase were impacted by
decisions made by a fellow officer on scene was Officer #118. He, along with another
officer (Officer #117), was involved in Incident 88, the incident in which officers were
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tasked with completing a welfare check at an apartment complex, only to be confronted
by an armed, non-compliant man. Upon seeing that the man was armed, Officer #118
explained that both officers drew their weapons at this time, as this was “just a normal
reaction” when dealing with an armed individual. Both officers began issuing commands
to the individual to drop his weapon, but the man refused, instead yelling at officers to get
out of his apartment. At this point, Officer #118 stated that the other officer used OC
spray against the suspect, but was unsure why his partner officer did this, saying: “I don’t
know what made him decide to do this. . .I don’t know. . .but he had taken his mace out
and he discharged it at this guy.”
According to Officer #118, as the suspect was attempting to wipe the spray from
his eyes (and still armed with the knife), Officer #117 moved closer to the suspect with
the intent to look at the suspect and assess how badly the spray had affected him and
whether they would be able to apprehend him. The suspect then began moving forward
toward Officer #117 and swinging his knife in the officer’s direction. Officer #118, who
had somehow ended up on the other side of the suspect, recognized that the armed man
now posed a deadly threat to the other officer and, because of the minimal amount of
space available for maneuvering in the small apartment, Officer #118 thought Officer
#117 was going to have to make a decision, explaining:
I took one step towards [the armed man] with the intention of grabbing him and it
only took one step and I realized that [Officer #117] wasn’t going to have a
choice - he was going to have to shoot him because he didn’t have the room and I
didn’t have the time to get to him before he got to [Officer #117]. So I
immediately, and everything started going through my head really quick, I go,
okay [Officer #117] is gonna shoot him and I’m down range of this bullet. I said,
this bullet [is] gonna go through [the suspect] and from that point I don’t know
where it’s gonna go because, I mean, if you’ve ever watched a bullet travel
through a body, it doesn’t go straight through.
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Because of his placement behind the suspect and in the line of Officer #117’s fire,
Officer #118 was concerned that if Officer #117 was going to fire his weapon at the
suspect – and he was very confident that he was – his partner’s bullet could pass through
the suspect’s body and potentially strike him. Officer #118 explained that his partner
officer was very close to the suspect (at “point blank range” in his words), so he felt there
was a strong possibility that the suspect’s body would not stop Officer #117’s bullet, thus
putting him in danger. To prepare for this possibility and working off of Officer #117’s
behavior, Officer #118 quickly moved positions, saying:
I immediately start thinking what do I do, so I just, I just went to the right side
wall and I just put myself face, in front of it, and I just held myself as close to that
wall as I could because, and I got there just about the time the first shot went off.
In this instance, Officer #118 was working off of a decision he believed his fellow
officer was about to make. These officers did not engage in communication with one
another during this point, leaving each officer to make a different set of decisions. This,
however, did not mean that their decision-making and subsequent behaviors were not
intertwined. Based on the totality of circumstances, Officer #118 was confident that
Officer #117 would make the decision to use deadly force and to fire shots at the armed
man. Because he was concerned that this decision could have dire consequences for him,
Officer #118 made the quick decision to move out of the officer’s line of fire and behind
a nearby wall to protect himself from ricocheting police gunfire. During his interview,
Officer #118 attributes much of what happened to Officer #117’s decision to use OC
spray against the suspect, stating:
I think the biggest mistake that happened that day, is probably one of your next
questions, biggest mistake that happened that day was [Officer #117] deploying
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the mace. . .that gave [the suspect] no other choice but to attack. If he had not
been. . .if the mace had not been deployed, I still think we could have talked this
guy down.
Officer #118 believed that if his partner officer had not made the choice to use
OC spray against the armed man, they could have diffused the situation and possibly
coaxed the man to drop the knife without having to use deadly force. Instead, Officer
#118 was forced to work off of the decision Officer #117 made, which dictated his
movement within the apartment, toward the suspect, and eventually away from the
suspect to avoid being struck by his partner’s rounds. In sum, Officer #118’s experience
in this incident highlights how an officer’s decisions can impact another officer’s
decisions and can limit the number of options available to all officers on scene.

SUMMARY
The incident-level analysis of the participating officers’ interviews yielded
important information as it pertains to Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making
framework. The results suggest that the mere presence of and/or decisions made by
officers have the potential to impact decisions made by other officers in the anticipation,
entry, and information exchange phases of the encounter. Furthermore, when such
instances occur in early phases of the incident, they can impact officers’ decision-making
and limit or increase the options available to them in subsequent phases.
First, officers can impact another officer’s decision to become involved in an
incident. If the request to respond to an incident is made by another officer whom the
individual officer admires or knows on a personal level, he or she may be more likely to
decide to become involved. In addition, an officer may not always have a choice
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regarding whether to become involved in an incident. Aside from being assigned to a call
by dispatchers, an officer may be directed to a specific incident by a superior. While it
can be argued that there is some independent decision-making on the part of the officer to
follow through with such orders, it is also logical to conclude that it is second nature for
an officer to follow directions from a superior without challenge.
Second, officers can impact the decisions made by other officers through the use
of communication. The results from the analysis revealed that officers in the sample
communicated with one another throughout the anticipation, entry, and information
exchange phases. Reasons for this communication included: providing other officers with
updated information about the situation and/or the suspect involved, confirming their
decisions with other officers, maintaining and/or preserving the safety of other officers,
and drafting plans regarding how to best handle the incident at hand. These findings show
that when other officers are present and involved in the same encounter, officers will
utilize one another as a source of information and confirmation for their decision-making.
Furthermore, these findings also highlight that officers can be just as concerned for the
safety of another officer as they can be for their personal safety. Just as Binder and Scharf
asserted that an officer’s concern for his or her safety can impact his or her decisionmaking, an officer’s concern for the safety of a fellow officer (or bystanders) can impact
his or her decision-making as well.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the results from the analysis demonstrated
that officers’ decision-making and behavior can inadvertently impact the decisions made
by other officers on scene. In the entry phase, for example, officers were found to be
mimicking the behaviors and decisions made by other officers involved in the same
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incident, thus following the lead of other officers on scene. Furthermore, it was
discovered that decisions and actions undertaken by an officer in the information
exchange phase can impact (i.e., limit) the options available to other officers involved in
the same incident. Both of these findings demonstrate that the decisions, behaviors, and
actions of officers involved in the same incident can influence and shape the decisions
made by other officers. Therefore, to provide scholars with a more comprehensive deadly
force decision-making framework through which to assess how officers make decisions
during an officer-involved shooting, Binder and Scharf’s framework should be amended
to accommodate the aforementioned findings from the multi-officer incident analysis.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION
This study was designed to contribute to what is known about police use of deadly
force by empirically assessing Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf’s more than three-decade
old deadly force decision-making framework. Scharf and Binder (1983) developed their
framework based on information developed through interviews of police officers who
shot citizens and other officers who held fire in situations in which they arguably could
have used deadly force. By analyzing a new sample of police officers across the United
States who had been involved in police shootings – both shooters and officers who held
fire - this study assessed the extent to which Binder and Scharf’s decision-making
framework accounts for how officers who make different choices about deadly force in
the same incident come to make these choices.
The data used in this analysis also lent itself to a new assessment of police officer
decision-making as it relates to the use of deadly force. Past studies designed to
understand how an officer makes the decision to shoot or hold fire focused on police
officers as individual actors and have primarily relied on data collected from incidents
involving only a single officer. Many violent police-citizen encounters, however, involve
multiple officers. Because previous work has largely viewed individual officers as
isolated from their colleagues, little is known regarding how the presence and actions of
other officers impact the decisions made by officers on scene related to officers’ use of
deadly force.
To assess the utility of the Binder and Scharf decision-making framework for
violent police-citizen encounters in which multiple officers were involved, the author
relied on qualitative data collected from interviews with 83 police officers from law
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enforcement agencies across the U.S. These 83 officers were selected from the larger
sample of 218 officers who were interviewed during a federally-funded study of officerinvolved shootings because they a) were present at incidents in which at least two officers
were present and b) at least one officer involved fired at least one shot and at least one
officer held fire. By limiting the subsample used in this analysis to officers meeting these
criteria, the author was able to answer the following questions: 1). Do the decisionmaking processes of officers who made different choices in the same incident follow the
deadly force decision-making framework proposed by Binder and Scharf? 2). Given the
same situation, do differences in how police officers move through the Binder and Scharf
decision-making process account for why some officers shoot and some hold fire? 3).
How does the presence of other officers affect the choices made by an individual officer
during a deadly force incident?
This final chapter summarizes what the study found relating to these three
questions and concludes the dissertation. After providing a brief review of key findings,
the chapter offers some recommendations for policy and future research.

THE BINDER AND SCHARF FRAMEWORK: NOT NEW, BUT IMPROVED
Binder and Scharf originally conceptualized their deadly force decision-making
model to provide a framework for understanding how police officers come to use deadly
force. They argue that officers’ decision-making in what they termed the “violent policecitizen encounter” can be classified into four different phases: the anticipation, the entry
and initial contact, the information exchange, and the final frame. They argue that all
officers who find themselves in such high-risk encounters make decisions in each of
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these phases, with the exception of the information exchange phase (which they note not
all officers enter into because at times, these types of incidents can unfold rather quickly,
preventing officers from having time to make contact with the suspect). Perhaps most
importantly, they make the argument that at a certain point in the encounter, an officer is
going to make the decision that deadly force is necessary and, if so, he or she will shoot,
or an officer is going to make the decision that deadly force is not necessary and, if so, he
or she will refrain from shooting. Once an officer reaches this point, he or she has entered
the final frame phase.
Each of Binder and Scharf’s phases capture logical time points during high-risk
incidents. For example, one would expect that when an officer is called to a scene, he or
she will take the time to collect information about the situation and/or suspect he or she
will be attending to prior to arriving at the location. It makes sense that, upon arrival, this
officer would observe the scene, update his or her understanding of the situation at hand,
and perhaps attempt to craft a plan to resolve the situation. This plan may require the
officer to issue verbal commands to the suspect (e.g., “Drop your weapon,” “Put your
hands up,” etc.). Finally, given the information the officer has paired with the suspect’s
level of compliance, he or she may make a decision regarding whether deadly force is
necessary and whether he or she should exercise this power.
Thus, it makes sense that many of the 83 officers in the sample entered each phase
and made at least one decision in each phase, just as Binder and Scharf asserted. For this
to be a comprehensive framework through which to assess officers’ deadly force
decision-making, however, it must encompass as many potential situational outcomes as
possible. More specifically, while Binder and Scharf acknowledge that not every officer
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involved in this type of incident will enter the information exchange phase, they do make
the assumption that all officers will enter the anticipation, entry, and final frame phases.27
The findings from this study indicate that this is not the case. To incorporate some of the
findings that emerged from this study but which are not recognized in Binder and
Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework, an updated version of the framework
including these new findings can be found below in Figure 3. A discussion of the new
framework follows:

Figure 3: Updated Binder and Scharf Deadly Force Decision-Making Framework (with
findings from this study incorporated)

Decision-making process can
begin here

Conscious decision to
shoot
Information
Exchange

Anticipation

Final Frame
Conscious decision to
hold fire

Entry &
Initial
Contact
No
Information
Exchange

No Final
Frame

Not a conscious
decision to shoot
No decision to shoot
or not shoot

The current sample of cases included instances in which officers were already on
the scene of the incident when the police-citizen contact in question was initiated (most
often by the officer himself or herself). In such cases, these officers began their decision-

27

It should be noted that Scharf and Binder (1982) did identify cases in which an officer does not make the
conscious decision to fire his or her weapon during an incident is an exception to entering the final frame
phase of the decision-making process.
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making process in the entry phase. Although this was the case only with a small number
of officers in the sample (n=5), these cases demonstrate that not all officers begin their
decision-making process in high-risk police-citizen encounters in the anticipation phase.
Therefore, the updated model above in Figure 3 accounts for instances in which officers
do begin their incident in the anticipation phase, but also cases in which officers are on
the location of the incident when they make the decision to initiate the encounter, thus
starting the police-citizen contact and decision-making process in the entry phase.
The current analysis also highlighted liabilities relating to the information
exchange phase. That is, not all officers issue verbal commands to suspects, thus forgoing
the information exchange phase. Thirty (30) officers in the sample did not issue verbal
commands because another officer involved in the incident had already initiated this type
of exchange with the suspect. This finding demonstrates that when multiple officers are
involved in a high-risk incident, not all officers will enter this phase, as it is often
unnecessary (and discouraged) for all officers on scene to issue verbal commands to the
citizen(s) involved.
Moreover, results from the study revealed that 16 officers did not make a decision
to fire or make a decision to hold fire, but rather never considered using deadly force in
their respective incidents. As making a decision is the premise for entering the final
frame phase, these findings suggest that not every officer in high-risk police-citizen
encounters enter the last of Binder and Scharf’s phases. Binder and Scharf do recognize
cases where an officer does not make a conscious decision to fire (i.e., their behavior is a
reaction to the behavior/movement of the suspect), but as it stands now, their framework
does not address cases in which an officer does not make a decision about the use of
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deadly force and holds fire. For example, there were instances in which officers in the
sample never considered whether to use deadly force because their attention was directed
elsewhere on scene (e.g., scene organization/management, attending to a wounded
officer). Therefore, this finding thus discloses another weakness in the Binder and Scharf
framework. The adjusted deadly force decision-making framework depicted in Figure 3
above accommodates for these various findings in the final frame phase by providing
additional outcomes. That is, an officer can enter the final frame phase and make a
conscious decision to fire or to hold fire, but he or she may also fail to enter the final
frame phase by making an unconscious decision to fire or by forgoing the consideration
of using deadly force altogether.
In addition to assessing whether officers in the sample entered and made decisions
in each of the four phases proposed by Binder and Scharf, this study also examined
whether officers who shot and officers who held fire made different decisions in early
phases and, if so, whether this accounts for their different actions relating to the use of
deadly force. Scharf and Binder (1983) hypothesized that the reason why some officers
choose to shoot and others choose to hold fire when confronted with similar situations is
due to significant differences in their decision-making throughout the encounter. That is,
decisions made by an officer who ultimately chose to fire in the final frame must be
markedly different from decisions made by an officer who ultimately chose to hold fire,
thus explaining the difference in outcomes between the two cases.
The results from this study, however, suggest that officers, regardless of their
decision during the final frame of the incident, make similar decisions and consider
similar factors throughout the anticipation, entry, and information exchange phases of
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encounters. Both shooters and witness officers used time during the anticipation phase to
collect information about the situation and/or the suspect they would be facing prior to
arriving on scene. Binder and Scharf identified a number of factors they believed impact
officers’ decision-making during this initial phase, such as mode of information and
believed accuracy of information. Both shooters and witness officers in the sample
explained how the source of the information (e.g., dispatcher, citizen, fellow officer)
played into their decision-making and, at times, explained how from whom they received
information corresponded to how accurate they perceived the information to be.
During the entry phase, and upon arrival at the scene of the incident, both shooters
and witness officers in the sample continued to collect information about the situation
and/or the suspect. A factor Binder and Scharf asserted to be particularly relevant to
officers’ decision-making in this phase was their personal safety. Both shooters and
witness officers shared that their personal safety led them to make certain decisions at
this point that minimized their likelihood of being seriously injured or killed by the
suspect (e.g., crafting and utilizing safe, tactical approaches when moving toward the
scene or suspect, drawing their firearm, etc.).
When officers entered the information exchange phase by making verbal contact
with suspects, shooters and witness officers continued to engage in similar behaviors and
make similar decisions. Both shooters and witness officers in the sample issued verbal
commands to the suspect in their incidents and made similar interpretations of their
suspect’s physical demeanor and verbal communications; both too described how this
influenced their view of the situation and their consideration of possible outcomes.
Interestingly, both shooters and witness officers considered possible situational scenarios
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in which they would choose to shoot if such conditions arose. This demonstrates that
some witness officers considered the possibility of shooting, but ultimately chose not to
fire shots.
In sum, these results suggest that contrary to what Binder and Scharf
hypothesized, officers who shoot and officers who hold fire make very similar decisions
and consider many of the same factors when making decisions in the first three phases of
the encounter. If the difference in officers’ decision to use deadly force is not explained
by a significant difference in their early decision-making, there must be other
mechanisms at work. The findings from this study identify situational conditions and the
presence and decisions made by other officers involved in the incident as potential
explanations for the difference in decision-making in the final frame phase.

THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS
If a significant difference in officers’ decision-making early in the encounter does
not account for why some officers shoot and others hold fire, what does explain this
difference? The results from this analysis suggest that the involvement of multiple
officers in a single incident can have a strong impact on individual officers’ decisionmaking, primarily when it comes to the decision to use deadly force. The presence of
multiple officers may also explain why not every officer in the same incident had to make
a decision regarding whether to use deadly force. Although Binder and Scharf were
unable to consider the impact of other officers on officers’ decision-making in their
original model, the results from this analysis demonstrate that other officers can influence
officers’ decision-making and actions during a high-risk police-citizen encounter that

210

involves multiple officers. To outline how these findings can be incorporated into the
Binder and Scharf framework, Figure 4 below depicts both the factors said to impact
officers’ decision-making in each of the four phases as identified in Binder and Scharf’s
original framework, as well as the new factors identified in this analysis. The discussion
that follows will describe the additions to the framework as they pertain to each of the
four phases:
Figure 4: Updated Binder and Scharf Deadly Force Decision-Making Framework
(incorporating additional social influences from this study)
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•
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•
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•
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•
Influence of
perceived or assigned
role
•

In the anticipation phase, results from this dissertation disclose that other officers
can influence an individual officer’s decision to become involved in the incident in the
first place. If an officer is requested to assist on a call by an officer he or she has a
personal relationship with, that officer may be more likely to choose to respond to the
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incident. Furthermore, an officer may be directed to respond to a specific incident by a
superior, leaving that officer relatively little choice in whether he or she attends to the
call. As such, “mode of involvement” should be included as a possible factor influencing
officers’ decision-making during the anticipation phase of the high-risk police-citizen
encounter.
Once officers arrived on scene and began the entry phase, they continued to
utilize communication with one another to formulate plans, preserve their personal safety
and the safety of other officers, and confirm their assessment of the situation and options
to resolve it with other officers. These findings are important contributions to Binder and
Scharf’s framework, as the factors they identified as determining officers’ behavior were
rooted in a focus on officers as independent actors. For example, while Binder and Scharf
argue that safety is a concern for an officer during the entry phase and explain how this
concern may impact his or her decision-making at this point during the incident, they do
not pay mind to how an officer’s concern for the safety of other officers can affect their
decision-making. The results of this study suggest that officers are just as concerned for
the safety of their fellow officers as they are for their own safety.
Another interesting finding that arose from the current analysis was that officers’
decisions and behaviors can be mimicked by other officers involved in the same incident
and this behavior was observed in the entry, information exchange, and final frame
phases of the encounters analyzed. For example, if one or multiple officers are
approaching a scene in a certain way, other officers involved may mirror this same
behavior. If one or more officers decide to address a situation in a certain manner, other
officers – regardless of whether they agree – may be more likely to follow this behavior
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because others are engaging in it. This suggests that other officers have the ability to
influence the decisions and behaviors of other officers involved in the same incident
perhaps without even knowing they are doing so.28
Furthermore, the presence and actions of officers involved in the same incident
can directly impact the decisions and behaviors made by other officers during the final
frame phase. This study disclosed that some officers made the decision to hold fire
because another officer on scene had already fired shots and eliminated the threat posed
by the suspect. In some cases, officers chose to hold fire because another officer was in
his or her line of fire. Others reported that they never considered shooting because they
were attending to other on-scene matters (e.g., scene management/organization, tending
to an injured officer), but were arguably able to do so because other officers were there to
address the threat posed by the suspect. As such, the presence of or actions by other
officers can have a strong influence on how officers behave during high-risk encounters
and should be recognized as factors that can influence officers’ decision-making during
the entry, information exchange, and final frame phases.
Lastly, results from the analysis suggest that an officers’ perception of his or her
role or an officers’ assigned role during an incident can influence their decisions and
actions throughout a high-risk police-citizen encounter involving multiple officers. In a
few cases observed in the study, the presence of additional officers allowed for officers
(e.g., shift supervisors, sergeants, and lieutenants) to focus their attention on other aspects
of the event, such as scene organization and management, therefore eliminating their
need to make a decision regarding the use of deadly force. In addition, an officer’s
28

More specifically, results from this study disclosed that officers who held a ranked position, had
received some type of specialized training (e.g., SWAT training), and/or had more years on the job, were
the officers whose behavior others were likely to mirror.
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assignment during a high-risk police-citizen encounter may influence his or her actions
throughout the encounter. The presence of multiple officers allows leaders to designate
specific tasks to each officer with the goal of bringing the incident to a close and, as such,
the use of deadly force by an individual officer may be more or less likely depending on
that officer’s assignment (e.g., lethal coverage, TASER deployment, crisis negotiator,
etc.). Based on the results of the analysis then, “perceived or assigned roles” should be
noted as factors influencing officers’ decision-making during the entry, information
exchange, and final frame phases.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Police officers are provided with the authority to make decisions that can result in
the death of another human being, yet we still know relatively little about how officers
come to the decision to pull the trigger or hold fire. Using Binder and Scharf’s deadly
force decision-making framework to guide the analysis, the overall goal of this study was
to produce findings that could, in some way, contribute to what is known about decisionmaking among officers involved in police shootings. The results from the analysis
revealed new findings relative to Binder and Scharf’s framework and what is known
about officers’ decision-making in encounters that involved multiple officers and which
concluded in police gunfire. It is the hope of the author that these findings can inform
understanding of deadly force decision-making and can be used to influence police
officer training and future data collection efforts regarding police use of deadly force.
One of the major findings from this study is that an officer’s decision-making
process can be influenced (advertently or inadvertently) by other officers involved in the
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same incident. Decisions made by officers on scene may expand or limit the options
available to other officers or may cause officers to make decisions they would not have
otherwise not made had they been the only officer involved in the incident. In addition,
the presence of multiple officers can allow individual officers to adopt social roles during
an incident that they arguably could not have otherwise held if they were the only officer
present at the scene. The fifth chapter of the dissertation highlighted how some officers in
the sample were able to attend to other issues during the incident (e.g., scene
management/organization, tending to an injured officer) because they knew they had
other officers present on scene who could attend to the suspect. These represent instances
that are specific to multi-officer shootings, and because multi-officer shootings are a
possibility, these findings should be represented in police training.
These findings can be incorporated into law enforcement training in a number of
different ways. First, all officers should be reminded that officer-involved shootings may
involve more than one officer. Because of this, officers should be cognizant of the fact
that their behaviors and decisions during high-risk incidents can impact other officers
who are involved. Instead of viewing this as an individual decision-making process that
concludes in a single officer making a decision to fire or hold fire, officers should be
trained to consider how their independent decision-making process could impact and
influence other officers’ decision-making processes as well.
It is possible that the belief that a potentially violent police-citizen contact will
only involve a single officer is unintentionally perpetuated in department training. If
officers are completing simulation and scenario-based training as individuals, this may
inadvertently encourage officers to assume that should they find themselves in a high-risk
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encounter, they will be the only officer involved. As this is not the case, police
departments should use scenario-based training with multiple officers to expose them to
the possibility that high-risk incidents can involve more than one law enforcement
official. By requiring multiple officers to run through deadly force scenarios together,
officers can learn how their decisions impact the decisions made by and options available
to others and vice versa. This type of training exercise would give officers first-hand
experience with group communication and decision-making, which is a skill that may
benefit them should they find themselves in this type of incident with other officers.
Another way in which police departments can benefit from the findings of this
study relates to how they conduct post-shooting interviews with officers involved in
incidents wherein shots are fired by the police. It is common procedure across police
departments to interview officers shortly after a police-citizen encounter in which they
fired shots to collect facts about the incident from both officers who discharged their
weapons and witness officers. This allows investigative officials from the police
department to gather information about the incident from the officer’s point of view to
determine whether a reasonable officer would have made similar decisions given the
circumstances. Investigators do not, however, typically collect detailed information about
each decision made by the officer throughout the incident, nor do they probe the officer
about why he or she made the decisions they made during their deadly force encounter.
The level of change in post-shooting interview procedure would vary from
department to department (depending on how they conduct this process), but such change
can be accomplished and should be encouraged. To guide this proposed change in
interview protocol, police departments could use the Binder and Scharf four-phase
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framework to guide the questions they ask participating officers regarding the decisions
they made throughout the incident in question. Appendix C presents some ideas about the
topics to be covered by the interviewer. It should be noted that post-shooting
investigators may already cover many of the topics covered in the proposed line of
questioning. The purpose of the proposed interview guide, however, is to provide a
template that serves as a starting point to obtaining more information about officers’
decision-making during high-risk police-citizen encounters.
These alterations in the post-shooting interviews of police officers could provide
police departments with information pertinent to understanding officers’ decision-making
during violent police-citizen encounters. This additional information could most certainly
be used by police departments when crafting training opportunities for their officers.
And, should departments be so inclined to share these data with scholars, this information
could be collectively analyzed with the purpose of enhancing our understanding of the
decision-making processes completed by officers in this type of rare incident.
In conclusion, to adequately inform deadly force training and policy, police
officials and scholars need to have a more comprehensive understanding of how an
officer makes the choice to discharge his or her weapon, makes the choice to hold fire, or
makes no choice regarding the use of deadly force at all. The results from this study
provided insight into police shootings that involved multiple officers in which
participating officers made different decisions relating to their use of deadly force, but
additional data and work are needed to continue to expand our knowledge and
understanding of this type of rare, but life-threatening, police-citizen encounter. As
scholars and police continue to pursue this avenue of research, we can work together to
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ensure that law enforcement officials are equipped with sufficient decision-making skills,
are cognizant of how their decisions can impact the decisions made by others, and how
the decisions they make throughout critical incidents, such as high-risk police-citizen
encounters, relate to the outcome of the incident. Understanding officers’ decisionmaking processes can lead to training improvements, better prepared officers, and safer
situational outcomes for law enforcement officials and citizens alike.
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